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SUMMARY
Technological innovation in complex enterprise systems requires coordinated
interplay between a heterogeneous set of industrial players. The complexity in how
firms form relationships with each other perplexes the decision-making processes for
individual players when they explore the technological search space in order to achieve
breakthrough innovation. Building upon the existing literature on business ecosys-
tem, interfirm alliance, new product development, and technology management, we
explore the interplay between technological innovation and interfirm relationship as
well as the alliance formation patterns in the business ecosystem context. We start
with providing a macroscopic perspective on the information and communication tech-
nology ecosystem, followed by in-depth empirical investigations in the mobile handset
industry. We employ network visualization, sequence clustering, and organizational
simulation methodologies for the macroscopic analysis. Our microscopic analysis
borrows methodologies from econometrics including regression analysis, difference-
in-differences estimation, and event study. Our results propose an effective way to
visualize the whole industrial ecosystem and show how the enterprise system has
transformed over time. The results of the microscopic analyses show how interfirm
relationship shapes technological innovation and how technological innovation is ma-
terialized in firm value. Lastly, we present an integrated computational framework to
infer alliance formation strategy. We contribute to the literature by providing gener-
ative methods and empirical evidences that accommodate a more complete view of
the innovation process in the business ecosystem setting. The dissertation concludes
by suggesting directions for future research and highlighting implications for research





The tool that people used in an era has defined the era from the stone age to the
information age. Human history has evolved with the technological advancements
of the tools. A sufficiently disruptive advancement opens up a new era, while a
plethora of incremental improvements accumulated within an era enables transfor-
mation (Christensen, 2013). Tools, instantiated in the form of products and services
around us, represent the outcome of the underlying innovation processes and comprise
the collective wealth of humanity (Beinhocker, 2006). Sitting atop this accumulated
wealth, we are literally observing the era of technological innovation. Media high-
lights new products and services every day and people crave them at a rapid pace.
Every product and service around us—automobile, aircraft, phone, computer, and
even web service—is getting better and better in a more nuanced way. Understand-
ing the underlying process of innovation has attracted a great deal of attention and
effort from the research community since Schumpeter (1942) formulated the concept
of “creative destruction” as a general innovation process.
Among many theoretical attempts, Henderson and Clark (1990) provide a renowned
conceptual framework with which we understand the process of innovation today. Be-
fore this study, technological innovation was viewed in dichotomies: incremental and
radical innovation. The authors break down the lens to view the innovation outcomes
into two dimensions. One dimension is whether the core component has changed and
the other dimension is whether the linkages among components have changed. Based
1
on this framework, they introduce two new concepts of innovation. Modular inno-
vation refers to innovation that replaces the core component in the product or the
service, while architectural innovation refers to innovation that rewires existing com-
ponents in a different way. This framework is particularly useful as the architecture
of a single product or a single service becomes increasingly complex. Automobiles or
aircrafts are good examples of complex products. By complex we mean that com-
ponents of a product or a service are interdependent to deliver the desired value.
Because of this interdependency, the way components are connected to each other
is as important as individual performance of a component to achieve innovative out-
comes. Although their intention is not to divide every innovation into four categories,
their framework achieves their intent by highlighting the importance of configuration
among components for innovation. This innovation framework is general enough to
explain possible innovation directions for a simple object like a light bulb as well as
a complex object like a modern automobile.
Today, we are facing at least two driving forces that call for updating our current
conceptualization of the innovation process. The first transformative force is that not
only product/service components are interdependent but also companies themselves
are interdependent horizontally. Traditionally, interdependence between components
can be viewed as hierarchical supply chain structure (Luo et al., 2012). For instance,
an automobile consists of a myriad of components and parts such as engine, tire,
frame, and electronic control unit. The automobile manufacturer is responsible to
ensure components work in a coordinated manner to achieve desired performance.
However, today’s value creation process often involves horizontal cooperation be-
tween independent companies. For instance, Google or Facebook does not provide all
possible services themselves. Rather, they create value for end users by allowing third-
party entities to create and deliver services through their service (Basole and Rouse,
2008). This open structure of innovation exists not only for service companies but
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even for brick-and-mortar companies, which is conceptualized as “open innovation”
in Chesbrough (2003). Even in supply chain management, the structure to manage is
shifting from a linear sequence to a network (Bellamy et al., 2014; Basole and Bellamy,
2014). While the recent business ecosystem literature attempts to provide a holistic
perspective on the interconnectedness and interdependence among firms taking dif-
ferent roles (Iansiti and Richards, 2006; Moore, 1996), the technological innovation
literature has not incorporated this necessary new perspective.
The second driving force is the wide availability of digital platforms. The im-
portance of seizing hegemony in digital platforms has been recognized dating back
to when Microsoft became a de facto monopoly for operating system in the personal
computer industry by the mid-’90s. Since then, a number of theoretical and empirical
studies investigate the nature of platform-based competition in multi-sided markets
(Rochet and Tirole, 2003, 2006; Armstrong, 2006; Wilbur, 2008; Weyl, 2010). One
of the key findings from the development of this literature was to recognize the im-
portance of managing network effect (Uzzi, 1996). We witness abundant examples of
successful platform-based businesses from flourishing web services and the ecosystem.
In spite of the paramount importance of platforms across the board, the technological
innovation literature has not consolidated the roles and effects of digital platforms.
Platforms are important in its own right, but they can potentially enable and disable
certain trajectories of technological evolution in products and services.
This dissertation addresses this call to update the innovation framework in the
business ecosystem context and consider the presence of digital platforms. Our re-
search context focuses on the ICT ecosystem, where hardware equipment manufac-
turers, hardware component manufacturers, telecommunications service providers,
software developers, and media companies coexist and depend on each other to cre-
ate and deliver value to end users. In the ICT ecosystem, innovative products and
services are outcomes of the underlying new product development process shaped by
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strategic cooperation and competition. Unless a product of interest is simple nuts and
bolts, a firm inevitably faces strategic choice between cooperation and competition.
Each firm’s choice affects another’s, so the industrial ecosystem is interconnected via
various feedback loops. A complex product or service is likely an output of orches-
tration among firms with specialization in different areas of expertise. In addition
to cooperation, firms of each type compete with each other. The competition drives
firms to keep working on offering more innovative product at a competitive cost than
their competitors.
To perform in-depth analysis on product innovation, we zoom into the mobile
handset industry from the broader ICT ecosystem. A mobile handset is an output
from the collaboration of at least three types of players: hardware manufacturer,
service provider, and software developer. These players co-create the value delivered
through mobile handsets. At the same time, firms within each type compete against
each other. Samsung competes with HTC in the manufacturer realm, AT&T with
Verizon in the network carrier arena, and Apple with Google in the digital platform
area. Since manufacturers have to deal with their suppliers and software platforms
source contents from content providers, this triadic structure is embedded in the
broader ecosystem context. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship among the triad in
the ICT ecosystem. Based on these two macroscopic and microscopic contexts, we
describe the evolution of the ICT ecosystem, advance the technological innovation
theory incorporating digital platforms, and investigate the interaction between inter-
firm relationship and product innovation.
The three parties in the middle row play the central role in the ecosystem. Man-
ufacturers assemble a final product using its supply chain network to procure parts.
Network carriers in this context are service providers that transform a phone from a
plastic box to something useful. Lastly, platform developers are software companies











































Figure 1: Schematic Illustration of the Mobile Handset Industry Embedded in the
ICT Ecosystem
both roles of manufacturer and platform developer. Apple epitomizes such a case.
These days, the platform developers have grown a network similar to the supply
chain network of manufacturers: application developer network. While the vertical
relationship can be characterized as one party purchasing goods and/or service from
the other, the relationship among the central players is not. These central firms do not
have monetary relationship but strategic relationship. Manufacturers need to conform
the platform developers’ hardware requirements. Platform developers offer software
functionalities that could potentially harm the profitability of the service providers’
value propositions. Manufacturers cannot sell any products without a contract with
carriers. These mutual necessities engender interesting strategic relationships and
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interactions among them. In a broader context, the ICT ecosystem contains com-
panies from two additional segments: hardware component manufacturer and media
companies.
1.2 Prior Work
Although each subsequent chapter contains focused literature review specific to the
context of the study presented in the chapter, it is appropriate to review prior work in
line with the motivation up front so as to provide a broad background and perspective
for the whole dissertation. We first briefly review prior work in the research domains
that we draw on and then review notable methodologies employed in this dissertation
aside from the standard empirical methods.
1.2.1 Research Domains
This dissertation draws on the extant literature in five distinct but related research
domains: enterprise transformation, interfirm alliances, new product development,
platform strategy, and firm value of innovation.
Enterprise transformation proposed by Rouse (2005) argues that concerted changes
in multiple layers of organizations must occur in order for a complex enterprise to
be transformed in a desired direction. Enterprise transformation touches the issues
such as how to design an organization (Hannan and Freeman, 1984) and what kind
of leadership is necessary (Tichy and Devanna, 1986). Rouse (2005) proposes three
dimensions to look after during transformation: means, ends, and scope. In other
words, the manager in charge of enterprise transformation should keep in mind where
to go, how to go, and which part of the organization to change. This task, however, is
easier said than done. Basole et al. (2013b) lists the challenges and opportunities for
enterprise transformation research. One of the challenges is that environment that
an enterprise faces is dynamic, so having a successful enterprise transformation is
like hitting the bull’s eye on moving targets. Chapter 2 provides a visual description
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of the transformation path that the ICT ecosystem took over the past two decades,
which helps managers better assess the as-is state and envision the to-be state of the
enterprise. Chapter 6 aims to develop a more active measure to manage complex-
ity in enterprise transformation by leveraging data-driven clustering and simulation
methods.
What makes enterprise transformation research complex is that the interdepen-
dence among constituents of the business ecosystem. Because of the interdependence,
one company’s action brings about consequences, not only to itself, but to its rivals
and collaborators (Oxley et al., 2009). Companies today hardly create value alone
(Basole and Karla, 2012; Dhanarag and Parkhe, 2006). Rather, they form various
types of formal and informal relationship with each other to achieve shared goals.
Interfirm alliance represents a formal collaboration aspect between two or more com-
panies. Depending on the shared goals, interfirm alliances can be categorized as
exploratory such as R&D collaborations or exploitive such as licensing agreements
(March, 1991; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). Research using the interfirm alliances
data sheds light on understanding the issues of enterprise transformation. For exam-
ple, Basole (2009) uses visualization of interfirm alliances to show enterprise trans-
formation in the application developer network. The visual description of the ICT
ecosystem transformation portrayed in Chapter 2 is also based on the interfirm al-
liances data. Chapter 6 additionally consider mergers and acquisitions (M&A) as a
formal relationship between firms.
Developing a new product is one of the reasons why companies join forces in a
formal collaboration (Kalaignanam et al., 2007). The NPD literature is of particular
importance for this dissertation. The practice of NPD has been studied in multi-
ple layers of abstraction. At the firm level, for instance, how to develop an optimal
resource allocation scheme for NPD and how to select the right NPD projects over
multiple screening stages are the main issues for managing the NPD process within
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a firm (Chao and Kavadias, 2008; Chao et al., 2009, 2014). At the product level,
on the other hand, a firm engaging in NPD is often conceptualized as an agent in
a high-dimensional space searching for an improved configuration of product/service
components (Kauffman and Weinberger, 1989; Kauffman et al., 2000; Rivkin and
Siggelkow, 2007; Billinger et al., 2014). The search space theory assumes that there
is a hypothetical space of potential idea on product/service configuration and agents
are looking for a better solution under feasible cost within the space. Agents cannot
always move freely in the space because of the endogenous trade-offs between differ-
ent technological aspects (Frenken and Nuvolari, 2004; Murmann and Frenken, 2006).
Chapter 3 proposes a revised search space model constrained by external digital plat-
forms. We model that companies explore the constrained search space by means
of managing product family (Kekre and Srinivasan, 1990; Fisher and Ittner, 1999).
Chapter 4 investigates how NPD is influenced by the choice of alliance partners.
Considering that platform choice constrains the search process for better prod-
ucts, choosing the right platform is important for manufacturers. Platform choice
necessarily opens up a discussion on the two-sided market (Rochet and Tirole, 2003,
2006; Armstrong, 2006) because the platform in its classical meaning is to connect
agents divided in two or more sides. For example, newspaper connects advertisers
and readers and E-bay matches buyers and sellers. In the context of this dissertation,
platform connects application developers and end users. There are many theoretical
(Weyl, 2010) and empirical (Rysman, 2004) work on platform competition and strat-
egy. While the importance of the platform is widely agreed, most studies focus on
the implications for the companies that aim to build a successful platform. Our con-
tribution to this literature lies in theorizing the role of platforms in the NPD process
for manufacturers in Chapter 3.
It is almost axiomatic that developing an innovative product or service enhances
the value of the company. The standard way to make a causal inference on whether
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certain events have an impact on the firm value reflected on stock market perfor-
mance is event study methodology (Fama et al., 1969; MacKinlay, 1997). Using
event study, several empirical studies indeed confirm that new product development
and innovation have positive implications for firm value (Bayus et al., 2003; Fosfuri
and Giarratana, 2008; Girotra et al., 2007; Sood and Tellis, 2009). While most stud-
ies use patenting activities as a proxy for innovation, there are a few studies that
relate product-level technical specifications with firm value (Koski and Kretschmer,
2010). Using a multi-country event study model following Park (2004), Chapter 5
differentiates from and contributes to this literature by using an advanced measure
for product innovativeness developed in Chapter 3 as a proxy of the product-level
innovation.
1.2.2 Methods
In addition to standard regression analysis techniques such as ordinary least squares
(OLS), logistic, and Poisson models, we employ five other methods that warrant some
further explanation at least briefly up-front. We review key literature for each method
we rely on in the main chapters.
The first method is network visualization. Growing significantly, this method has
recently drawn much attention from research community studying complex network.
Since Tufte and Graves-Morris (1983) lays out the theoretical foundation of the field,
network visualization became an established method to show structural properties
of a network. Venkatraman and Lee (2004), for example, uses network visualization
to show how the game developer’s choice of platform differs depending on platform’s
dominance and newness. Basole and Karla (2011) use a visualization approach to
study structural changes in the mobile platform ecosystem. Basole et al. (2013a)
proposes a way to combine visualization with analytics in the interfirm alliances
context. Tools have advanced as well. About a decade ago, one of the most commonly
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used graph visualizing tools was Pajek (Batagelj and Mrvar, 1998). Pajek provides
a simple yet powerful ways to interact with graph data and create a figure out of
it. However, the size of graphs that research community is interested in has grown
significantly and Pajek is not efficiently visualizing a large graph. Bastian et al. (2009)
developed a new network visualization framework called Gephi. It aims to handle
and visualize even a large graph effectively. Moreover, it allows users to download
third-party plug-ins and layout algorithms for network visualization. Recent studies
in various fields including data mining (Park and Lee, 2014) and public policy have
used this new tool to communicate a large and complex network efficiently. Chapter 2
relies heavily on the network visualization methods to portray longitudinal enterprise
transformation in the ICT ecosystem.
The second method is the difference-in-differences (DID) estimator. Suppose that
we have two groups of observations: treated group and control group. In order to
measure the average treatment effect, we are to compare these two groups. If our
setting is a controlled experiment where other characteristics of the sample are drawn
randomly, we just need to run statistical tests such as t-test that compare two groups
of samples. However, as in many observational datasets, unobserved characteristics
may be correlated with the treatment itself also as known as the selection bias. The
DID method is intended to address the selection bias by not computing the post-
treatment difference between the groups but comparing the differences between the
groups across pre- and post-treatment periods. For instance, one of the first studies
that used this method is Card and Krueger (1994). They exploited the event of
minimum wage increase in New Jersey in 1992 to investigate whether the increase
in the minimum wage leads to decrease in employment. They used Pennsylvania
as a control group and found that minimum wage increase actually led to increase
employment. In spite of some criticism that the power of this method is overrated
(Bertrand et al., 2004), it is one of the most popular research methods in empirical
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studies (Abadie, 2005; Forman et al., 2008; Goldfarb and Tucker, 2011; Jung and Lee,
2014). Chapter 4 adopts this method to compare technical specifications of mobile
handsets available on different network carriers before and after the iPhone.
The third method is an event study using stock market performance. Since Fama
et al. (1969) proposed the standard event study method, it has been widely used
by economics and management research (Binder, 1998). Although admitting the
limitation that it is only possible for publicly traded firms, its strength is the ability
to translate qualitative aspects of certain events into financial benefit or penalty
to a firm. As non-U.S. firms have grown significantly, Park (2004) and Campbell
et al. (2010) develop an extended version of event study that accommodates multi-
country settings. Event study has been used for evaluating not only the financial
implications of interfirm alliances (Oxley et al., 2009), but also the firm value impact
of new product announcements (Hendricks and Singhal, 1997; Bayus et al., 2003).
Kalaignanam et al. (2007) considers asymmetric product launching partnership using
the event study. Their notion of asymmetry is mainly the size of allying firms—large
or small. Chapter 5 focuses on different roles that companies take in an effort to
create a new product. We look for potential asymmetric firm value implications for
the different roles when a new product is launched. We also relate such abnormal
returns with the technological superiority of the new products using a sophisticated
measure of product innovativeness.
The fourth method is sequence clustering that estimates transition structure from
sequences of events. The main objective of cluster analysis in general is to classify ob-
servations into a set of bins, so that researchers can generalize the observations. What
a clustering algorithm does in essence is to maximize homogeneity within clusters and
heterogeneity across clusters. Then, observations within the same cluster are similar
to each other and those in different clusters are dissimilar as a result. Traditional
clustering methods fall into two categories, agglomerative and divisive, depending on
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whether they search for clustering using bottom-up or top-down approach. A bottom-
up approach starts with the same number of clusters to the number of observations.
Each observation belongs to its own cluster at the beginning. Then, the algorithm
starts merging clusters from those that are the most similar. Agglomerative hierar-
chical clustering is a representative example of this kind and k-means clustering can
be viewed as this type (Rokach and Maimon, 2005). On the contrary, a top-down
approach starts with a single clustering containing all observations and tries to find
a cut that maximizes the difference between the two groups. Modularity clustering
(Newman, 2006) and dependence clustering (Park and Lee, 2014) are examples of
this type. In addition to these traditional clustering methods, nonparametric cluster-
ing methods have emerged recently for tasks such as clustering curves (Serban and
Wasserman, 2005; Serban, 2008) or sequence of events (Hilton et al., 2015). The first
half of Chapter 6 adopt Hilton et al. (2015) to identify clusters of firm behavior in
forming alliances and M&A relationships with other firms.
Lastly, organizational simulation is the fifth method. Rouse and Boff (2005) pro-
vides a conceptual framework that covers from behavior modeling of individuals and
groups to drawing insights and conclusions from the models. Simulation is espe-
cially useful when a random experiment is hardly feasible, researchers are interested
in how structural property affects organizational outcome, or the problem does not
yield a closed-form or analytical solution. As a classic example, March (1991) used
artificial coding to show different types of organizational learning: exploration and
exploitation. Arthur (1994) demonstrated emergent pattern of collective behavior
using the El Farol problem as an example. Bodner and Rouse (2007) studied R&D
process using organizational simulation and Park et al. (2012) studies healthcare de-
livery system using the multi-level organizational simulation to create a policy flight
simulator. Organizational simulation could model things from individual behavior
responding to incentives (Baumann and Stieglitz, 2014) to firm behavior as an agent
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searching for a better solution given the situation it is in. Harrison et al. (2007)
surveyed papers that used simulation method in the management and organization
literature. They argue the management and organization literature should embrace
organizational simulation as an acceptable method more proactively. As a result, a
growing number of research is now using organizational simulation to study individ-
ual firm’s behavior in a competitive environment. The latter half of Chapter 6 uses
organizational simulation informed by the clustering results to assess the impact of
organizational learning on overall ecosystem network structure.
1.3 Research Objectives
In this section, we present the main research questions for Chapters 2 through 6 and
aim to provide a consistent storyline that flows through the research theme of the
dissertation as a whole.
The dissertation begins with Chapter 2 that tackles the problem of providing an
effective bird-eyed view for the entire ecosystem of interest. Among many types of re-
lationship between players in the ICT ecosystem, we chose the interfirm alliances net-
work as a target context to start with. While firms can collaborate in many ways, the
interfirm alliances capture explicit effort of value co-creating process in the ecosystem.
Considering firms are operating in different industries (or segments), alliances can be
broadly divided into two categories: within the segment and across the segment.
Firms operating in the same industry are potentially competitors to each other, so
alliances between such firms can be regarded cooperatively competing—coopetition.
In contrast to coopetition, collaboration across industry represents blurring of indus-
try boundaries—convergence. Lastly, from the network structure perspective, we are
interested in whether the entropy of the whole ecosystem increases or decreases over
time—complexity. Thus, the research questions for Chapter 2 can be summarized as
follows.
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Research Question 1 How can the enterprise transformation path be quantified and
efficiently described using the visual analytics tools? What are appropriate quantita-
tive measures for ecosystem-level coopetition, convergence, and complexity?
After looking at the network structural aspects of interfirm alliances, we zoom
into the microscopic context of the mobile handset industry to look into the product
innovation process. We start with developing a measure for the innovativeness of
products. We particularly focus on smartphone as a target product context because
digital platforms started playing an active role in smartphone after the basic or the
feature phone era. The notion of innovativeness is fuzzy to define for a smartphone
because people value technological aspects differently: one may like longer battery
life and the other faster processing time. This fuzziness makes it a good context
in which we can investigate how to quantitatively measure innovativeness in multi-
dimensional technological space. Once we quantify innovativeness of smartphones,
we compare them with respect to firm strategies in the search space constrained
by digital platforms. Given that innovative product is an outcome of the search
process in a search space, we view smartphone manufacturer sets search strategies in
a certain multi-dimensional technological space bounded by the platform developer.
The research questions for Chapter 3 are as follows.
Research Question 2 How can we measure and compare innovativeness in multi-
dimensional technological space? How are product family management and platform
choice strategy associated with product innovativeness of the device manufacturer?
After investigating the interaction between product innovativeness and digital
platforms, we turn to the dyadic relationship between manufacturer and service
provider. In the mobile handset industry, manufacturers sell products through service
providers’ subscriber network. Manufacturers compete with others in the same net-
work. In this sense, service providers can play a gate-keeping role to manufacturers.
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Leveraging this position, service providers may be able to intensify manufacturer-side
competition by introducing a strong product in their network. We can also expect
that the increased level of competition can sustain itself even after the impetus is
removed. Moreover, this effect can influence another product category than the focal
product category. Labeling these two spillover effects as temporal and horizontal, we
formulate the research questions for Chapter 4 as follows.
Research Question 3 Can service provider regulate the level of competition on the
manufacturer side? Are there any temporal and horizontal spillover effects?
In the end, we would like to know whether product innovation matters in dollar
terms to the firm. One way to measure such firm value is event study measuring
abnormal returns in stock market performance. We measure abnormal return of new
product announcements for all three types of players involved in new smartphone
development: hardware manufacturer, service provider, and platform developer of
a given product. Do the launches of new products bring about positive abnormal
returns? If so, do more innovative products lead to higher positive abnormal returns?
Potentially, this effect may vary between the three types of firms. It is also possible
that the market reacts differently across announcement and release of new products.
These are the research questions for 5.
Research Question 4 Is the launch of an innovative product recognized as a pos-
itive event for firm value by the stock market? What is the differential firm value
of smartphone launch announcements for device manufacturers, service providers,
and platform developers? Is there differential market reaction to announcement and
release of products?
The previous research questions mainly involve empirical investigations analyzing
how the ICT ecosystem has transformed over past two decades, how innovation in
new products interacts with interfirm relationship, and whether the innovation pays
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off. Our last research question concerns identifying inherent community structure and
developing a simulation framework that helps formulate future research hypotheses.
While Chapter 2 visualizes the competitive dynamics and strategic interaction based
on predefined industry segments, the network structure possesses inherent clusters
based on link formation structure. We then aim to build a tool that mimics the core
mechanisms of ecosystem formation processes. The research questions for Chapter 6
are as follows.
Research Question 5 Is there an inherent community structure inferred from the
ICT ecosystem network structure? How can a simulation framework replicate the ICT
ecosystem structure that allows systematic generation and test of potential hypotheses
in complex enterprise systems?
1.4 Outline
This dissertation is a culmination of the research effort to address the research ques-
tions presented in the previous section. The questions encompass analyzing innovation
management process in a complex business ecosystem and developing a framework for
decision support systems utilizing various computational techniques. The following
five main chapters present detailed research with varying scopes, methodologies, and
domains. Figure 2 outlines the overall structure of the dissertation.
Chapter 2 proposes a way to visualize complex enterprise systems as a network
and to present a persuasive story on the transformation path by leveraging the power
of visualization technique. This chapter consists of a research paper. Basole et al.
(2015b), published in Telecommunications Policy and titled “Coopetition and Con-
vergence in the ICT Ecosystem,” analyzes enterprise transformation that has occurred
in the ICT ecosystem over the past two decades using interfirm alliances data. This
study focuses on quantifying and visualizing the competitive dynamics shaping the
ICT ecosystem, grounded in theories of complex systems, strategy dynamics, and
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Chapter 3.
Theorizing the Effect of













































Figure 2: Dissertation Outline
industry life cycle. It defines and develops graph and information theoretic mea-
sures of coopetition, convergence, complexity, and velocity of the ICT ecosystem.
Then, it frames “transformation path” of the ICT ecosystem and maps the trajectory
using complex network visualizations. The transformational path of the industrial
ecosystem is decomposed into two dimensions: coopetition and convergence. The
ICT ecosystem portrayed in the chapter consists of five industry segments defined by
58 standard industry classification (SIC) codes ranging from hardware device man-
ufacturer to software developer and media advertisers. As interfirm alliances exist
within and across different segments, we focus on dissecting alliances into two types:
within-segment and cross-segment alliances. Assuming firms in the same industry
segment are competitors, within-segment alliances denote cooperative competition—
coopetition. On the other hand, we interpret alliances across segments as blurred
industry boundaries and convergence of the ecosystem. This chapter extends Basole
(2009) and Basole and Karla (2011) by applying network visualization to the ICT
ecosystem. It also quantifies and illustrates the insights by Basole and Rouse (2008)
in which they conceptualize the complexity of the ICT ecosystem.
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From Chapter 3, we dive into the more detailed context of the mobile handset
industry embedded in the broader ICT ecosystem. We start with theorizing a revised
search space model in the presence of digital platforms. This chapter then provides
empirical evidences about how a device manufacturer strives for product innovation
in the search space constrained by digital platforms. This chapter particularly delves
into the smartphone industry as digital platforms do not play a major role in basic
and feature phone categories. To theorize a revised search space model, we draw on
the classic search space theory and dominant designs Utterback and Suárez (1993);
Suárez and Utterback (1995). Among many possible aspects of firm strategy on in-
novation, we focus on the search strategy and its interaction with search boundaries
imposed by digital platforms. As a search strategy, we look at how manufacturer
extends product family in a constrained search space. As digital platforms externally
impose search boundaries that manufacturers are bound, the manufacturer’s choice
in platform mix is another dimension of firm strategy in this chapter. This study is
based on the technological evolution of smartphones including physical characteris-
tics, computing performance characteristics, and features over the past decade. We
propose an index to measure innovativeness of a smartphone upon which we test
the four main hypotheses. Regarding product family management, we find that the
number of product families and more experience in a certain family are positively
associated with product innovativeness. For platform strategy, choosing exclusively a
newer platform is positively associated with product innovativeness. Combining the
product family management literature with platform strategy from the perspective
of product innovation, this chapter contributes to the understanding of how opera-
tional management and platform strategy affect product-level innovativeness in the
smartphone industry.
Chapter 4 turns to the relationship between manufacturer and service provider,
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while the previous chapter looks at the relationship between manufacturer and plat-
form developer. In particular, we exploit an industry-wide transformative event: the
exclusive launch of the iPhone on the AT&T’s service network. Leveraging this set-
ting, we investigate how exclusive contract of a service provider can be leveraged
to induce supply-side competition on product innovation, which leads to virtuous
self-sustaining cycle. This chapter uses difference-in-differences estimation method to
estimate the impact of the iPhone on the competitive landscape. Over the exclusive
contract period between Apple and AT&T, other competing device manufacturers
supplied their technologically superior phones to AT&T. We find this competition-
induced product enhancement effect survived even after the exclusive contract had
expired. These findings are supported by various robustness checks including esti-
mation using narrow time window and testing against placebo events. We also find
some evidences that manufacturers enhance their products for AT&T in the technical
aspects that the iPhone excelled, which suggests manufacturers attempt to keep up
with the new technological expectation disrupted by the iPhone. Lastly, we contrast
heterogeneous responses from different major manufacturers including Samsung, LG,
Motorola, and Nokia. This chapter shows how exclusive acquisition of a superior
product can create a virtuous cycle of inducing superior products from other compet-
ing suppliers through product innovation contest on service network.
Chapter 5 examines potentially asymmetric impact of product innovation on the
market value of manufacturer, service provider, and platform developer in the mobile
handset industry. We also compare the market impact of announcement and release
of new products to identify temporal asymmetry in market reaction to product inno-
vation. We use multi-market event study model involving three factors: local market
index, global market index, and trade-weighted exchange rate change. Using this
model, we measure the magnitude of abnormal returns of individual stock price of
the related firms listed in different markets around the world. We confirm positive
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abnormal returns to manufacturer firm value. Exploiting the temporal gap between
announcement and release, we find that a product announcement leads to positive
cumulative abnormal returns to the manufacturer, while the actual product release is
associated with negative firm value. The magnitude of negative change upon release
is smaller than that of positive impact upon announcement. Thus, we observe net
positive impact of a new product launch throughout announcement and release and
we interpret these results as an evidence of fluctuating market expectation uncertainty
on a product. Moreover, we find that the more innovative a new product is, the more
positively market reacts. This chapter contributes to the extant combined literature
on new product development and event study by taking into account the influence of
detailed product technical specifications. Most previous work in the area uses patent
as innovation outcome (Trajtenberg, 1990; Sherry and Teece, 2004) largely disregard-
ing detailed product characteristics. As patent is not a consumable or usable product
to end consumers, there is a conceptual gap between the commonsense innovation and
the patenting behavior. Although a few papers look at the technical specifications
(Koski and Kretschmer, 2010), they look at only one or two technical aspects to stand
as a proxy for the level of product superiority. This chapter considers a number of
technical specifications altogether to provide a holistic view on product innovation.
Chapter 6 steps back to zoom out to view the entire ICT ecosystem again. While
Chapter 2 focuses on describing and visualizing the ecosystem transformation based
on the predefined industry classification scheme, this chapter aims attention to make
inferences based on firm behavior. Using a model-based clustering algorithm devel-
oped by Hilton et al. (2015), we estimate transition matrix and inter-arrival time
matrix that describe how firms form a sequence of relationships of various types.
Clustering based on these estimation results, we identify five clusters of firms exhibit-
ing different behavior. Each of the five clusters informed by the algorithm contains a
mix of companies from different industry segments, so our clustering results provide
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additional information on the ecosystem structure on top of the established predefined
industry classification. Based on the clustering results, we build a simulation model
that replicates the ICT ecosystem and incorporates organizational learning model.
Firms in the simulation framework copy the behavior of prominent benchmarks in
the network, which influence the overall network characteristics of the ecosystem.
Chapter 7 finally summarizes the findings from the five main chapters and dis-
cusses implications for research and practice in technological innovation management
in the business ecosystem. The dissertation concludes with directions for future work.
We provide a few preliminary ideas for future work extending this dissertation based
on a mix-and-match among methods and domains used in different chapters.
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CHAPTER II
VISUALIZING AND DETECTING THE PATH OF
BUSINESS ECOSYSTEM TRANSFORMATION
2.1 Introduction
It is well known that the information and communications technology (ICT) ecosys-
tem has experienced a significant transformation over the past two decades (Chris-
tensen and Anthony, 2004; Fransman, 2010). Driven by rapid technological advances,
changing societal preferences, and shifting economic and regulatory conditions, firms
had to continuously seek ways to improve existing and create and deliver new value
propositions in order to grow and survive (Iansiti and Richards, 2006). These com-
plex dynamics continue to persist and have led the ICT ecosystem to become one of
the most dynamic and fiercely competitive business environments.
While the evolution of the ICT ecosystem has been an important line of inquiry
for scholars (Moore, 1993; Malerba et al., 1999; Agarwal and Bayus, 2004), some is-
sues remain unanswered. Particularly limited work has been done in quantifying and
visualizing the competitive dynamics shaping the ICT ecosystem. Rather than using
perceptual measures, a quantitative visual approach provides a more objective foun-
dation critical for managerial sense and decision making. Moreover, it also enables
a comparative analysis of patterns within and across industries as well as a way to
answer foundational business ecosystem strategy and policy questions.
We concentrate our study on two competitive dynamics: coopetition and con-
vergence. Coopetition refers to the cooperation between competing firms leading to
possible win-win conditions. Convergence refers to the blurring of industry bound-
aries. Both of these dynamics have been shown to be prevalent in the ICT ecosystem,
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as firms are continuously searching for new ways of creating and delivering value
(Basole and Rouse, 2008).
The ICT ecosystem is a particularly suitable domain to study coopetition and
convergence as it is highly dynamic and brings together a variety of different market
segments globally (Basole, 2009). At the same time, the role and power of existing
players is challenged by continuously emerging new players, creating an interesting
dynamic and tension of who will ultimately emerge as leaders. Previous studies have
analyzed the nature and dynamics of interfirm relationships (Basole, 2009; Rosenkopf
and Padula, 2008; Basole and Karla, 2012), investigated the role of platforms (Basole
and Karla, 2011), and evaluated different business models and strategies (Li et al.,
2002; Bouwman et al., 2008; Peppard and Rylander, 2006).
We build on this prior work and quantify and visualize the coopetition and conver-
gence shaping the ICT ecosystem. We ground our inquiry of ecosystem coopetition
and convergence in theories of complex systems, strategy dynamics, and industry life
cycle. Using a unique longitudinal dataset, we define and develop graph and infor-
mation theoretic measures of coopetition, convergence, complexity, and velocity of
the ICT ecosystem. We frame the “transformation path” of the ICT ecosystem using
these novel metrics and map the trajectory using advanced visualization approaches.
In doing so, we address the call of developing new ecosystem metrics, identifying
competitive characteristics shaping the ICT ecosystem, and visualizing the expand-
ing ICT ecosystem.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the
theoretical foundations. Section 2.3 presents our data and methodology. Analysis
and visualization of results are presented and discussed in Section 2.4. Section 2.5
concludes with a discussion of implications and future research opportunities.
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2.2 Theoretical Foundation
Our study draws on four interrelated literature streams: ecosystems as complex sys-
tems, coopetition, convergence, and industry life cycle.
2.2.1 Ecosystems as Complex Systems
The conceptualization of industries and markets as business ecosystems has been gain-
ing traction in the management, strategy, and policy literature (Iansiti and Richards,
2006; Moore, 1996). The ecosystem perspective, adapted from the biological and eco-
logical sciences, is based on the premise that industries consist of a heterogeneous and
continuously evolving set of constituents that co-create value and are codependent
for survival (Iansiti and Levien, 2004).
The complex systems lens posits that constituents are interconnected through a
complex, global network of relationships (Basole and Rouse, 2008), allowing them to
share risks, have access to synergistic knowledge, and be responsive to changes in
the institutional environment (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Basole and Karla,
2011; Russell et al., 2011). Scholars have shown that these interfirm networks are
a particularly effective organizational form to improve firm performance, speed of
innovation, and organizational learning (Ahuja, 2000; Zaheer et al., 2000). Ecosys-
tem players come from a variety of market segments and fill particular roles such
as keystones, dominators, and niche (Iansiti and Levien, 2004; Basole, 2009). As it
is quite unlikely for a single market segment to deliver all products or services to
end-consumers, successful value creation and delivery requires a careful orchestration
between firms across these segments (Basole and Karla, 2012; Dhanarag and Parkhe,
2006).
Furthermore, research has shown that ecosystems are shaped and driven by a
broader societal, technological, economic and regulatory context (Basole and Rouse,
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2008). This argument is rooted in the idea of “embeddedness” presented in Granovet-
ter’s seminal article on economic activities (Granovetter, 1985). Specifically, it states
that economic activities cannot be viewed in isolation from other institutions or from
the technological, political, and social context in which firms exist. The initiatives
in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, for instance, fundamentally transformed the
structure of the ICT industry. The launch of the iPhone in 2007 triggered enormous
new activities in the technology industry (Basole and Karla, 2012). Much more sub-
tle are people’s social and cultural norms and expectations where, over time, changes
enable new businesses and approaches to business. The extent and level of service
expectations have undoubtedly been influenced by the immediacy of instantaneous
and constant connectivity (Basole and Rouse, 2008). These vignettes illustrate that
these contextual influences can have a deep impact on economic activities and must
therefore be considered when conceptualizing the structure and dynamics of business
ecosystems.
The evolving complexity of ecosystems presents both challenges and opportunities
(Basole and Rouse, 2008). As ecosystems become increasingly complex, firms must
be capable of identifying and appropriately managing this complexity in order to re-
main competitive and survive. On the other hand, ecosystem complexity can expand
the opportunity space enabling firms to create new value propositions. Successful
firms find ways to navigate this complexity by monitoring their relative position in
the ecosystem and identifying opportunities they are exposed to. Understanding
and managing ecosystem complexity is also an important task for policymakers as
it enables them to formulate effective systemic policies and avoid unintended and
potentially negative consequences.
This study builds on this existing work and applies a complex networked systems
lens to identify, quantitatively assess, and visualize the evolution of two orthogonal
forces shaping the mobile ecosystem: coopetition and convergence.
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2.2.2 Coopetition
Business is both war and peace. In today’s dynamic business environment, firms
have to compete and cooperate at the same time in order to grow and survive. Bran-
denburger and Nalebuff (1996) refer to this phenomenon as cooperative competition,
or coopetition. The cooperative aspect of coopetition refers to the collective use of
shared resources to pursue common interests; the competitive aspect refers to the
use of shared resources to make private gains in an attempt to outperform partners
(Khanna et al., 1998; Tsai, 2002).
Coopetitive relationships are considered complex as they consist of actors that
produce and market the same products (Bengtsson and Kock, 2000). Coopetition
replaces the traditional neoclassical view of competition. Early research has argued
that that collaboration among rivals may inhibit competition by facilitating collusion
or by shaping industry structure in anticompetitive ways (Porter and Fuller, 1986).
More recently, however, scholars have shown that firms engaged in coopetition can
generate significant economic rents and achieve superior long-run performance (Lado
et al., 1997; Gnyawali and He, 2006; Gnyawali and Park, 2011). Hamel et al. (1989)
argued that coopetition through alliances is not devious, but in fact reflects a com-
mitment and capacity for each partner to absorb the skills of the other (Hamel et al.,
1989), leading to “coopetitive advantage” (Dagnino and Padula, 2002).
Coopetition is particularly valuable in industries characterized by short product
cycles, strong technological convergence, and high R&D costs (Gnyawali and Park,
2009; Pellegrin-Boucher et al., 2013). It is therefore quite pervasive in the ICT in-
dustry in general (Ritala et al., 2008; Ancarani and Costabile, 2010) and the mobile
ecosystem in particular (Maitland et al., 2002; Peppard and Rylander, 2006; Basole,
2009; Gueguen, 2009; Gueguen and Isckia, 2011; Zhang and Zhu, 2011). Coopetition
enables firms to access complementary resources from external partners, while at the
same time requiring them to continuously improve their activities and market offers
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in order to maintain and develop their competitive advantage (Bengtsson and Kock,
1999, 2000; Gnyawali and He, 2006; Lado et al., 1997). Alliances among competitors
has also been shown to provide an opportunity for imposing technological standards
and allow firms to become market pioneers by creating “lock-in” capabilities (Shapiro
and Varian, 1999; Gueguen, 2009). Furthermore, coopetition accelerates R&D efforts,
significantly reduces costs, diversifies the portfolio of products or services, and drives
higher levels of consumer satisfaction (Dittrich and Duysters, 2007; Gueguen, 2009;
Ritala and Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009; Pellegrin-Boucher et al., 2013).
Coopetitive relationships, however, can also have negative and unintended effects,
including the increased risk of opportunistic behavior (Brandenburger and Nalebuff,
1996), threat of knowledge expropriation (Hamel, 1991; Oxley and Sampson, 2004),
erosion of trust (Nieto and Santamaŕıa, 2007), and disruption of existing business
models (Bonel and Rocco, 2007). Before entering coopetitive relationships, firms
must take these downsides into account and judiciously evaluate potential partners.
This study follows the definition of coopetition by Bengtsson and Kock (1999)—i.e.
collaborating with direct competitors (Bengtsson and Kock, 2000)—and develops a
network analytic measure to understand the level of coopetition in the ICT ecosystem.
Figure 3 conceptualizes our measure for coopetition.
Low Moderate High 
Figure 3: Levels of Coopetition
27
2.2.3 Convergence
Convergence refers to a transformation process that blurs boundaries by unifying
value propositions, technologies, or markets (Greenstein and Khanna, 1997). Scholars
have identified several types of convergence, including knowledge, technology, and
industry (Hacklin, 2008).
Knowledge convergence is the combination of knowledge bases and the erosion of
boundaries that define and isolate industry-specific knowledge (Hacklin et al., 2009).
It is sometimes also referred to as scientific convergence, a process where distinct
scientific disciplines begin to cite each other and collaborate (Curran et al., 2010).
Knowledge convergence is generally motivated by an industry actor’s identification
of new opportunities lying at the edge of its industry border and awareness of the
potential of combining own knowledge with external one, thereby leading to novel
and potentially innovative activities.
Technological convergence is closely linked to knowledge convergence and is de-
fined as the combination of previously distinct technologies into a common prod-
uct (Gambardella and Torrisi, 1998). Technological convergence leads to new value-
creating opportunities and product and service offerings (Stieglitz, 2003). There
are many examples of technological convergence in the ICT industry, including the
bundling of a mobile phone and digital camera into a camera phone or a game console
and media player into a portable entertainment solution (Han et al., 2009).
When technologies converge and applications from distinct domains are combined,
they infringe on existing value-creating territories of underlying sectors and industries
(Hacklin et al., 2009). This leads to collision of business models and gradual blurring,
or redefinition, of market boundaries (Porter, 1985; Hamel and Prahalad, 1994). This
phenomenon is called industry convergence (Hacklin, 2008). Prior research has shown
that industry convergence often leads to a new cross-industry segment that widens
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markets, lowers barriers to entry and increases competition (Borés et al., 2003). More-
over, industry convergence can lead to reconfiguration of the value chain through the
addition or elimination of activities (Greenstein and Khanna, 1997; Wirtz, 2001),
consolidation through mergers and acquisitions (Chan-Olmsted, 1998; Lee and Co-
larelli O’Connor, 2003), as well as a complete shakeout of players from the ecosystem
(Steinbock, 2003; Basole, 2009).
Industry convergence is particularly prevalent in the ICT context (Katz, 1996;
Duysters and Hagedoorn, 1998; Chan-Olmsted, 1998; Gambardella and Torrisi, 1998;
Wirtz, 2001; Liu, 2013). Traditionally separate market segments, such as broadband,
cable, and telephony for instance, are now deeply intertwined, providing integrated,
bundled digital products and services to consumers (Basole and Rouse, 2008). Schol-
ars have attempted to measure industry convergence in many ways, including cor-
porate diversification (Teece et al., 1994; Gambardella and Torrisi, 1998; Fan and
Lang, 2000), knowledge/technology relatedness (Breschi et al., 2003; Joo and Kim,
2010; Makri et al., 2010), patent collaboration (Fai and Von Tunzelmann, 2001; Cur-
ran et al., 2010; Curran and Leker, 2011), and macroeconomic input-output analysis
(Xing et al., 2011).
Our study builds on this work and develops a network analytic measure of industry
convergence. Figure 4 conceptualizes our measure for convergence.
Low Moderate High 
Figure 4: Levels of Convergence
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2.2.4 Industry Life Cycle
The level and extent of coopetition and convergence must be considered in the context
of ecosystem maturity. Originally presented by Utterback and Abernathy (1975), the
theory of industry life cycle presents a formidable perspective to contemplate ecosys-
tem coopetition and convergence. The industry life cycle theory argues that firms
compete based on alternative “product designs” in early industry stages. Firm entry
is rampant and there is widespread experimentation with alternate designs (Argyres
and Bigelow, 2007). Over time, product innovation decreases while process innova-
tion increases, leading to the emergence of a “dominant design” (Christensen et al.,
1998). During this phase firms compete on cost rather than design and economies of
scale lead to industry consolidation, forcing out smaller firms (through exit or acqui-
sition) and raising entry barriers (Argyres and Bigelow, 2007). Similarly, Klepper and
colleagues (Klepper and Graddy, 1990; Klepper, 1996, 2002) showed that all indus-
tries evolve through prototypical phases of a life cycle and undergo transformations
in structure, diversity, and dynamics.
The industry life cycle lens has been used extensively in the study of ICT industry.
Mazzucato (2002), for example, examined the maturation of the PC industry. Kwak
et al. (2012) investigated the evolution of alliance structure in standard setting in
the telecommunications industry. Rice and Galvin (2006) studied the evolution of
alliance patterns over industry life cycle for multinational electronics firm. Filson
(2001) examined the life cycle impact on price, quantity, quality of products within
the ICT industry.
Agarwal and Sarkar (2002) argued that three theoretical lenses have been predom-
inantly used to explain industry life cycles. Evolutionary economists, for instance,
have shown that industries grow slowly at first, then expand rapidly until the number
of firms reaches a peak. The process reverses thereafter, despite continued industry
growth, until a few large firms come to dominate the market. This pattern has been
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observed across many different industries. From a technology management perspec-
tive, the life cycle of an industry is driven by technological discontinuities (Anderson
and Tushman, 1990). This perspective suggests that an industry evolves through
long periods of incremental change punctuated by times when radical, new, superior
technologies displace old, inferior ones (Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Agarwal and
Sarkar, 2002). Organizational ecologists argue that dynamic models of legitimacy,
resource attraction, and competition explain the founding, growth, and decline of
industries (Hannan and Carroll, 1992).
Together, these complementary perspectives emphasize the fact that firms face
different competitive environments at different phases and thereby different levels
of survival risk (Agarwal and Sarkar, 2002). The level and extent of convergence
and coopetition can thus vary based which particular industry life cycle phase the
ecosystem is in. Our study leverages the industry life cycle lens to explain the position
and trajectory of the ICT ecosystem in the coopetition-convergence opportunity space
(shown in Figure 5).
2.3 Data and Methods
2.3.1 Data
The primary dataset used for this study is Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum1, a well-
established, comprehensive, and accurate commercial database commonly used in the
study of global interfirm relationships across multiple sectors (Schilling, 2009). It has
been used extensively in strategic management, finance, research policy, and the man-
agement and organization sciences (Hsu, 2006; Sampson, 2004; Schilling and Phelps,
2007). SDC Platinum contains detailed information on joint ventures and alliances
(i.e. R&D, sales and marketing, supply and manufacturing, licensing and distribu-










Figure 5: Convergence-Coopetition Landscape
publications, wires and news sources. The primary strength of this database is its
global and cross-industry scope (Schilling, 2009). It covers at least one alliance of each
of the 1,000+ four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. In addition,
it provides searchable access to 200+ additional data elements, including names, SIC
codes and nationality of firm participants, and relationship types, terms and synopsis.
Given the growing scope of the ICT ecosystem, it is important to specify the
boundaries of the system being studied (Basole and Karla, 2012). To meet our goal
of mapping the evolution of coopetition and convergence, our boundary criteria had
to be as inclusive as possible. We consequently used all four-digit SIC codes that make
up both incumbent and emerging parts of the ICT ecosystem (Basole, 2009; Wulf,
2012). This resulted in an identification of 58 four-digit SIC codes (shown in Table
1). It is important to note that each four-digit SIC code represents one ecosystem
segment in our study.
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Table 1: Industry Segment Classification (adapted from Basole (2009) and Wulf
(2012); nec stands for “not elsewhere classified”.)
Sector SIC Codes SIC Code Description Color Code
Hardware 3671 Electron tubes Blue
Components 3672 Printed circuit boards
3674 Semiconductors and related devices
3675 Electronic capacitors
3676 Electronic resistors
3677 Electronic coils, transformers, & other inductors
3678 Electronic connectors
3679 Electronic components, nec
3691 Storage batteries
3692 Primary batteries, dry and wet
3694 Electrical equipment for internal combustion engines
3695 Magnetic and optical recording media
3699 Electrical machinery, equipment, and supplies, nec
3827 Optical instruments and lenses
3861 Photographic equipment and supplies
Hardware 3571 Electronic computers Red
Equipment 3572 Computer storage devices
3575 Computer terminals
3577 Computer peripheral equipment, nec
3578 Calculating and accounting machines, except electronic computers
3579 Office machines, nec
3651 Household audio and video equipment
3652 Phonograph records and prerecorded audio tapes and disks
3661 Telephone & telegraph apparatus
3663 Radio & TV broadcasting & communications equipment
3669 Communications equipment, nec
3944 Games, toys, children’s vehicles,exc. dolls, bikes
Software 5734 Computer and computer software stores Orange
7371 Computer programming services
7372 Prepackaged software
7373 Computer integrated systems design
7374 Data processing services
7375 Information retrieval services
7376 Computer facilities management services
7377 Computer rental and leasing
7378 Computer maintenance and repair
7379 Computer related services, nec
7382 Security systems services
Telecommunications 4812 Radiotelephone communications Green
4813 Telephone communications, except radiotelephone
4822 Telegraph and other message communications
4899 Communications services, nec
Media 2711 Newspapers: publishing, or publishing & printing Purple
2721 Periodicals: publishing, or publishing & printing
2731 Books: publishing, or publishing & printing
2741 Miscellaneous publishing
4832 Radio broadcasting stations
4833 Television broadcasting stations
4841 Cable and other pay television services
7311 Advertising agencies
7312 Outdoor advertising services
7313 Radio, television, and publishers’ advertising representatives
7319 Advertising, nec
7812 Motion picture and video tape production
7819 Services allied to motion picture production
7822 Motion picture and video tape distribution
7829 Services allied to motion picture distribution
8742 Management consulting services
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We then extracted all alliances between 1990 and 2012, in which at least one firm
had one of the aforementioned SIC codes as its primary SIC code. To identify the
date of alliance formation, we used the “Date Announced” field in SDC Platinum.
Other dates, such as terminated or expired, are rarely reported. This led to an initial
list of 62,910 unique firms (based on the six-digit Committee on Uniform Security
Identification Procedures (CUSIP) identifier) and 66,192 alliances. Next, we limited
our dataset to alliances that were completed/signed, extended, terminated, or expired;
we thus excluded alliances that were on letter of intent, pending, or rumored. SDC
Platinum also provides SIC codes for alliances. We thus also excluded alliances whose
primary SIC code was not in our SIC list (i.e. some firms may form alliances in an
entirely different industry). This led to a final dataset of 20,232 firms and 20,870
alliances (3,850 joint ventures (18.4%); 7,005 R&D and marketing (33.6%); 3,944
technology transfer (18.9%); 2,819 manufacturing, original equipment manufacturer
(OEM), and supply chain (13.5%) ; 2,715 licensing (13.0%)).
Table 2 provides a summary of the geographic distribution of firms and alliances
in our dataset. We used the taxonomy suggested by Curwen and Whalley (2013) to
differentiate between major geographic regions.
Next, we constructed a firm-level ecosystem network using a weighted adjacency
matrix. An adjacency matrix is a square matrix with nodes (e.g. firms) as both rows
and columns. The presence of an alliance between firms i and j, denoted by xij, is
coded as 1, and 0 otherwise. Given that alliances may contain more than two firms,
we constructed relationship edges between all firms in an alliance. An alliance with
three firms, for example, therefore would generate three edges. If a firm’s primary
SIC code was not our list, we dropped that firm from analysis. As this may result
in an alliance with only a single valid firm, we dropped that alliance from further
analysis as well.
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Table 2: Geographic Distribution by Region
Number of Firms Number of Alliances
Region -1997 -2002 -2007 -2012 -1997 -2002 -2007 -2012
Western Europe 1,174 2,240 2,918 3,241 780 1,366 1,565 1,680
Eastern Europe 125 154 169 186 39 47 48 51
Middle East 76 127 187 217 11 16 26 31
Asia-Pacific 1,324 2,890 3,481 3,841 1,546 3,128 3,426 3,615
North America 4,390 7,781 11,344 12,342 7,079 10,425 13,062 13,771
Latin America 84 195 265 291 26 49 59 65
Africa 28 44 82 97 3 6 13 15
Cross-Region 4,038 6,292 7,611 8,232
Total 7,201 13,431 18,446 20,215 13,522 21,329 25,810 27,460
Entries in the matrix were scaled following the weighting scheme proposed by Za-
heer et al. (2010), who argued that the strength of interfirm relationship is determined
by the amount of knowledge exchanged. Consequently, R&D and marketing (5) were
assigned the largest weight followed by technology transfer (4), supply chain, manu-
facturing, and OEM (3), and (exclusive) licensing (2). All other remaining alliance
types were given a unit weight (1). For joint ventures, we looked into the alliance
text of each agreement as suggested by Zaheer et al. (2010). If a joint venture was
associated with another alliance type (e.g. R&D), we coded it as that type. If no
alliance type was identified, based on author consensus, we assigned it to the lowest
unit weight. If an alliance consisted of multiple types (e.g. marketing and manufac-
turing), we selected the maximum value of relevant alliance type weights. We did not
consider relational direction, resulting in an undirected multiplex graph.
Similarly, we also constructed a segment-level ecosystem network using a weighted
adjacency approach. Edges between two segments were weighted by the number and
type of relationships between two firms between two segments. Each entry in the




We considered several different network measures for coopetition. First, we considered
segment network density (existing over all possible links) as a measure of coopetition.
However as not all edges are equally likely to occur, we believed that density would
penalize us for sparse segment networks and underestimate coopetition. Next, we
considered weighted edge count between firms within a SIC as a measure of coopeti-
tion. However, this measure, even if normalized by segment size, would have favored
larger segments. As a result, we decided to measure ecosystem coopetition using
the number of connected components. A connected component is defined as a sub-
graph whose nodes are connected to each other by paths and not connected to other
nodes in the supergraph. It thus measures the number of “pockets” of coopetition in
the ecosystem. It is invariant to the variation of weighting schemes because it is a
structural property of the whole network. As we are interested of coopetition at the
ecosystem level we considered the total count and not an average or median across
segments. Coopetition (Cp) is thus measured as:
Cp = | set of connected components of G | (1)
where G is the firm-level network containing only the within-segment edges excluding
cross-segment ones.
2.3.2.2 Convergence
Similar to coopetition, we also considered several different networks measure for con-
vergence. We eliminated weighted network density as a measure as not all segment
are candidates for interconnection and we would underestimate convergence. Thus,
we decided to measure ecosystem convergence using the inverse transformation of the
average path length of the inter-segment network. Since the current weighting scheme
between segments represents “strength” of alliances between the two segments, we
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need to convert edge weight to represent “distance” between segments. We employed
Gaussian radial basis function as our transformation to convert strength to distance.
distance = exp(−σ · strength) (2)
We choose the attenuation factor σ to be 0.1 to ensure reasonable scale. Average
shortest path length in the segment-level network, whose edges are weighted by dis-
tance according to Equation (2), measures the distances between all two pairs of
nodes and then computes the average. The smaller the average shortest path length,
the closer segments are to each other. Using the inverse relationship allows us to
invert the average shortest path length to a measure of convergence; a network with
low average shortest path length is consequently highly converged. Convergence (Cv)
is thus measured as:








where V is the set of all segments, d(s, t) is the shortest path length between segments
s and t, and n is the size of V .
2.3.2.3 Complexity
We measure the complexity of the ecosystem using an information-theoretic entropy
approach (Shannon, 1948; Basole and Rouse, 2008). Complexity measures the struc-
tural randomness of the firm-level network containing all unweighted within-segment















We measure the velocity of the ecosystem in terms of the two strategy measures,
Cp and Cv. Velocity is a measure of the first derivative how an ecosystem changes.
Velocity is thus computed as:
vCp = Cp(t)− Cp(t− 1) (5)
vCv = Cv(t)− Cv(t− 1) (6)
where vCp and vCv denote velocity along coopetition and convergence, respectively,
and t is year.
2.3.3 Ecosystem Visualization
We used Gephi 0.82 beta, a leading open-source visualization platform, to portray
the networks (Bastian et al., 2009) and computed network metrics using NetworkX
(Hagberg et al., 2008).
To position segments in the network visualizations, we first used the neato layout
algorithm (North, 2004) provided by GraphViz (Ellson et al., 2002). Noverlap layout
included in Gephi was used where appropriate to avoid overlap between segment
nodes. Once the positions of segment-level nodes were determined, its position is
fixed throughout all graphics so that readers are not burdened to follow segments of
interest across different time points. For firm-level network illustrating coopetition,
we constructed network only by within-segment edges excluding cross-segment edges.
We used random layout over a circular disk whose radius is proportional to the number
of firms of each segment. The location of disks anchors on the location of segments
determined by the segment-level network visualization. We used Matplotlib (Hunter,
2007) to create the evolutionary complexity heat map and maximum coopetition
pocket size bar chart shown in Figures 7 and 10 respectively.
For clarity, readability, and aesthetic reasons, we also chose to group and visually
encode our 58 ecosystem segments (as defined by the four-digit SIC code) using the
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five-sector approach proposed by Wulf (2012). The last column in Table 1 shows
the color code we used for each segment. Each of these colors is used consistently
throughout all visualizations.
2.4 Analysis & Discussion of Results
Figure 6 shows the cumulative growth of firms and relationships and the average
number of relationships per firm from 1990-2012. The evolution indicates that, while
the number of firms engaging in alliances is growing, the rate of alliance formation is
decreasing. The average degree per firm reached a peak in the late 1990s (3.7) and
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Figure 6: Evolution of Ecosystem Network Structure
A closer examination of the evolution of alliance types by competitive dynamics
39
Table 3: Coopetition and Convergence Relationship Types
Coopetition Convergence
-1997 -2002 -2007 -2012 -1997 -2002 -2007 -2012
Equity and Others 475 1,677 2,252 2,491 1,032 3,878 5,117 5,588
Licensing 106 201 212 213 327 584 619 624
Manufacturing, OEM, Supply Chain 78 221 274 308 283 642 772 820
Technology Transfer 259 316 857 1031 818 1,047 1,722 2,023
R&D and Marketing 1,238 1,518 1,819 1,878 4,305 5,118 5,742 5,862
Joint Ventures 1,346 1,745 1,847 1,909 3,267 4,396 4,595 4,735
Total 3,502 5,678 7,261 7,830 10,032 15,665 18,567 19,652
(see Table 3) reveals that while R&D, marketing, and joint-venture alliances domi-
nated both coopetition and convergence activities in the early phases of the ecosystem,
we see a substantial growth in technology transfer and non-equity relationships re-
cently, indicating a possible shift from value exploration to value capturing. This
result thus supports the premise of the industry life cycle theory, which suggests that
firms collaboratively explore the opportunity space to share resources and reduce risk
through alliance formation in the early stage. As the market matures, the emphasis
of interfirm relationships is shifted towards knowledge exchange and value capture
such as through technology transfer relationships.
Figure 7 shows a cumulative growth heat map of coopetition, convergence, and
complexity of the ICT ecosystem. We use size and color of bubbles to differentiate lev-
els of ecosystem complexity. While both coopetition and convergence have increased
during our study time frame, two distinct ecosystem phases can be identified. Early
on the ecosystem was primarily characterized by a growth in convergence; more re-
cently we are seeing a growth in coopetition. The figure reveals a clear transformation
path with convergence saturating around 2000, far earlier than coopetition in 2008.
Interestingly, we observe that complexity reached its peak shortly after this inflection
point and has slightly declined since then. Given that we use an information-theoretic
entropy measure for ecosystem complexity, which emphasizes edge formation and net-
work structure, decreasing ecosystem complexity in recent years suggests that fewer
firms enter the ecosystem over time and existing firms with many relationships are
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accumulating more edges. This network formation phenomenon is confirmed by pref-
erential attachment theory, which argues that new firms are more likely to connect
to central firms than to less central ones (Barabási and Albert, 1999).








































Figure 7: Evolution of Ecosystem Coopetition, Convergence, and Complexity (Bubble
size and color reflect ecosystem complexity. Complexity is rescaled by exponential
function for visual emphasis.)
These insights understandably lead to the question of how fast the ecosystem is
evolving. Figure 8 shows the velocity of both coopetition and convergence. The
previously identified difference in saturation timing is also reflected in our analysis
of coopetition and convergence velocity. While we see a steady decline in conver-
gence velocity, we observe two velocity peaks for coopetition (in 2000 and 2006) and
a slight upward trajectory over the past few years. These findings appear to precede
the US economic cycle peaks in March 2001 and December 2007 suggesting potential
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macroeconomic effects. High convergence velocity suggests that firms were rapidly
forming alliances with firms from other ecosystem segments to explore and collabo-
ratively deliver new value propositions to the market. As convergence settled, the
velocity of coopetition increased around the year 2000, suggesting that firms sought
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Figure 8: Velocity of Ecosystem Coopetition and Convergence
Figures 9a-b provide a closer, visual network perspective of the structural evo-
lution of coopetition in the ICT ecosystem. It should be noted that these figures
show only within-segment edges. The figures show that there are some variation of
coopetition growth and saturation between segments. For instance, coopetition in the
prepackaged software segment (SIC 7372) increased substantially between 2002-2007.
Coopetition in data processing services (SIC 7374) on the other hand did not saturate
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until more recently. Striking is also the rapid rise in coopetition in the media sector
(purple). These results highlight that coopetition levels and saturation timing varied
across segments and coincide largely with a shift in industry life cycle phases.
We also observe that several ecosystem segments contain some dominant firms.
The electronic computers segment (SIC 3571) for instance contains three central play-
ers: IBM Corporation, Apple, and Hewlett-Packard Company. Among them, IBM
plays the most central role. There are also multiple dominant firms in the household
audio and video equipment (SIC 3651) as well as telephone communications segments
(SIC 4813), suggesting that these segments are driven by a few large firms.
Interestingly, however, there are segments (of comparable size to the ones men-
tioned above) in the mobile ecosystem in which the coopetitive structure is far more
democratic, including semiconductors and related devices (SIC 3674), radiotelephone
communications (SIC 4812), and cable and other pay television services (SIC 4841).
Although these segments may have large firms driving and shaping the segment, the
alliance structure is relatively more evenly distributed. Together, these visualizations
highlight that varying levels of coopetition exist in the ICT ecosystem.
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(a) -1997 (b) -2012
Figure 9: Visualization of Structural Evolution of Coopetition
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The coopetition visualizations presented in Figure 9 can be further examined
by the change in the maximum size of coopetition “pocket”. From a graph theo-
retic perspective, a pocket of coopetition refers to a connected component within
each segment. Since we consider firms in the same (four-digit SIC code) segment as
competitors, the maximum size of coopetition pocket represents the extent of coopet-
itive relationships in a segment. The larger this number is, the greater the level of
coopetition in the segment. Figure 10 shows the evolution of the maximum size of
coopetition pocket. P0, P1, P2, P3 represent the four cumulative periods of 1990-1997,
through 2002, through 2007, and through 2012, respectively. The top panel shows
the baseline maximum pocket size for each segment, while the bottom three panels
show relative change from the previous period. The top five relative changes for each
period are marked by shaded bars in the bottom three panels. The baseline panel
highlights that some segments do not engage in any coopetitive activities. The rela-
tive change panels reveal that the hardware component sector (blue) is particularly
eminent during the early phase while the software sector (orange) has substantial
coopetition growth between 2002-2007. More recently, the top driving sectors are
distributed across all sectors. The prepackaged software segment (SIC 7372) espe-
cially has grown remarkably over the entire time frame, even considering its large
baseline size, suggesting that many firms in the segment are engaged in coopetitive
activities.
Figures 11a-b provide a segment-level network visualization of the structural evolu-
tion of convergence in the ICT ecosystem. The figures clearly reveal that convergence

















































































































































































Figure 10: Maximum Coopetition Pocket Size by Segment
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(a) -1997 (b) -2012
Figure 11: Visualization of Convergence Evolution
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The relative position of segments to each other reveals the growing interdependen-
cies between different sectors. The software sector (orange) is clearly the most central
in the ICT ecosystem and acting as the gluing sector that ties together the hardware
equipment (red), telecommunications (green), and media sectors (purple). The hard-
ware components sector (blue) is closely connected to the hardware equipment sector.
The media sector is more closely linked to software and the telecommunications sector.
The relatively largest growth in segment size over our time frame is experienced
by the information retrieval services (SIC 7375). As the ICT ecosystem is becoming
increasingly data intensive and dependent, the importance of this software sector
segment is becoming more apparent. It is therefore no surprise to see it closely
positioned to the segments in the media sector.
When comparing the nature of the media sector from 1997 until now, we can also
see that the media sector has grown substantially in size, suggesting that the relative
influence and importance has also grown.
Perhaps one of the most striking observations from these network visualizations
is that the inter-segment network was quite sparse in the early days; in more recent
years the network has not only become more dense, but also more intense, suggesting
a greater convergence and thereby knowledge exchange between segments. Figure
12 provides a detailed, matrix representation of the state of ecosystem convergence.
The cells represent whether two segments are engaged in inter-segment relationships.
The darker the shade of the cell, the more intense the convergence between segments.
Within-sector cells are colored following our consistent color scheme, while cross-
sector edges are marked in gray. The matrix reveals that the hardware component
sector (blue) has two or three central segments connect to other segments; segments in
all other sectors are closely connected to each other. The hardware component sector
is closely converged with the hardware equipment sector (red) and sparsely converged
to the media sector (purple). On the other hand, hardware equipment, software
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(orange), telecommunications (green), and some segments in media sector are closely
connected to each other. Note that some segments2 including are particularly well
converged with most of the other segments in the ecosystem, suggesting that a few















































































































































































Figure 12: Ecosystem Convergence Matrix (1990-2012)
2Representative SIC codes include 3674, 3679, 3571, 3577, 3651, 3661, 3663, 3669, 7371, 7372,
7373, 4812, and 4813.
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2.5 Conclusions and Policy Implications
All modern companies struggle with survival in the face of rapid socio-technical
change. Quantification and visualization of ecosystems is an important step towards
understanding the evolution of industries and the factors affecting this evolution.
Rather than using perceptual measures, it provides a more objective foundation crit-
ical for managerial sense and decision making. Moreover, it also enables a compar-
ative analysis of patterns within and across industries as well as a way to answer
foundational business ecosystem questions of integration, diversification, first-mover
advantage, and firm entry and exit.
This study focuses on quantifying and visualizing the competitive dynamics of the
ICT ecosystem. In particular, we define and develop graph and information theoretic
measures of coopetition, convergence, complexity, and velocity of an ecosystem. Our
advanced visual analysis reveals that coopetition and convergence—two key strategic
dimensions of opportunity space—have shaped the transformative path of the ICT
ecosystem in different ways. While convergence characterized the early phases, coope-
tition is more prevalent in recent years. Our study also shows that while segments
in the ecosystem have converged, the rate of convergence is decreasing, suggesting a
growing level of ecosystem maturity and potentially decreasing importance on formal
interfirm relationships. We also find evidence of a declining engagement in inter-
firm R&D and a growing number of technology transfer relationships, indicating a
possible shift from value exploration to value capturing. The management literature
has developed theories around the trade-off between value creation and value appro-
priation (March, 1991; Mizik and Jacobson, 2003; Jacobides et al., 2006; Reitzig and
Puranam, 2009). Value creation and exploration are linked with search activities that
cover a wide area of the opportunity space. Such distant searches thus involves cross-
segment collaboration activities. Value capturing and appropriation are the process
of extracting value based on the relatively well-known local knowledge. Therefore,
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local searches are associated with within-segment collaboration activities. Our con-
ceptualization of convergence and coopetition in this chapter builds on cross-segment
and within-segment alliances, respectively. Thus, we interpret Figure 7 as a sign of
ecosystem-level shift from value exploration to value capturing activities.
The findings of our study also have several important policy implications. Ecosys-
tem convergence leads to a blurring of traditional market boundaries, which demands
new consideration of industry-wide and market segment centric policies (Longstaff,
2002; Fransman, 2010; De Vries, 2011). Given the growing interdependence of market
segments, policies in one can adversely impact the other. The ongoing debate of net
neutrality, for instance, has had implications for mobile network operators, Internet
service providers (ISPs), and content providers. Increased coopetition also creates a
shift in market power concentration that alters competition in both the short and long
term. Policymakers must therefore carefully assess partnerships between competitors
(Bauer et al., 2012). Similarly, the increasing global footprint of the ICT ecosystem
has an impact on the formulation of trade policies (i.e. where and how value is cre-
ated and captured) as well as on the setting of national/global innovation policies
(i.e. cross-border partners jointly owning intellectual property (IP)). Further, our
ecosystem transformation analysis reveals that the path and velocity of the ecosys-
tem differs across the coopetition and convergence dimensions. Broadly, this has two
implications: first, policies must be formulated and implemented in ways to accom-
modate the pace of change. Second, it provides insight into what area of competition
policy must be considered when. Lastly, the evolution of our information-theoretic
measure of ecosystem complexity suggests that, with the combination of scale and
interdependency, it requires more effort to formulate policies that minimize/reduce
unintended consequence impacting the ecosystem. Effective policymaking is thus
increasingly challenging.
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Our study is not without limitations. First, our data consists of interfirm re-
lationships of predominantly large and well-established firms identified by formal
alliance agreements. ICT ecosystem innovation, however, is also driven by small
and entrepreneurial firms as well as informal relationships between firms. Thus, the
entrepreneurial ecosystem consisting of de novo firms may exhibit structural char-
acteristics and dynamics different from the ICT ecosystem analyzed in this chapter.
Second, SIC segment classification, while established and validated, potentially lim-
its the scope of actual industry boundaries. For instance, mobile games may be its
own segment and distinct from platforms, but using standard SIC classification, they
are both grouped into the prepackaged software segment. Third, the edge weight-
ing scheme from 1 to 5 based on the alliance type may seem arbitrary, although
we developed this encoding scheme based on Zaheer et al. (2010). There are other
ways to encode edge weights. For instance, we can ignore relationship strength at
all and apply uniform edge weight. We believe that the implications and conclusions
drawn in this chapter are largely invariant to different edge weighting scheme, but
it is worthwhile to examine the sensitivity of the results as future work. Fourth,
static visualizations do not effectively portray the real complex nature of ecosystem
dynamics. An interactive or animated approach would be beneficial. These limita-
tions represent exciting opportunities for future research. Lastly, a firm’s position in
the value chain matters. Future research on competitive ecosystem dynamics should
thus consider the extent to which relationships are formed with firms upstream or
downstream in the value chain.
2.5.1 Practical Implications
Our study has several practical implications. With a rapidly changing business envi-
ronment, fast product cycles, and decreasing average life expectancy of firms, decision
makers are feeling a sense of urgency to find novel ways to understand and manage
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the complexity of their business ecosystem. This study is a first step in applying a
framework of new business opportunity mapping and measurement through the lens
of complexity theory in order to provide decision makers with actionable insights
about patterns of ecosystem evolution. Specifically, this study provides quantitative
metrics and a visual framework with which they can map the structure and velocity of
business ecosystems and the competitive dynamics that govern it. Our approach thus
enables firms to understand the nature of competitive actions at both the firm and
ecosystem level, organize appropriately, and devise appropriate innovation strategies.
These novel data-based metrics provide the foundation for strategic analysis of new
business opportunities that is not possible using traditional market analysis tools.
An extension of our work could include a comparison of individual firm strategies in
the ecosystem, allowing us to potentially identify firms that lead or chase markets.
Our study also provides a foundation to understand the transformative impact of less
visible ecosystem events. For instance, we could examine how peripheral activities in-
fluence the strategies of core actors in the ecosystem. These implications are excellent
avenues for future research.
We did not expect to see a clear demarcation of eras for the ICT ecosystem
transformation. We learned from this study that the ICT ecosystem has grown fast
in convergence first before 2000 and its transformation locus has shifted to coopetition
afterwards. Moreover, the ecosystem complexity measured by information-theoretic
entropy peaked around 2000. This set of findings nicely led to the narrative of the
ecosystem shift from value creation to value capturing. We did not expect to have
this clear narrative before we actually developed the measures and saw the results.
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CHAPTER III
INNOVATION STRATEGY FOR PRODUCTS ON
DIGITAL PLATFORMS
3.1 Introduction
The previous chapter overviews the ICT ecosystem and documents the transforma-
tion path using network visualization and quantification of coopetition, convergence,
and complexity. In this chapter, we dive into the ecosystem to narrow our focus on a
specific subset of the ecosystem: the smartphone industry. The benefit of narrowing
down the research context is that we can observe the product-level output of firms
in the scope. The smartphone industry is a place where manufacturer and platform
developer are codependent to each other. Manufacturer produces physical product,
while platform developer supplies software that runs the device. The product tech-
nical specifications evolve within the configurations that software affords to utilize.
This chapter aims to develop a theory that views digital platforms as constraints in
the search space where manufacturers explore feasible ways to improve their products.
Innovation is essential for firm survival in product-centric industries (Schumpeter,
1942; Utterback and Suárez, 1993). Product innovation enables firms to gain market
share (Robinson, 1990; Banbury and Mitchell, 1995; Klepper, 1996); differentiate and
diversify their offerings (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978); facilitate entry into new
markets (Helfat and Lieberman, 2002); and adapt to changing business environments
(Womack et al., 1990; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995; Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995).
Prior research on product innovation strategy is extensive (Brown and Eisenhardt,
1995; Krishnan and Ulrich, 2001) and has examined a broad spectrum of issues,
including ideation and design (Dahl and Moreau, 2002), sourcing (Veugelers, 1997;
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Kessler et al., 2000; Ragatz et al., 2003), engineering (Michalek et al., 2005), and
marketing (Atuahene-Gima, 1996; Lukas and Ferrell, 2000). Several contemporary
forces, however, are transforming the nature of product innovation and challenging
existing theories, frameworks, and models (Yoo et al., 2010; Nambisan, 2013).
Technological convergence, for instance, has led to the design and development
of increasingly complex products. Through hardware miniaturization, component
modularity, and standardization, traditionally separate offerings are now being in-
tegrated into a single product. Technological convergence has also changed the way
firms design and source. Whereas in the past product components and relevant know-
how resided in-house, firms today often co-create offerings with other firms and are
embedded in an increasingly global and complex value network (Basole and Rouse,
2008). In an era of convergence, product innovation thus involves a wider search
across technological, organizational, and geographic boundaries.
Second, there is an increasing infusion of digital technology into physical prod-
ucts. Many products are now a sophisticated combination of hardware and software.
Examples are pervasive and range from phones, cameras, watches, and televisions to
appliances, medical devices, toys, and cars (Nambisan, 2013). This has led to the
emergence of a layered modular product architecture, which is a hybrid between the
modular architecture paradigm of physical product design and the layered architec-
ture of digital technology (Yoo et al., 2010). Within this architectural framework,
the physical machinery layer defines the physical material properties of the hard-
ware, while the logical capability layer defines how different physical components will
be controlled and maintained. Previous research has primarily examined the phys-
ical machinery (i.e., hardware) and largely ignored the logical capability layer (i.e.,
software) in product innovation (Eaton et al., 2011). Innovation of digital products
requires a consideration of both (Yoo et al., 2010).
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Third, the logical capability layer, e.g., operating system or software-based plat-
form (Tiwana et al., 2010), has been shown to be of particular importance to the
growth, evolution, and transformation of technology ecosystems (Burgelman and
Grove, 2012; Basole, 2009; de Reuver et al., 2015). Software platforms connect stake-
holders in the ecosystem, enable new value creation, and facilitate a continual refine-
ment and expansion of products (Boudreau, 2012). In fact, entire industries are being
formed around digital platforms (Gawer and Cusumano, 2014). Given their impor-
tance, it is not surprising that a fierce battle between platforms has emerged. Firms
offering software platform-based products must judiciously choose among available
platforms, consider the respective benefits of each, and devise an appropriate strat-
egy of whether to attach to a single or multiple platforms (Venkatraman and Lee,
2004).
Lastly, the consumer demand for digitally-enabled products is diverse and enor-
mous (Smith et al., 2001). Relative to products offered in the near past, digitally-
enabled products are adopted and, due to obsolescence, often replaced at a much
faster rate (Billington et al., 2012). In such high velocity environments, competitive
advantage declines in duration (Wiggins and Ruefli, 2002) and firms are required
to adjust their strategic postures (D’Aveni and Ravenscraft, 1994; Giachetti and
Dagnino, 2014). Prior work has identified various possible strategic actions firms can
implement to cope with this competitive intensity within a product line (Bayus et al.,
1999; Jiao et al., 2007). Chief among these is the design and development of product
families. A product family is defined as a set of similar products that are derived from
a common platform and yet possess specific features and functionalities to meet par-
ticular customer requirements (Meyer and Lehnerd, 1997). A product family strategy
allows firms to reuse proven elements in an offering and achieve economies of scale
in order to accommodate an increasing product variety across diverse market niches
(Utterback and Meyer, 1993; Robertson and Ulrich, 1998).
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In light of these realities, existing product innovation models and frameworks must
be revisited. While hardware–software systems have been a topic of research interest
(Teich, 2012), there is a dearth of studies examining product innovation strategies
of digital platform-centric products (Nambisan, 2013). This chapter seeks to explain
how a firm’s product family strategy and digital platform choice impacts product
innovativeness.
We pursue this question by framing product family and digital platform as con-
cepts in innovation search. More specifically, we argue that a product family repre-
sents a “path-constrained” search strategy, while digital platforms represent “areas”
in technology design space. For product family, we examine two key operational char-
acteristics: number of product families concurrently offered and size of the product
family. In doing so, we recognize that firms may pursue multiple parallel searches and
extend existing offerings. For digital platforms, we examine the age of the platform
and the extent to which firms concentrate on one or more platforms. Our empirical
analysis shows that (1) wider and (2) deeper search with product family, (3) newer
platforms, and (4) platform concentration are positively associated with product in-
novativeness.
Theoretically, our study develops a holistic approach to quantifying product inno-
vativeness, differentiating products that integrate a combination of innovative features
and those that actually advance the hypothetical innovation frontier. Our study also
extends ideas of search scope, depth, and boundaries/regions in product innovation
(Katila and Ahuja, 2002a). Managerially, our research identifies strategies that are
associated with product innovativeness in an era of hardware-software systems.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 and 3.3 provide
theoretical background and develop our main hypotheses. Section 3.4 describes meth-
ods and data. Section 3.5 presents our results. Section 3.6 discusses implications and
limitations and Section 3.7 concludes.
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3.2 Theoretical Background
3.2.1 Models of Search Space
Prior research has advocated many different frameworks, models, and approaches
to understand how firms innovate. Arguably one of the most dominant paradigms
in the management literature is to conceptualize innovation as search, a problem-
solving process in which organizations manipulate knowledge to create new products
and services (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Fleming, 2001; Katila and Ahuja, 2002a).
New product engineers, for instance, search for solutions to technical problems by
translating requirements into a set of feasible designs (Frenken and Nuvolari, 2004).
The notion of a technological design space was first introduced by Bradshaw
(1992). Technologies embody a large set of design dimensions that interact in complex
ways (Simon, 1969). The design space specifies the principal technical dimensions of a
technology so that each product is represented by a point in multi-dimensional space
(Frenken and Nuvolari, 2004).
Schumpeter (1934) notably argued that innovations can be conceptualized as novel
combinations of existing resources. A firm’s innovation process thus involves sam-
pling a “space” of technical possibilities by recombining, relocating, or manipulating
knowledge within this space (March and Simon, 1958; Nelson and Winter, 1982). This
technological space is also often synonymously referred to as a pool or landscape of
technical knowledge (Levinthal and March, 1981; Kauffman, 1993).
The NK modeling framework (Kauffman and Weinberger, 1989), for instance, sug-
gests that firms use a bounded, iterative, trial-and-error search for novel combinations
of existing building blocks over a complex technological landscape. This biologically-
inspired model views the search space as a multi-dimensional landscape in which each
point represents a combination or configuration of technological elements along with
the associated utility or usefulness (Loch et al., 2003; Fleming and Sorenson, 2004;
Murmann and Frenken, 2006).
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3.2.2 Search Strategies
Two notions of search are particularly salient in prior work: local and distant search.
Search is considered local, or exploitative, when firms solve problems using knowledge
that is in the neighborhood of their current knowledge base (Helfat, 1994; Stuart
and Podolny, 1996; Fleming and Sorenson, 2004). Distant, or exploratory search, is
defined as search behavior that involves deliberate effort to explore knowledge bases
away from current ones (March, 1991; Katila and Ahuja, 2002a). Cyert and March
(1963) referred to these two strategies as slack search and problematic search. While
useful, these definitions are not considered precise for empirical investigations and
alternate conceptualizations have been developed (Laursen, 2012).
Katila and Ahuja (2002a) introduced concepts of search depth and search scope.
Search depth refers the extent to which firms search within a given knowledge area.
By searching a knowledge domain deeply, firms gain an exceptional level of under-
standing and achieve significant breakthroughs by accumulating a deep but narrow
knowledge pool through specialization. The deeper the search effort, the greater a
firm’s cumulative knowledge and competence in that area (Katila, 2000). As suggested
previously, firms are predisposed to search locally, or in other words, in knowledge ar-
eas in which they have expertise. Search depth thus refers to a local and exploitative
search strategy.
Following Katila and Ahuja (2002a), higher search depth positively impacts prod-
uct innovativeness through several experience effects. By using the same knowl-
edge elements repeatedly, search errors and false starts are reduced, search routines
are established, and searches become overall more reliable (Levinthal and March,
1981). Increased experience within a knowledge space also makes search more pre-
dictable, thus search activities can be sequenced more efficiently (Eisenhardt and
Tabrizi, 1995). Lastly, repeated usage of knowledge elements leads to a deeper un-
derstanding of those elements, allowing firms to find potentially novel combinations
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that are not apparent to less experienced firms of that knowledge domain. On the
other hand, it has been shown that repeated searching in the same area is likely to
result only in incremental technological advancements and decreasing the likelihood
of “radical” innovations (Mezias and Glynn, 1993; Katila, 2000; Fleming and Soren-
son, 2004; Schilling, 2005). Continuous search of familiar knowledge exhausts the
potential of finding novel solutions as all possible combination of knowledge elements
are ultimately achieved (Fleming, 2001; Kim and Kogut, 1996; Schilling and Green,
2011).
Search scope commonly refers to the breadth of knowledge domains explored and is
generally used to describe domains in which the firm lacks prior experience or compe-
tence (Katila, 2000; Fleming, 2001; Schilling and Green, 2011). A larger search scope
enables firms to recombine unfamiliar or atypical combinations of knowledge yielding
greater novel outcomes and pursue a greater number of recombinatorial possibilities,
thereby increasing the likelihood of “radical” innovations. While larger search scope
increases the likelihood of highly novel or radical solutions, it can also be costly (Cyert
and March, 1963; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Kauffman et al., 2000). High scope search
is more uncertain, difficult, and outcomes are varied and less successful on average
(Fleming, 2001; Katila and Ahuja, 2002a). Searching in knowledge domains where
they lack prior knowledge and experience, firms expend more resources and effort to
understand that area. As scope increases, the number of interactions of knowledge
elements increases and comprehension is diminished due to limited cognitive capacity
(Simon, 1978; Schilling and Green, 2011). Uncertainty also increases, as firms do not
have the benefit of prior experience (Nelson and Winter, 1982).
Besides searching locally and distant, research has also argued that firms employ
sequential and parallel search strategies (Abernathy and Rosenbloom, 1969). Sequen-
tial search refers to a focused search approach in which firms are committed to a best
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evident path and pursuing alternate possibilities only if the original proves unsuc-
cessful. Parallel search on the other hand suggest that firms pursue two or more
alternatives simultaneously (Green, 2014). Firms can thus gain both greater search
depth and search scope with a parallel search strategy. However, parallel search can
also be more costly, as firms must expend more resources to manage and direct them.
Prior research in technology management has shown that successful innovation
searches are generally more frequent and distant from what a firm already knows.
Firms’ tendency however is to do exactly the opposite—search too little and stay
local. The prevalence of local search is predominantly explained by the fact that
significant effort is required to achieve a certain level of technological competence due
to greater risks and uncertainty faced by firms when they search for innovations far
away from their current location in the space of technological possibilities.
3.2.3 Search Space Regions and Boundaries
The technological search space can be subdivided in many different ways. Extending
the local/distant search concept in a geospatial sense, the search space can be dif-
ferentiated by geographic boundaries (Almeida, 1996; Ahuja and Katila, 2004). The
search space can also be divided by knowledge ownership respective to the search
firm. (Katila and Ahuja, 2002b) suggests that knowledge spaces have internal and
external sectors: the former in which knowledge is created by the search firm and
the latter in which knowledge is created by others (Mansfield, 1988; Rosenkopf and
Nerkar, 2001; Katila and Ahuja, 2002b). This differentiation suggests that firms are
innovative either because they translate internal knowledge into new products or cap-
ture knowledge spillovers from others. Moreover, Katila and Ahuja (2002b) suggests
that given the salience of industry-specific knowledge, the external search space can
be further divided into knowledge within and outside the search firm’s industry.
Considering dimensions of discovery and viability, Silverberg and Verspagen (2005)
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suggest that the technological search space be divided into four key regions: (1)
technology excluded/infeasible by nature, (2) possible, but not discovered yet, (3)
discovered but not viable, and (4) discovered and viable. The fundamental idea
behind these four spaces is that not all regions have an equal likelihood of being pur-
sued, discovered, or explored. Boundary regions can also be related to the nature of
knowledge—for instance boundary spanning between science and technology knowl-
edge. Studies have shown that ideas are more likely to be high impact when they
are the result of a successful connection forged between seemingly disparate bodies
of knowledge (Uzzi et al., 2013).
3.2.4 Product Innovativeness
The primary motivation of navigating through the search space is to find locations
and regions that generate innovative products. An innovative new product is the
cornerstone to success in many industries (McNally et al., 2010). Product innova-
tiveness, for instance, has been shown to have significant influence on a range of
important performance characteristics, including cycle time (Ali et al., 1995), new
product development performance (Kleinschmidt and Cooper, 1991), product success
(Calantone et al., 2006), speed to market (Fang, 2008), and design quality (Swink,
2000).
Despite a rich body of research (see (Avlonitis et al., 2001; Danneels and Klein-
schmidtb, 2001) for excellent reviews), there is no single agreed upon definition or
measurement of what really constitutes product innovativeness. Innovativeness is of-
ten defined as newness (Garcia and Calantone, 2002), meaningfulness (de Brentani,
1989), or discontinuity (Garcia and Calantone, 2002). Regardless which definition
is used, an assessment demands a consideration from whose perspective it is con-
sidered innovative. While most studies surprisingly do not explicitly distinguish the
innovativeness perspective (Danneels and Kleinschmidtb, 2001), several scholars have
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suggested that a product can be “new” to the world (Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1993),
to the market (Heany, 1983), to the firm (Swink, 2000), or even to the customer (Ali
et al., 1995).
Product innovativeness, however, is not merely a binary assessment. Prior work
has thus examined the degree or extent of product innovativeness. Many studies
use a dichotomous approach, suggesting that product innovativeness can be incre-
mental/radical, evolutionary/revolutionary, or discontinuous/continuous (Avlonitis
et al., 2001). Kleinschmidt and Cooper (1991) argued for a triadic categorization,
distinguishing between high, moderate, and low innovativeness and suggesting char-
acteristics for each. Henderson and Clark (1990) offered a typology based on an
innovation’s impact on core design components and relationships between them, sug-
gesting that product innovativeness can be incremental, architectural, modular, or
radical in nature.
3.3 Hypotheses Development
Building on these theoretical foundations, we argue that two contemporary phenom-
ena in hardware–software systems require further attention in the study of innovation
search. Specifically, we theorize that a firm’s choice in product families and digital
platforms influences the outcomes of its innovation search. The following sections
elaborate on these.
3.3.1 Product Family and Innovation Search
Manufacturers are continuously searching for ways to both expand their product lines
and differentiate their product offerings in order to meet the ever-changing market
expectations (Ho and Tang, 1998). Previous studies have shown that designing and
developing product families is a particularly effective means to achieve economies
of scale necessary to accommodate increasing product variety across diverse market
segments (Utterback and Meyer, 1993; Cottrell and Nault, 2004). More broadly,
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by thinking in terms of product families, firms can increase market share and create
competitive advantages (Kekre and Srinivasan, 1990; Pine, 1999; Krishnan and Ulrich,
2001).
Pending the functional perspective taken, different interpretations of product fam-
ilies exist (Jiao et al., 2007). From a marketing and sales perspective, a product
family describes the various sets of features and functionalities firms have used to
target different customer groups. From an engineering perspective, a product family
represents a configuration of different components and technologies into a feasible de-
sign. Product family strategies are particularly common in assembly industries, such
as consumer electronics, computers, and automobiles (Sundgren, 1999; Gawer and
Cusumano, 2002), as exemplified by products such as Sony’s Walkman R©(Sanderson
and Uzumeri, 1995) or Black & Decker’s power tools (Meyer and Lehnerd, 1997).
Meyer and Lehnerd (1997) define a product family as a set of similar products that
are derived from a common platform and yet possess specific features and functional-
ities to meet particular customer requirements. Individual products within a product
family are commonly referred to as a family member or product variant (Jiao et al.,
2007). Product variants share designs, components, and other assets (Utterback and
Meyer, 1993; Robertson and Ulrich, 1998; Krishnan and Gupta, 2001). Previous work
distinguishes between two classes of product families, namely modular and scalable.
In a modular product family design, different modules are added or substituted to
a common core to develop different products. In a scalable (or parametric) product
family design, key product parameters are varied (e.g., “stretched” or “shrunk”) to
satisfy a range of customer needs (Simpson et al., 2001; Jiao et al., 2007). By reusing
existing elements in new product variants, firms can not only accrue cost benefits, but
also reduce development risk and system complexity, improve the ability to upgrade
products, and leverage their existing manufacturing processes (Sawhney, 1998; Jiao
et al., 2007).
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In terms of innovation search, we posit that a product family represents a search
path of related functional, generational, and compositional elements (see Figure 13).
When developing a new product variant, firms do not search across the entire inno-
vation search space, but instead are constrained to regions related to the search path
associated with that product family. Scalable product family configurations involve
local search exclusively, refining and improving existing designs. Firms exploit exist-
ing knowledge by scaling or shrinking design parameters. Breakthrough innovations
are less likely to occur. Modular product family configurations may involve both
local and distant search as firms may replace existing modules for others. A device
manufacturer for instance may replace alternative radios in a smartphone design or
use different display technologies, targeting entirely different market segments, use
cases, or customer bases.
3.3.1.1 Number of Concurrent Product Families
While the design and development of a single product family may involve local search,
introduction of multiple families may involve greater scope of search, including ex-
ploratory distant search. Firms may experiment with new technological configurations
and designs to target new market segments. As product families will most likely vary
in their market target and functionalities, they will also traverse and occupy different
regions of the innovation space to deliver differentiated value.
By adding more product families, firms increase the scope of their search (Katila
and Ahuja, 2002a). Search scope describes how widely a firm explores new knowl-
edge. It has been shown that search scope positively affects product innovativeness as
it expands the knowledge pool by adding new variations (March, 1991) and enhanc-
ing recombinatory search (Fleming and Sorenson, 2001). Multiple product families
thus represent multiple search paths in innovation space. Firms create multiple prod-
uct families to achieve product differentiation and address different market segments
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(Halman et al., 2003). The idea of pursuing multiple product families also corre-
sponds to the line of thinking that parallel search is particularly beneficial in complex
technology landscapes (Kornish and Ulrich, 2011). Firms pursuing multiple product
families thus explore more of the design space, can learn and gain insights from the
different search paths pursued, and accrue knowledge spillover benefits which can
in turn be implemented into innovative new product offerings. A larger number of
product families allow manufacturers to experiment with and explore novel configu-
rations of different features and functionalities, increasing the likelihood of creating
more innovative products.
Hypothesis 3.1 Ceteris paribus, the number of concurrently developed product fam-
ilies will be positively associated with product innovativeness.
3.3.1.2 Size of Product Family
A second innovation search dimension is search depth (Katila and Ahuja, 2002a).
Search depth refers to how deeply a firm reuses its existing knowledge. Nelson and
Winter (1982) showed that incremental product changes build on past practices and
technique. Dosi (1982) emphasized that technological innovation is both physical
and conceptual, consisting not only of parts and components, but also of a set of
accumulated knowledge, techniques, and skills. New products may leverage older
products directly through reuse of physical components or indirectly through cumu-
lative learning (Jones, 2003). Prior studies have shown that increase in search depth
can positively impact product innovativeness, by reducing the likelihood of errors,
making search more reliable and predictable, and creating a deeper understanding
of the underlying technological concepts (Levinthal and March, 1981; Winter, 1984;
Katila and Ahuja, 2002a). Firms increase search depth by extending the size of the
product family. New product variants build on existing members of the product
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family. The creation of new product variants, through either product family con-
figuration approach, reuses a firm’s existing knowledge. The greater the size of the
product family, the deeper the knowledge reuse. Larger product families allow firms
to realize economies of scale and scope (Axarloglou, 2008; Giachetti and Dagnino,
2014). By extending the size of product families, firms continuously refine, tune, and
improve technological designs, ultimately leading more innovative products. More
formally,
Hypothesis 3.2 Ceteris paribus, the size of the corresponding product family will be







Figure 13: Product Family in Search Space
3.3.2 Platform and Innovation Search
Platforms are pervasive in today’s business environment (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002;
Evans et al., 2006). While there is no universal definition, research in the man-
agement literature has primarily conceptualized platforms either as markets (eco-
nomic perspective), technological architectures (engineering design perspective), or
enablers of digital products and services (information systems perspective) (Gawer
and Cusumano, 2014; de Reuver et al., 2015). In this study, we adopt the definition
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by Tiwana et al. (2010) that a platform represents the logical capability layer, or “ex-
tensible codebase of a software-based system that provides core functionality shared
by the modules that interoperate with it and the interfaces through which they in-
teroperate.” Such digital platforms play a particularly important role for products in
the information and communication technology ecosystems (Basole, 2009; Boudreau,
2010). Given their importance, it is not surprising to see fierce competition between
platforms for market share (Gawer and Cusumano, 2008; Eisenmann et al., 2011).
The battle between platforms in the personal computer industry is particularly well
documented (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002; Bresnahan and Greenstein, 2003). A fierce
battle now also exists in the rapidly emerging mobile device and video game console
industry (Venkatraman and Lee, 2004; Zhu and Iansiti, 2012).
We argue that a digital platform demarcates an already discovered, viable, and
potentially untapped technology region in innovation search space (see Figure 14).
Given that competing platforms often have many common and some unique capabil-
ities, we further posit that the respective search regions enabled by these platforms
have some degree of overlap as well as fill unique regions in the space.
The conceptualization that platforms enable regions in innovation space builds on
ideas proposed by Katila and Ahuja (2002b) and Silverberg and Verspagen (2005)
that innovation search spaces can be distinguished by technological boundaries and
that some knowledge spaces are enabled by entities external to the search firm. Soft-
ware platforms facilitate new technological capabilities and are generally provided by
platform providers. Moreover, this conceptualization is appropriate if we consider
knowledge recombination as a bounded problem-solving process. Some knowledge
recombinations are simply infeasible due to physical constraints or conflicts; others
may not be possible due to a lack of technological enablement. Metaphorically, it




It is well documented that the age of the knowledge space searched by a firm has
an influence on product innovativeness (Sorensen and Stuart, 2000; Rosenkopf and
Nerkar, 2001; Katila and Ahuja, 2002b). On the one hand, older knowledge spaces are
more established, reliable and valuable than more recent ones (March et al., 1991).
Firms have had time to access, learn, and understand the consequences of elements
contained in older knowledge spaces, thereby decreasing the risk of costly errors and
increasing innovation search productivity (Levinthal and March, 1993; Katila and
Ahuja, 2002b).
Conversely, researchers have argued that firms should rather search in more re-
cently developed knowledge spaces, because, as knowledge spaces age, they become
obsolete and no longer match the market demand (Eisenhardt, 1989; Thompson,
1967). Referring to it as the competency trap, Sorensen and Stuart (2000) found that
firms building on to a large extent on past knowledge bases often miss the opportunity
to innovate with recent and potentially more rewarding knowledge. In contexts where
innovations occur rapidly, older knowledge spaces are particularly likely to deplete,
eventually exhausting all possible knowledge combinations. Search in old knowledge
spaces hurts finding new innovations; firms searching in recent knowledge spaces avoid
obsolescence.
Following our proposition that platforms determine feasible innovation search
space regions, we argue that a platform’s age influences the boundary of that space.
Platforms as well as their capabilities and functionalities evolve over time. Newer
platforms build on existing knowledge and advance the boundary of the innovation
search space, enabling recombination of unexplored and viable knowledge elements.
Older platforms represent older knowledge spaces, which have likely been searched
exhaustively and provide fewer opportunities for novel knowledge recombinations.
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Hypothesis 3.3 Ceteris paribus, platform age will be negatively associated with prod-
uct innovativeness.
3.3.2.2 Platform Concentration
Contemporary technology ecosystems are characterized by the presence of multiple
software-based platforms (Evans et al., 2006; Tiwana et al., 2010). Firms must often
make deliberate choices choosing among available software platforms, taking various
enabling capabilities and characteristics provided by each into consideration. Some
firms may choose to use a single platform for all their product offerings, while others
may choose multiple. Prior work in engineering design and technology management
has offered several different explanations for how firms choose platforms including
network effects, economic potential, incentives, and platform attractiveness.
In terms of innovation search, a firm’s platform choice corresponds to which and
how many search regions it has available for its search initiatives. Firms choosing a
single platform limit their search scope. But given that all search initiatives will be
targeted into a single search area, their understanding of that area deepens substan-
tially. Multiple platforms on the other hand widen the search scope. It allows firms
to gain new knowledge, insights, and experience about novel recombinations. These
insights can lead to important knowledge spillover effects useful for other search initia-
tives. However, with multiple platforms, firms must expend more resources in order
to search a diverse set of knowledge spaces, which can be costly, uncertain, risky, and
thereby lead to less innovative outcomes. Given resource constraints, firms choosing
multiple platforms must therefore decide how to distribute its search initiatives across
these multiple search regions.
We refer to the distribution of search initiatives as platform concentration. The
more distributed a firm’s search initiatives across the chosen platforms, the lower
its platform concentration. The more targeted the search initiatives for a region,
70
the higher the platform concentration. Higher platform concentration implies that
a firm has a higher search depth in a particular platform region. There are several
benefits of platform concentration. Platform concentration enables firms to gain
greater understanding of that knowledge space. Consequently, it enables firms to
eliminate bad and focus on good combinations. Over time, platform concentration
creates competence and experience that helps with future search initiatives.
Hypothesis 3.4 Ceteris paribus, the degree of platform concentration will be posi-





Figure 14: Digital Platform in Search Space
3.4 Data and Methods
3.4.1 Research Context
This study uses the smartphone industry to test the proposed hypotheses. The smart-
phone industry has a number of characteristics that makes it particularly suitable for
studying strategies related to product family, digital platforms, and product innova-
tiveness. First, the smartphone industry is arguably one of the most rapidly evolving
technological domains of recent years, characterized by a deep intrinsic intertwin-
ing of innovative hardware and software (Anonymous, 2015). Over the past decade
we have witnessed an explosive growth of smartphones. Smartphones have evolved
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from very expensive, clunky monochrome devices to sleek, converged, mass consumer
market devices. One of the first “Swiss Army Knife” phones was the IBM Simon
released in 1993. It had functions such as a fax, a personal data assistant (PDA), a
pager, and even featured a touchscreen that could be used to dial phone numbers.
Since then many transformational advances in mobile phone technology and prod-
uct design have occurred, including the Nokia Communicator 9000, which featured
a slide-out QWERTY keyboard, Research in Motion’s BlackBerry 5810, which pro-
vided the ability to read e-mail and surf the Web, or the Palm Treo, which integrated
PDA functionalities and a handwriting recognizing system in a mobile phone with
expansion slots and an upgradeable operating system (OS). Unquestionably, a land-
mark event in the history of smartphones was the launch of the Apple iPhone in
2007. The iPhone integrated a touchscreen display with one of the best web browsing
experiences on a mobile device. Today’s leading smartphones are largely a derivative
of this innovative product. Technologies used in smartphones today are highly mod-
ular and interdependent. Smartphone manufacturers must make careful choices in
selecting and integrating the right combination of technological components to pro-
duce a novel and successful product. This choice requires search in a continuously
expanding, but constrained technology design space. New sensors, for instance, can
only be added to the device if the appropriate mobile central processing unit (CPU)
speed is available. Likewise, a camera module is only of value if the built-in storage
is reasonably large enough relative to the camera resolution.
Second, smartphones, by definition, are driven and enabled by digital platforms
(i.e., operating systems). Over the past decade we have seen a fierce battle for mar-
ket share between a diverse set of mobile platforms. Only a decade ago, Symbian
and Blackberry OS were the leading platforms. Today, smartphone manufacturers
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can choose from several more, including iOS, Android, Windows Phone, or a Linux-
variant. Platform versions are regularly updated to keep up with technological ad-
vances and evolving needs. Smartphone manufacturers are forced to make deliberate
platform choices, including a consideration of whether to develop their own propri-
etary platform, which platform(s) to launch new smartphone models on, and whether
to diversify or concentrate their platform portfolio. The digital platform choice is
thus an important strategic decision a smartphone manufacturer must make to have
its product adopted by consumers (Cusumano, 2010).
Finally, unlike any other consumer electronics category, smartphone models are
developed and launched at an unprecedented pace. This is in part triggered by the
insatiable appetite of the market for new gadgets as well as the growth in global
demand. In order to meet these changing market needs, manufacturers must make
careful product decisions and consider ways to differentiate their offerings. To differ-
entiate offerings and rapidly develop new products, the use of product families is a
pervasive phenomena in the smartphone industry.
3.4.2 Sample
To the best of our knowledge, there is no single public data source that provides a
comprehensive, integrated, and curated dataset on smartphones. We thus carefully
retrieved, matched, and triangulated data from two of the most well-established con-
sumer websites, namely PhoneArena1 and PDAdb2. PhoneArena provides detailed
technical specification data on smartphones including product announcement and
release dates; PDAdb provides complementary information, including product code-
names, operating system versions at the time of launch, and CPU chipset models.
As smartphone model names occasionally differed and there was no single unique




data sources. Our initial dataset included 1,331 smartphone models from 79 different
manufacturers released between 2000-2012. Following Katila and Ahuja (2002a),
we dropped products with identical model names and technical characteristics, but
were marketed for different geographic regions (e.g., “American Version”). We also
dropped rumored but never released models from our sample. Our final sample then
reduced to 1,092 unique smartphone models.
We extracted detailed technical specifications including physical design (width,
weight), display (size, resolution, pixel density, panel type), computing power (CPU
clock speed, number of cores, random access memory (RAM) size, storage size), bat-
tery life (battery capacity, talk time, stand-by time), connectivity (cellular network
speed, Wi-Fi standard, Bluetooth version), camera (resolution of main camera, reso-
lution or existence of sub camera, resolution of video), and types of sensors. We also
identified each smartphone’s digital platform (Android, iOS, WindowsPhone, etc.)
and platform version3.
Table 4 presents a descriptive summary of all technical specifications. Figure 15
shows the technological evolution (x-axis denotes time; y-axis presents standardized
z-score values). Several observations can be made. First, there are two different modes
of evolution: exponential and linear. For example, physical (thickness and weight)
and battery properties (talk time, stand-by time, capacity) have been decreasing and
increasing linearly, respectively. Following Moore’s law, computing properties have
been increasing exponentially. Second, technological specifications generally improve
3Most technical features are well understood; others demand some more explanation. Battery
capacity, for instance, is an indicator of how much charge, measured in milliampere-hours (mAh),
a smartphone can hold. Talk and stand-by time (both measured in minutes) consider the power
efficiency of the circuit design. It is possible that smartphones with identical battery capacities can
have different talk times because one is more efficiently designed. Coding quantitative technical
specifications is straightforward. Weight is measured in grams, while screen size is measured in
inches. More complicated is the coding of qualitative technical specifications, such as display panel
type, Wi-Fi standard, or Bluetooth version. For display panel type, we used the time (in years)
since our sample start date (2000) when a certain display panel type was first used in a smartphone
model as a proxy of the technological advancement of the panel type. For the different connectivity
standards, we used the documented speed of the standard as a proxy for technological superiority.
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over time but there are time periods when improvements plateau or reverse in trend.
Average thickness, for instance, increased from 2002-2004; average storage memory
plateaued from 2009-2011; average stand-by time stalled from 2009-2011 while bat-
tery capacity kept increasing during the same period. Lastly, and related to the prior
observation, features have differing take-off timings suggesting clear demarcation of
new introduction, fundamental change, or even popularity. Sensors are virtually
non-existent in smartphones prior to 2007, but increase significantly after that. Av-
erage wireless speeds jumped post-2010. Diagonal display sizes increased rapidly after
2008. Together, these findings support a well-established assumption, namely that
manufacturers must make design trade-offs when adding or improving one feature for
another.
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of Technical Specifications of Smartphones in the
Sample
Group Innovation Dimension N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Physical Thickness 1,073 14.39 4.11 6.70 41.00
Weight 1,052 133.34 30.12 55 490
Display Display Diagonal 893 3.35 0.68 1.80 5.55
Resolution 1,069 231,067 216,112 16,000 2,073,600
Pixel Density 880 206.78 54.44 113 441
Display Panel Type 998 2.45 3.28 1 12
Computing # Cores 808 1.19 0.49 1 4
CPU Clock Speed 842 766.09 377.07 33 2,000
RAM 775 403.83 360.83 1 2,048
Storage 644 4.90 7.69 0 64
Battery Talk Time 976 6.67 3.43 2 35
Stand-by Time 954 324.29 152.10 48 1,090
Battery Capacity 1,008 1,374.41 311.69 500 3,300
Camera Main Camera Resolution 1,020 4.03 2.37 0.10 16.00
Video Resolution 475 843,904 702,851 25,344 2,073,600
Sub Camera Resolution 244 0.77 0.58 0.10 2.10
Connectivity Cellular Network Speed 1,050 13.12 25.16 0.06 100.00
Wi-Fi Standard Speed 845 284.49 278.37 11 600
Bluetooth Version 928 2.27 0.65 1.10 4.00
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We consider product innovativeness as the extent to which one or more smartphone
features (i.e., technical specifications) are more advanced (or completely novel) as
compared to all previously available models. This definition builds on conceptual-
ization of an innovative new product from Martin and Mitchell (1998) and Katila
and Ahuja (2002a). Our study thus considers innovativeness based on a market view
perspective. With this core definition, an improvement in any single feature “rela-
tive” to all previous smartphones in the market—a faster CPU, improved battery life,
or novel sensor—would thus make a smartphone innovative. However, given that a
smartphone is a complex hardware–software product consisting of multiple technolog-
ical features, this view would be limiting. Changes in each feature must be considered
jointly to truly capture product innovativeness.
As prior work has pointed out, there are inherent trade-offs between features
in complex products (Frenken and Nuvolari, 2004; Murmann and Frenken, 2006).
For instance, memory storage size constrains the maximum resolution of a smart-
phone camera. Likewise, a smartphone could contain a desktop-class speed CPU
only when heat and battery is under control. Consequently, to assess the innovative-
ness of a smartphone, we adopted the notion of an innovation frontier (Lieberman and
Dhawan, 2005). The innovation frontier represents a hypothetical “best” smartphone
benchmark that integrates the best features and feature levels (e.g., largest battery
capacity, lightest weight, thinnest thickness) from all smartphones previously in the
market. If a new model surpasses this innovation frontier in any aspect, we consider
that smartphone innovative.
Based on expert feedback, two additional requirements have to be taken into ac-
count in the development of a product innovativeness index. First, a smartphone
surpassing the benchmark in only one aspect must have a lower innovativeness index
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than one surpassing it in many aspects. Second, the innovativeness index must not
be sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of a single feature. For instance, smart-
phones will evolve and incorporate new, emerging technologies (e.g., 3D displays) in
the future. The index should be flexible and be neither ignorant nor too sensitive to
addition or removal of such new technological elements. To allow for these require-
ments, we doubly abstracted the product innovativeness index by categorizing the
smartphone features into logical and equally weighted groups.
Conceptually, our innovativeness index captures how “close” or “distant” features
incorporated into a new smartphone model are beyond smartphones currently in the
market. Implicitly, this assumes that there is a desired technology evolution direction
for each feature. For example, all else being equal, the market will favor a higher clock
speed CPU or a thinner/lighter smartphone. For some features, however, the direction
can be ambiguous. Length and width preferences are debatable. Consumers valuing
mobility may prefer smartphones with a small surface area, whereas others valuing
large displays may prefer a long and wide form factor. To avoid such ambiguity, we
only included features where there was a clear notion of feature advancement. The
final list of groups and associated features included in our index are shown in Table













where G denotes one of the seven feature groups (physical, display, computing, bat-
tery, connectivity, camera, and sensors); |G| is the total number of feature groups and
|G| is the number of features in the feature group G; and x corresponds to a specific
feature in each feature group (e.g., weight in physical group). xi thus denotes the
technological specification of feature x of smartphone i. µx(t) and σx(t) are mean and
standard deviation of feature x of all smartphones that had been released into the
market before time t. In sum, our index computes z-score (xi−µx(t)
σx(t)
) for each feature
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x, takes the average within each feature group G, and then computes the average over
all seven feature groups G. Feature groups are equally weighted and each feature has
the same weight within a group. Using the standardized score (i.e., z-score) in the
innovativeness index makes the variable follow the normal curve, which is a desirable
property for regression analysis.
Our innovativeness index purposely uses a balanced approach to identify inno-
vative smartphones. However, this approach does have limitation that it does not
explicitly capture smartphones advancing the contemporary innovation frontier. Con-
sequently, two possible scenarios may occur. First, a particular model may advance
the frontier, but its overall innovativeness may be poor. For instance, a smartphone
may have the largest screen size to date, but at the cost of short battery life and
substantial weight. Second, a smartphone may be near the frontier, and therefore
highly innovative, but never in fact advanced the boundary. To complement the z-
score-based continuous innovativeness index proposed in Equation (7), we therefore
compute two additional dependent variables. The first is a binary variable of whether
or not a smartphone i advanced the innovation frontier in any technological feature
group; the second is the number of feature group boundaries a smartphone i advanced
outward.
3.4.3.2 Independent Variables
The number of product families corresponds to the total count of product families
a firm concurrently offered during the previous year with respect to a smartphone’s
announcement date t. Following our conceptualization, a product family consists of
smartphones with similar combination of features. We operationalize membership in
a product family using three key criteria. First, manufacturers often explicitly de-
scribe products using predecessor–successor relationships. Many products that carry
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Smartphone Predecessor-Successor CPU Chipset Project Codename
Figure 16: Operationalization of the Product Family Definition
the same model name are part of a flagship series (e.g., Samsung Galaxy S to Sam-
sung Galaxy S II). This convention is often used to signal to consumers that certain
products group together. Second, following a technological component perspective,
we argue that smartphones sharing the same CPU chipset, and thus possess the same
processing capabilities, belong to the same product family. Third, manufacturers
frequently use codenames to refer to smartphone models during the design and de-
velopment process. Smartphones sharing same codenames thus can be considered to
belong to the same product family as well. Figure 16 presents a graphical conceptual-
ization of these three practices. Nodes represent smartphone models; edges represent
the three product family connectors. A product family then is the entire subgraph
(i.e., union of the three criteria) within a manufacturer’s product offerings.
The size of product family is defined as the total number of smartphones offered
within the same product family during the previous year. It thus measures the size
of a product family subgraph.
Platform age is defined as the difference (in years) between the product announce-
ment date t and the platform’s launch date. Based on the conceptualization that
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platforms cumulatively build on prior platforms, newer platforms expand the feasible
search area.
We measure platform concentration of a manufacturer using the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI). This index is a well-tested and widely used measure that quantifies level
of concentration, i.e., how diversified a firm or a particular industry is. For each man-
ufacturer, we first compute shares of smartphones developed for each platform. We
then compute the sum of squares of shares for all platforms. A higher concentration
measured as high HHI means that a manufacturer focuses on a particular platform;
a lower concentration indicates that the firm uses a diversified approach.
3.4.3.3 Control Variables
We include both product- and firm-year-level control variables. First, the number of
products a manufacturer launched in the past year controls for the prolificity of a man-
ufacturer’s product development cycle and schedule. Second, the number of platform
versions during the previous year controls for how actively a platform is maintained.
High frequency of version updating has its trade-offs. Updated platform versions may
make previously unavailable regions in search space feasible, however, implementing
new versions may also incur learning costs. Third, we control for whether the focal
smartphone was developed on a manufacturer’s proprietary platform. Some man-
ufacturers, such as Apple and Blackberry for instance, maintain their own mobile
platforms and develop smartphones only for their platforms. Samsung, on the other
hand, has migrated across many different platforms over the past few years, including
its own. Lastly, following Kini and Williams (2012), we control for relevant firm char-
acteristics. Since smartphone represents a high-tech industry, we control for R&D
intensity measured as R&D expenditure divided by total assets. As manufacturing
smartphones involves maintaining a global supply chain and other capital-intensive
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activities, we also control for capital intensity measured by capital expenditure di-
vided by total assets. The number of employees controls for firm size. All firm-related
variables are drawn from Compustat North America or Compustat Global and are
recorded at firm-year level. We also include dummy variables denoting whether the
manufacturer is from the U.S. and whether the manufacturer is listed in Compustat.
Following Kini and Williams (2012), we impute zeros for manufacturers not listed in
Compustat.
Table 5 provides summary statistics of all variables and the corresponding pairwise
correlation coefficients. Note that the innovativeness index cannot be computed for
the first smartphone in the dataset due to lack of benchmark. By definition, the first
phone does not have a benchmark of existing smartphones to compare with.
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics and Pairwise Correlations
Variable Pairwise Correlations and Descriptive Statistics
Innovativeness Index
(Dummy) Boundary Advanced 0.20
# Boundaries Advanced 0.22 0.89
# Product Families 0.33 -0.06 -0.06
Family Length 0.15 -0.02 -0.04 0.09
Platform Age 0.03 -0.13 -0.15 -0.09 0.26
Platform Concentration 0.03 -0.04 -0.08 -0.11 0.28 0.24
(Log) # Products 0.23 -0.10 -0.11 0.64 0.24 -0.01 0.11
# Platform Versions 0.13 -0.17 -0.18 0.36 -0.13 -0.23 -0.06 0.28
(Dummy) Own Platform -0.07 0.04 0.05 -0.24 0.39 0.27 0.33 -0.12 -0.52
R&D Intensity 0.01 0.09 0.07 -0.12 0.39 0.21 0.23 0.02 -0.37 0.53
Capital Intensity 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.23 0.04 -0.04 -0.22 0.20 -0.23 0.09 0.05
(Log) # Employees -0.01 0.07 0.05 -0.27 0.17 0.15 0.20 -0.19 -0.30 0.41 0.61 -0.09
(Dummy) US Manufacturer 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.09 -0.04 -0.06 0.10 -0.13 -0.23 0.28 0.29 0.00 0.38
(Dummy) Compustat Missing -0.09 -0.08 -0.08 0.03 -0.21 -0.06 -0.12 -0.05 0.46 -0.25 -0.57 -0.49 -0.42 -0.29
Year 0.30 -0.27 -0.28 0.39 -0.04 0.07 -0.08 0.33 0.69 -0.29 -0.26 -0.15 -0.16 -0.13 0.38
Month -0.04 -0.10 -0.11 0.09 0.05 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.00 -0.01 -0.08 0.00
N 1,091 1,092 1,092 1,092 1,092 1,092 1,092 1,092 1,092 1,092 1,092 1,092 1,092 1,092 1,092 1,092 1,092
Mean 0.64 0.13 0.17 3.06 3.28 4.44 0.67 1.50 18.49 0.18 0.05 0.04 1.41 0.19 0.27 2009.20 6.17
Std. Dev. 0.50 0.33 0.51 3.03 3.85 2.53 0.33 1.16 9.96 0.38 0.06 0.05 2.02 0.39 0.44 2.69 3.41
Min -0.80 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2000 1
Max 2.20 1 4 13 16 11.67 1 4.93 34 1 0.28 0.16 6.06 1 1 2012 12
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3.4.4 Estimation
We estimate the following model through OLS regression
Innovativeness Indexi =β0 + β1 # Product Familiesi + β2 Family Lengthi + β3 Platform Agei
+ β4 Platform Concentrationi + γ1Xi + γ2Yjt + εi (8)
where i indicates the focal smartphone, j denotes the manufacturer of the smartphone,
t is year, and εi is the idiosyncratic error term for smartphone i. Xi contains the
control variables corresponding to smartphone i (the number of smartphones launched
by j in the last year, the number of platform version updates in the last year, and
whether the smartphone i was launched on the manufacturer’s proprietary platform).
Yjt denotes firm-year control variables (R&D intensity, number of employees, U.S.
based firm dummy, and Compustat-listed firm dummy).
For estimations involving the two alternate dependent variables—dummy for boundary-
advancing smartphone and the number of feature groups that advance the boundary—
we use logistic and Poisson regression models to fit the above equation.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Product Innovativeness Index
Before presenting the results of our hypotheses, it is pertinent to confirm the validity
of our innovativeness index. Table 6 lists the top 20 smartphones ordered by our
innovativeness index. The models from Samsung dominates the list, but other promi-
nent manufacturers including Apple, LG, and Motorola appear as well. Our list of
manufacturers corresponds strongly with public perception as well as rankings of top
vendors provided by leading market research firms (Gupta et al., 2014). An exami-
nation of specific models also highlights many smartphones commonly identified for
their innovativeness. Apple iPhone 4, Samsung Galaxy S2, and Samsung Galaxy S3
were awarded the best smartphone of the year in 2011, 2012, and 2013 by the Mobile
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World Congress, a highly regarded industry conference for mobile technology. These
three phones are indeed placed near top at 10th, 2nd, and 6th respectively in the
rankings based on our proposed innovativeness index.






P D Cp B Cm Cn S
1 Samsung Wave 2.195 Y Y Y
2 Samsung Galaxy S II 2.150 Y Y Y
3 Samsung Omnia HD 2.092 Y Y
4 Samsung Galaxy Note 1.962 Y Y Y
5 Samsung Galaxy Note II 1.910 Y Y Y
6 Samsung Galaxy S III 1.908 N
7 Apple iPhone 1.906 Y Y Y Y
8 Huawei Ascend D quad XL 1.868 Y Y Y
9 Samsung Omnia II 1.822 N
10 Apple iPhone 4 1.811 Y Y Y Y
11 Motorola A1000 Communicator 1.805 Y Y Y Y
12 Samsung Omnia II CDMA 1.792 N
13 LG Optimus 2X 1.783 Y Y
14 LG Optimus 4X HD 1.764 Y Y
15 Samsung Beam 1.744 Y Y Y Y
16 Asus PadFone 1.740 Y Y Y
17 Motorola Droid Razr Maxx 1.738 Y Y
18 LG Optimus LTE II 1.716 Y Y
19 Samsung Galaxy Nexus 1.699 N
20 Huawei Ascend D quad 1.699 Y Y Y
Note: P-Physical, D-Display, Cp-Computing, B-Battery, Cm-Camera, Cn-Connectivity, S-Sensor
Figure 17 shows a scatter plot of all smartphone models and their innovativeness
index over time. Each dot represents a smartphone model; we use color-coded symbols
to differentiate between the major digital platforms (Android, Windows, iOS, Others).
We note that innovativeness is increasing over time in general. iOS-based smartphones
consistently rank high on the innovativeness index. iOS is a proprietary platform used
exclusively on Apple products. We also see that the variation in innovativeness is
greater for Android-based smartphones than for Windows-based smartphones. This
can be partially explained by the fact that Android is an open-source platform that
is also used in low-budget, entry-level smartphones by many different manufacturers.
We also find that while Windows-based smartphones appeared as early as 2002, its
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Figure 17: Innovativeness Index by Digital Platform
3.5.2 Search Strategy and Product Innovativeness
Table 7 presents the results of the OLS regression analysis. In this analysis, the
innovativeness index is the dependent variable. The first column (Model 1) reports
the baseline model in which the number of products, number of platform versions,
proprietary platform dummy, R&D intensity, capital intensity, number of employees,
U.S. based manufacturer dummy, and missing Compustat dummy were included as
control variables. In Models 2-5 we introduce number of products families, product
family size, platform age, and platform concentration, respectively, to assess those
variables’ possible effects on product innovativeness.
The number of product families concurrently offered during the previous year is
positively associated with product innovativeness and statistically significant (0.048,
p < 0.01), confirming Hypothesis 3.1. The size of the product family of a focal
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smartphone is also statistically significant and positively associated with product in-
novativeness (0.016, p < 0.01), supporting Hypothesis 3.2. Hypothesis 3.3 proposes
that smartphones developed on older platforms tend to be less innovative. The re-
sults provide statistical support for this, with platform age negatively associated with
product innovativeness (-0.022, p < 0.05). Finally, hypothesis 3.4 proposes that when
a manufacturer concentrates its product launches on a single platform rather than
distributing launches across multiple, product innovativeness will be higher. We also
find statistically significant support for this, with platform concentration positively
associated with product innovativeness (0.154, p < 0.05). In summary, all four hy-
potheses are supported.
In order to understand the economic significance of the results, a clear interpreta-
tion of the innovativeness index is needed. As described, the innovativeness index, in
essence, denotes where on the normal curve a smartphone lies. Consider the example
of a smartphone with innovativeness index equal to 1.0. As the innovativeness index
is the average z-score of a new smartphone compared to prior ones, it means that
our focal smartphone is one standard deviation more innovative than all previous
smartphones. Put differently, the focal smartphone is superior to about five out of
six existing previous smartphones following Φ(1) = Pr(Z ≤ 1) = 0.841, where Φ is
the cumulative distribution of the standard normal distribution Z. Moreover, our
results show that we have strong positive constant terms across all models. For the
full model, the constant term is 0.671, suggesting that a new smartphone is techno-
logically superior to approximately 75% of previous models. Correspondingly, we find
that one unit increase in the number of concurrently developed product families in the
past year is associated with a 1.5% increase (Φ(0.719)−Φ(0.671) = 0.015) in the focal
smartphone’s innovativeness standing. Similarly, one unit increase in product family
size in the past year is associated with 0.5%p increase (Φ(0.687)−Φ(0.671) = 0.005)
in the historical rank order. Each additional year to platform age is associated with
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a 0.7% decrease (Φ(0.649) − Φ(0.671) = −0.007). Lastly, an increase in platform
concentration is associated with a 4.6% (Φ(0.825)− Φ(0.671) = 0.046) increase.
An examination of our control variables shows that the number of products re-
leased and number of platform versions used in the prior year are negatively associated
with product innovativeness. However, we do not find any statistical significance for
these results. Similarly, neither R&D intensity, capital intensity, nor firm size are
statistically significant with product innovativeness. Our results suggest that U.S.
manufacturers seems to offer slightly more innovative products, but without any sta-
tistically significant support. Smartphones developed by manufacturers that are not
listed in Compustat, however, have a statistical significant negative association with
product innovativeness, suggesting that more established firms are more likely to
create innovative products.
We also compute variance inflation factors (VIF) to check for potential multi-
collinearity issues. Based on Model 5, the mean VIF is 3.00 and the highest VIF is
8.16 for platform version count. Following the rule of thumb that VIF scores greater
than 10 are of concern, our results suggest that our estimates do not suffer from
multicollinearity issues.
3.6 Discussion
3.6.1 Quantifying the Innovativeness of Complex Products
The new organizing logic of innovation—integrating digital platforms into physical
products—requires scholars and practitioners to go beyond existing theories and prac-
tices (Yoo et al., 2010). Many of today’s digitally-integrated products provide multiple
functionalities. To do so, they often contain multiple different technologies. It is thus
natural to view such products as complex, modular systems consisting of multiple
technological subsystems. Remarkably, existing perspectives on the innovativeness of
such complex products do not take into account the different parts that make up the
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Table 7: Relationship between Innovativeness Index and Search Strategies
1 2 3 4 5
# Product Families 0.046** 0.044** 0.043** 0.048**
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Product Family Size 0.015** 0.017** 0.016**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)




(Log) # Products 0.038 -0.021 -0.031 -0.033 -0.043†
(0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025)
# Platform Versions 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.003 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
(Dummy) Own Platform 0.004 0.042 -0.018 -0.016 -0.062
(0.082) (0.079) (0.079) (0.078) (0.080)
R&D Intensity 0.017 -0.059 -0.312 -0.186 -0.138
(0.577) (0.549) (0.537) (0.527) (0.519)
Capital Intensity 0.548 -0.033 0.111 0.064 0.468
(0.521) (0.624) (0.553) (0.548) (0.565)
(Log) # Employees -0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.008
(0.019) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
(Dummy) US Manufacturer 0.019 -0.002 0.025 0.007 0.021
(0.060) (0.046) (0.048) (0.049) (0.056)
(Dummy) Compustat Missing -0.260** -0.237** -0.230** -0.235** -0.190*
(0.093) (0.082) (0.075) (0.075) (0.076)
Constant 0.680** 0.655** 0.647** 0.768** 0.671**
(0.118) (0.112) (0.106) (0.127) (0.132)
N 1,091 1,091 1,091 1,091 1,091
F -stat 5.27 13.42 15.29 19.49 18.10
Adj. R2 0.22 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.27
Note: Year- and month-fixed effects are included in all models. Robust standard errors, clustered by
manufacturer, are in parentheses. *, ** denotes statistical significance at 5% and 1%, respectively.
system, but rather focus on the innovativeness of individual technologies or compo-
nents. A product that excelled in only a single technological dimension would thus
be deemed innovative.
We suggest that this perspective is limiting and propose a novel way of quantify-
ing innovativeness of complex products. We argue that all constituent technologies
must be considered together to determine a product’s innovativeness. Moreover, our
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study is motivated by the fact that, in practice, it is quite difficult and perhaps even
infeasible for a product to be innovative across all technological dimensions simulta-
neously. There are inherent design trade-offs that must be made, both physical and
logical in nature, which constrain the creation of a “best-of-all-technologies” product.
Manufacturers thus make deliberate technological design choices to bring a specific
smartphone to market. A multidimensional technological innovation perspective must
be adopted.
In our study, we utilize all documented technological specifications to determine
the innovativeness of a smartphone. We group these specifications into seven well-
established and accepted performance categories. Our results show that there are
clear positive evolutionary patterns within these categories and those patterns are
congruent with market perception. In terms of physical characteristics, smartphones
are getting thinner and lighter. All display characteristics (size, resolution, pixel
density, and panel type) are improving over time. Following Moore’s Law, comput-
ing characteristics (CPU, storage, and RAM) are also steadily improving. Constant
improvements are also seen with battery (talk time, standby time, and capacity), cam-
era (resolution and number), connectivity (speed and options), and sensor (number)
characteristics.
In order to understand the concept of our innovativeness index, it may be helpful
to draw on an analogy from sports. In the Olympics, athletes participate in the
decathlon. The result in each of the ten events determines the overall performance
of an athlete. Each event matters, but the success depends on the collective set.
An athlete with the fastest 100-meter dash time could fail miserably in all other
events. Thus, the athlete that finishes high in all events is most likely to win. We
posit in our study that product innovativeness is similar. The overall innovativeness
of a smartphone (i.e. performance of the athlete) is dependent on the extent of
performance across all technological dimensions (i.e. performance in each Decathlon
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event).
Our approach thus allows us to capture a balanced view of product innovativeness
and examine it in relation to the hypothetical “innovation frontier”. It is flexible to
future changes, as new technological features can easily be integrated. It also pro-
vides some interesting practical insights for device manufacturers. As results of top
smartphones in Table 6 show, many highly innovative products do not necessarily
advance the frontier. Consider the Samsung Galaxy S III, widely regarded as one
of the most innovative smartphones in industry. Despite a high innovativeness index
(1.908), achieved through significant computing capabilities and physical properties,
the Galaxy S III did not advance the frontier. In fact, our results show that no
smartphone—even a product with high innovativeness index—advances the frontier
in all dimensions. On the other hand, consider the Apple iPhone 4, another award
winning smartphone. On our hall-of-innovation list, it ranks 10th with an innovative-
ness index of 1.811. It advanced the frontier in three dimensions, including physical
dimensions, display characteristics, and sensors.
These findings suggest two key things. First, for a smartphone to be deemed inno-
vative, a device manufacturer must not necessarily advance any of the technological
dimensions but rather utilize the state-of-the-art, preferably in multiple categories.
This points to the broader notion that a fast-follower can reap the benefits of inno-
vations available in the market. Second, our results show that when smartphones
advance the frontier, advances tend to occur in a subset of dimensions. Figure 18
shows that physical dimensions are commonly improved in conjunction with com-
puting and battery characteristics. Similarly, computing and display characteristics
are advanced simultaneously. Device manufacturers thus should not expend their
resources on trying to advance all technological aspects, but rather focus on a com-
bination of pertinent ones.
Figure 19 shows the scatter plot of innovativeness over time for all smartphones
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Note: P-Physical, D-Display, Cp-Computing, B-Battery, Cm-Camera, Cn-Connectivity, S-Sensor
Figure 18: Co-occurrence of Advancing Frontier
and the quadratically fitted lines for two groups of smartphones. Large red dots denote
smartphones that advanced the frontier at least in one feature group. Small gray dots
represent product that did not advance the frontier. As expected, products with a
high innovativeness index indeed advanced the frontier in many instances. However,
the results reveal that there are cases where smartphones with high innovativeness
index did not advance the frontier while products with low innovativeness index did.
The plot also reveals that high innovativeness is generally correlated with advancing
frontier in early days, while frontier-advancing and non-advancing models appear
more recently.
Examining only the non-frontier advancing products (gray dots), we also can ob-
serve that the average innovativeness increased until 2010 and then suddenly diverged
afterwards. In contrast, the average innovativeness of frontier-advancing smartphones
has consistently increased over the study time period. It confirms how robustly the in-
novativeness index captures the overall innovation landscape of the industry compared
92
(S) Beam I8520






















2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Year
Not Advancing Frontier Advancing Frontier
Quadratic Fit Quadratic Fit 95% CI
Figure 19: Depiction of the Innovation Frontier
to the raw evolution charts of individual technological features in Figure 15. While
many computing-related individual technical features exhibit exponential growth over
time following the Moore’s Law, the innovativeness index grows in linear scale and
is contained within a sensible bound. This stabilization comes from the fact that
we define innovativeness relative to prior products. This is indeed natural way of
thinking about innovativeness; top products keep surpassing their predecessors, but
the market is eventually flooded by mediocre phones.
3.6.2 Managing Product Families and Digital Platforms
In a multidimensional technology landscape, firms make deliberate innovation search
strategy choices in order to avoid potentially undesirable or costly outcomes. Prior
work has suggested benefits of diverse search strategy approaches, including local
versus distant search, depth and breadth search, and even sequential versus paral-
lel search. As physical products are increasingly digitized and the role of software
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increases, hardware–software combinations need to be explicitly studied in product
innovation research. In this study, we frame two hardware–software product inno-
vation phenomena as concepts in search space, namely product families and digital
platforms.
The use and extension of a product family can be thought of as search depth
strategy; the use of multiple product families can be thought of as parallel search.
While not entirely new, prior work has not explicitly conceptualized product families
as an explicit search strategy. The integration of digital platforms into physical
products on the other hand is relatively novel and has not been addressed in the
innovation search literature to date. We conceptualize digital platforms as boundaries
in search space, enabling and highlighting possible search areas.
In an increasingly competitive business environment, device manufacturers con-
tinuously seek to find ways to create innovative new products. Our study shows that
choosing appropriate product family and digital platform strategies can help with this
pursuit. With respect to product families, device manufacturers must decide on how
many different product families to offer and whether to extend a product family. We
theorize, in Hypothesis 3.1, that multiple product families allow a manufacturer to
cover a larger area of the search space, resulting in a greater probability of creating
breakthrough innovations. We conceptualize product family to be a specific search
path through search space. Our thinking thus builds on the recognized benefits that
parallel search processes allow firms to explore the search space more broadly and
effectively. Our results confirm that device manufacturers can create more innovative
products with more product families. It enables manufacturers to gain broader knowl-
edge of viable areas of the search space, allowing them to discard poor technology
choices and integrating good results into future offerings.
Extending product families, as theorized in Hypothesis 3.2, also falls into the line of
thinking that firms can reap benefits through organizational learning. The longer and
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deeper the search path, the greater the probability of producing innovative outcomes.
Our study shows that manufacturers can and in fact should build on the knowledge
they have accumulated over time. By extending product families, the next search
step is more incremental, allowing a manufacturer to exploit an area in which it has
already built expertise. Our results suggest that product innovativeness is thus a
function of product family extension and parallel search.
The consideration of digital platforms as an integral part of their physical product
offering is a relatively new phenomena for device manufacturers. Given the promi-
nence of digital platforms, however, manufacturers have to make some important
platform strategy decisions. Broadly, manufacturers must contemplate two decisions:
which platform(s) to adopt and, if multiple, which one to focus on as their primary
platform. A more complex decision for manufacturers is to whether to offer their own
proprietary platform.
Hypothesis 3.3 states that firms have to continuously search and seek out new sets
of potential combinations in order to stay innovative. Our results show that regions
of the search space have an expiration date. The older the search region is, the less
likely a device manufacturer will innovate. This idea is in line with prior thinking
that firms can eventually exhaust a search space. Firms try all incremental or new
recombinations, and eventually no new ones are available. Our theory suggests that
new platforms enable new regions in search space, allowing for novel recombination
of features. Our results indeed confirm that platform age has a negative impact on
product innovativeness. This finding suggests that device manufacturer should, if
possible, seek out newer platforms.
Of course, this comes at a trade-off. While new platforms offer new opportunities
to innovate, firms must allocate potentially significant resources and capabilities to
“re-tool” and explore a possibly new search area. So, what platform portfolio strategy
should a manufacturer pursue? We theorized, in Hypothesis 3.4, that a concentrated
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platform strategy leads to higher product innovativeness. Indeed, our results confirm
that device manufacturers that have adopted multiple platforms, but focus on one,
tend to create more innovative products. The implications are multifold. The results
suggest that firms pursuing multiple platforms learn and accumulate new knowledge
about the search space. However, they should not distribute their efforts on each
platform evenly. Once they find a reasonable region in search space, they should
start focusing on that single region. This result is in line with the resource-based
view of firms that only a limited number of activities (e.g., pursuing platforms) can
be supported simultaneously.
The results also have practical significance. Firms should continuously learn but
eventually focus their efforts on one platform. In an era where there is an increase in
platform competition and new platforms emerge regularly, firms must make difficult
choices in abandoning the “platform” ship, staying with single platform, or joining
multiple platforms. Our results demonstrate that a multiple platform strategy is
indeed beneficial, however we provide a more fine-grained differentiation between
that of a multiple platform and multiple-concentrated platform strategy.
3.6.3 Advancing the Innovation Frontier
The discussion so far has focused on overall product innovativeness. However, as we
noted earlier there are also two alternative perspectives of innovation as well, namely
whether a smartphone has advanced a boundary and the total number of boundaries
advanced. We use Logistic and Poisson regression models respectively to estimate
Equation (2).
Table 8 shows the results of our post-hoc analysis. We only include the full model
specification. Columns 1-2 show the raw estimates; columns 3-4 report marginal semi-
elasticity, dy
d(lnx)
. When the independent or control variable is in logarithmic form, we




Table 8: Relationship between Frontier-Advancing Innovation and Search Strategies
Raw Coefficient Semi-elasticity
1 2 3 4
(Dummy) # Boundaries (Dummy) # Boundaries
Boundary Advanced Boundary Advanced
Advanced Advanced
# Product Families 0.139** 0.131** 0.038** 0.058**
(0.045) (0.033) (0.013) (0.015)
Family Length 0.015 0.011 0.005 0.005
(0.029) (0.026) (0.009) (0.013)
Platform Age -0.117* -0.108* -0.044* -0.062*
-0.055 (0.049) -0.019 (0.027)
Platform Concentration 0.805† 0.619† 0.049 0.063†
(0.475) (0.322) (0.031) (0.037)
(Log) # Products -0.264 -0.243† -0.024 -0.042†
(0.173) (0.133) (0.016) (0.023)
# Platform Versions -0.022 -0.015 -0.033 -0.034
(0.015) (0.015) (0.022) (0.034)
(Dummy) Own Platform -0.766* -0.372 -0.015** -0.015*
(0.316) (0.242) (0.005) (0.008)
R&D Intensity 5.127 3.534 0.030 0.040
(3.145) (2.253) (0.019) (0.025)
Capital Intensity 8.102** 7.809** 0.033** 0.066**
(2.576) (2.274) (0.010) (0.021)
(Log) # Employees 0.150* 0.111** 0.014* 0.019**
(0.064) (0.041) (0.006) (0.007)
(Dummy) US Manufacturer -0.351 -0.226 -0.006 -0.008
(0.284) (0.234) (0.004) (0.007)
(Dummy) Compustat Missing 0.576 0.421 0.010 0.012
(0.516) (0.377) (0.011) (0.013)
Constant -1.994** 0.700† N/A N/A
(0.738) (0.409)
N 1,087 1,092
Log pseudolikelihood -344.41 -455.82
Wald χ2 1577.20 9257.30
Note: Models 3-4 report semi-elasticity marginal effect, dy/d(lnx). Model 1 and 3 are estimated
by logistic regression model; Model 2 and 4 by Poisson regression model. Year- and month-fixed
effects are included in all models. Robust standard errors, clustered by manufacturer, are in
parentheses. †, *, ** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
We observe several interesting differences from our original innovativeness index
analysis. Only the number of products and platform age are moderately significant;
platform concentration is marginally significant in the Poisson regression. As these
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two variables conceptualize search scope—number of search paths (from a product
family perspective) and activated region (from a digital platform perspective)—we can
derive that advancing the innovation frontier is primarily associated with enlarging
search scope. It may also imply that knowledge spillovers across different regions of
the search space are of greater importance when advancing the innovation frontier.
There are also interesting and significant changes in the control variables. Both
capital intensity and firm size (as measured by number of employees) strongly explain
the probability and propensity of boundary-advancing smartphones. In contrast,
R&D intensity is quite insignificant, suggesting that defining the innovation boundary
is an endeavor of capital and size rather than R&D.
3.6.4 Practical Implications
The innovation index developed and proposed in this chapter provides a way to quan-
tify the innovation landscape for a product market. Product managers in manufac-
turer companies may be able to leverage our approach and measures used in this
chapter to develop their own business intelligence systems that can assist strategic
product positioning planning. Table 6 previously showed the list of the top smart-
phones in the history of the industry. It showed which smartphones were good prod-
ucts overall and which pushed the innovation frontier of the industry. This type of
analysis can be narrowed down and performed within a company instead of the entire
industry in order to help individual companies plan and position their new products.
Moreover, this chapter is particularly relevant to the product companies that have
close relationships with digital platforms. Although digital platforms have played an
important role in some consumer electronics product categories so far, their role will
be increasingly prominent for traditionally considered as brick-and-mortar product
and business categories as well. For example, automobiles are more and more pow-
ered by digital platforms. Our study can inform product managers at those companies
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influenced by digital platforms. Choosing a platform for new products, product man-
agers need to consider the obsoleteness of the platform and balance among multiple
platforms. The platform is an inherently constraining factor for new configurations
in the product development space, so choosing it with deliberate effort may save
unnecessary costs down the road.
One of the unexpected results is the differential impact of product family manage-
ment and platform strategy on the innovation index and the probability of pushing the
innovation frontier. Overall goodness of products represented as the innovation index
is influenced by both search scope and search depth in product family and platform
choice. However, pushing the innovation frontier of the industry is only associated
with search scope. Developing a new product that surpasses existing products in any
technical dimension requires exploratory activities of the search space. This nuanced
finding is new to our previous knowledge on new product development.
3.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we propose and develop a novel innovativeness index for complex
multi-technology products. We then theorize and empirically test the relationship
between product family and digital platform strategy on product innovativeness in
the highly dynamic smartphone industry using a unique dataset from 2000-2012.
Specifically, we extend current theories of innovation search by conceptualizing prod-
uct family and digital platforms as paths and regions in search space.
We find that concurrent number of product families and size of the focal product
family are positively associated with product innovativeness. These results corrobo-
rate findings from prior work on search breadth and depth, respectively. Our results
also suggest that products developed on older digital platforms are less innovative,
confirming that platforms activate search regions and search spaces can be exhausted.
Lastly, we find that a concentrated digital platform strategy, in which manufacturers
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pursue multiple, but focus their efforts on a single digital platform, has particularly
positive outcomes on product innovativeness. This finding is supported by principles
of organizational learning and resource-based view of firms.
Our study contributes to product innovation theory and practice at the intersec-
tion of operations management, information systems, and strategy. Specifically, we
empirically demonstrate how the new modular, layered product architecture—fusing
the physical and logical layers—influences product innovativeness. We hope that our
study, and the concepts developed in it, forms the basis for future innovation research
of complex products in an increasingly digitized world.
Our study is not without limitations. First, we focus our analysis on a single
product domain. Unquestionably, the smartphone industry is one of the early do-
mains where software and hardware are inextricably intertwined. Future research
should examine how our theory holds up in related product categories, such as tablet
computers, or other emerging platform domains, such as video games, medical de-
vices, or electric vehicles. Second, we acknowledge that platforms are continuously
updated and improved. Although we control for the number of version updates re-
leased by the platform provider in our analyses, future research should examine the
role of version upgrade types such as major, minor, and patch updates on product
innovativeness. Lastly, an interesting extension of our study would also include an ex-
amination of other ecosystem stakeholders and their contributions to innovativeness.
It is well recognized that third-party application developers are playing an influential
role in the broader mobile ecosystem and that smartphones are merely a vehicle to
value creation and delivery. With increasing importance of software applications, an
investigation how product innovativeness enables and fosters new types of applica-
tions/developers and how the need of new types of applications drive the direction of
product innovation would be an exciting direction for future research.
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CHAPTER IV
PRODUCT INNOVATION AND EXCLUSIVE
PARTNERSHIP WITH SERVICE PROVIDERS
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter develops a theory of the innovation process for new product de-
velopment in a search space constrained by digital platforms. We empirically validate
the proposed search space theory in the smartphone industry using a newly developed
measure for product innovativeness. This chapter looks at another integral relation-
ship in the triadic industry structure: the relationship between manufacturers and
network service providers. This relationship is similar to that between manufacturers
and platform developers in that the two parties are codependent for developing and
launching a new product. A smartphone, before anything else, is a mobile phone that
requires connection to the cellular network operated by a network service provider.
One key difference is that service providers do not have such a strong grip that plat-
form developers have in order to influence the technical specifications of the products.
Yet, we find that service providers can leverage their consumer base to regulate the
level of competition on the manufacturer side and affect the technical evolution of
products in a rather implicit way. In particular, this chapter pays close attention
to how the service provider’s selection of products to be available on its network in-
fluences manufacturer-side competition and the evolution path of product technical
specifications over time.
Procuring high-quality products from high-profile suppliers is one of the most im-
portant success factors for distributor or retail businesses facing consumers (Weigelt,
2013). Even better, if an exclusive arrangement can be made, the partnership can
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become a source of competitive advantage from differentiation (Subramanian et al.,
2013). Stories of retailers and platforms pursuing premium suppliers in real business
practices are plentiful. In 2012, Starbucks Corporation acquired a San Francisco-
based boutique bakery, La Boulange, after looking for a way to improve the quality
of its pastry lineup. In the digital world, video game consoles sometimes have exclu-
sive game titles available only on their own platforms. A series of franchise star titles
such as Halo on Microsoft Xbox helped retain existing customers and even induced
switching or multihoming from the user base of the competing consoles.
As much as looking for premium suppliers, downstream distributors also have an
incentive to regulate quality of supplier products. They set up explicit acceptance
criteria that eventually influence the evolution trajectory of product design due to
strategic reaction of suppliers (Luo et al., 2007; Williams et al., 2008). Implicit factors
like distributor market structure also influence the product design evolution (Williams
et al., 2011). However, the existing literature on strategic product design has focused
on the relationship between manufacturer and retailer, leaving the competitive aspects
among manufacturers largely unexplored. In this chapter, we examine how distrib-
utors can introduce a disruptive product in their network to intensify supply-side
competition so that suppliers need to provide their technologically superior products
to them. As a result, a distributor’s product assortment choice implicitly shapes the
technology evolution trajectory without explicit guidelines on product specifications.
In 2007, the U.S. telecommunications industry witnessed the arrival of a new
smartphone, which transformed the industry permanently. The introduction of the
Apple iPhone was a game changer for the whole mobile ecosystem affecting all types
of players operating in the industry: handset hardware manufacturers, network car-
riers as cellular service providers, software companies, and application development
communities (Basole, 2009). Before the iPhone, network carriers had governed and
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led the ecosystem as they could force manufacturers to ship some of their own soft-
ware and dictate which software programs would run on the device. They were even
able to influence the hardware specifications of the handset, but they lost their strong
grip on hardware after the iPhone (Vogelstein, 2008).
The iPhone changed not only the way the industry works from a platform and
software perspective but also from a hardware product innovation perspective. While
it did not necessarily have the best technological aspects, it offered a balanced com-
bination of existing technologies. In this sense, the iPhone can be regarded as a
prime example of architectural innovation that successfully recombined existing core
components in a novel way (Henderson and Clark, 1990). Still, some of its hardware
components were in fact state of the art (e.g., built-in exotic sensors such as accelerom-
eter, large capacitive touch screen, spacious permanent storage). What makes this
setting particularly fitting for our study is that the iPhone was released exclusively on
the service carrier network (AT&T). This exclusivity continued for nearly four years
until a successor model of the original iPhone was finally released on a competitor
service network (Verizon).
From AT&T’s perspective, the adoption of the iPhone exclusively on its network
was a risky bet (Mehta, 2007; Sharma et al., 2007). The strategic upside was to boost
market share by inducing consumers fond of the iPhone to switch from competitors
and tying those consumers to the usual two-year contract. On the contrary, the
downside would be that the whole wireless carrier business could be commoditized
and marginalized by yielding profitable revenue sources to the platform developer
providing more flexible and transparent service (Vogelstein, 2008). For instance, the
short messaging service, one of the most lucrative services for network carriers, became
almost completely obsolete due to apps that provide free messaging service using the
Internet (West and Mace, 2010). In retrospect, the deal turned out to be mutually
successful for both Apple and AT&T.
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Exploiting this temporal asymmetry in adoption timing, we study how hardware
suppliers react to the debut of a potentially disrupting product by adjusting the prod-
uct design and deployment decisions. We compare phones supplied to AT&T with
those to Verizon or other network carriers before, during, and after the exclusive con-
tract. We quantify the overall goodness of a phone relative to phones preexisting in the
market beforehand. Using the proposed measure, we estimate the average treatment
effect using the difference-in-differences (DID) method. We find that manufacturers
first avoid competition by clinging on to old product categories and reducing smart-
phones in their product mix. However, they eventually recognize the transformed
product competition landscape and pursue head-to-head competition. Moreover, in
response to the disruptive product, competing manufacturers supplied their tech-
nologically superior products to AT&T over the exclusive contract period. For a
given manufacturer, products supplied to AT&T were better than those supplied to
other network carriers by 0.239 standard deviation. The manufacturers particularly
focused on product features—display, computing, and sensors technology—in which
the iPhone excelled. This asymmetric competition-induced product enhancement de-
cision of manufacturers persisted even after the exclusive contract had expired. Our
study builds on the extant literature on strategic product design for channels and
contributes to the understanding on strategic implications of disruptive technology
adoption (Gaimon, 2008).
The rest of the chapter unfolds as follows. Section 4.2 reviews theoretical back-
ground and develops hypotheses. Section 4.3 describes our data sources and empirical
identification strategy. Section 4.4 reports our main results testing the hypotheses.
Section 4.5 provides robustness checks and discusses firm-level implications of our
findings and Section 4.6 concludes the chapter.
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4.2 Theoretical Background
From a new product development perspective, the literature on strategic product de-
sign for distribution channels provides the theoretical foundation for this chapter. Luo
et al. (2007) and Williams et al. (2008) studied the interaction between suppliers and
distributors on the product level by showing how the distributors’ product acceptance
criteria influences the suppliers’ new product design. Williams et al. (2011) further
examined how distributor-side market structure influences new product design. Our
study complements this research stream by highlighting the endogenous competi-
tive aspects in the interaction between suppliers and distributors in the presence of
disruptive innovation. Observing longitudinal responses allows us to differentiate be-
tween short-term and long-term reactions, which sheds light on the dynamic product
evolution trajectory.
Our research also touches on the exclusive dealing literature. Since access to and
acquisition of quality suppliers can be a source of competitive advantage as it allows
differentiation, exclusive dealing has been studied extensively in many academic fields
including applied microeconomics, supply chain, and marketing. Marvel (1982) and
Aghion and Bolton (1987) established the definition of exclusive dealing and the con-
ditions when such an exclusive arrangement arises. Many theoretical (e.g., Besanko
and Perry, 1993, 1994; Fumagalli and Motta, 2006) and empirical (e.g., Sass, 2005)
studies have followed. These microeconomic setups have influenced contemporary
supply chain studies (Shou et al., 2009; Chen and Guo, 2013; Wang and Shin, 2014).
In terms of research setting, our study connects to a line of research motivated by
the success of the iPhone. Because of exclusive launches in many countries (Cho et al.,
2014), the iPhone triggered several legal and economic analyses about tying, contract
restrictions, and antitrust issues. These legal cases corroborate the significant mar-
ket impact of the iPhone. Naturally, many academic studies have paid attention to
the exclusive arrangement made between Apple and AT&T for the iPhone (Chen
105
and Riordan, 2007; Bougette et al., 2012). The marketing literature, in particular,
has made a series of attempts to model the exclusive contractual structure. Most of
them are theoretical modeling pieces employing a game-theoretical approach. Subra-
manian et al. (2013) provide competitive analysis caused by exclusive arrangement,
while Sinkinson (2011) analyzes entry incentive upon exclusive contract. Both of
them specifically pinned their context to the smartphone industry. Cai et al. (2012)
generalized the problem to operating exclusive channels and revenue sharing. Despite
the impact of this exclusive arrangement, surprisingly, only a few studies performed
empirical investigation on the iPhone’s exclusive launch. Zhu et al. (2011) have shown
the changes and prediction of market share among major network carriers adjusting
price effect. Cho et al. (2014) looked at how exclusive contract affected consumer
demand across six different countries. To the best of our knowledge, no studies have
investigated product-level action-reaction triggered by the exclusive contract of the
iPhone.
4.2.1 Hypotheses Development
The first competitive response we hypothesize is the adjustment of product assortment
from the manufacturer’s perspective. Manufacturers have incentive to both increase
and decrease the portion of the “disrupted” product category among those supplied
to the “disrupted” distributor that adopted disruptive product. The direction seems
ambiguous in the lump sum, so we need to delve into the logic for each direction
and decompose the incentive temporally. The pressure for decreasing the disrupted
product category in product mix is from the competition in the supply side as the
disruptive product will raise consumers’ expectations for the disrupted product cate-
gory. At first, competitors may not realize that the new product is disruptive or not
until the market has turned over (Christensen, 2013). We can expect that competing
manufacturers simply focus on old product categories just to avoid competition in
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the short run.
The opposite pressure for increasing the disrupted product category in product
mix comes from the consumer demand side as consumers with strong desire for the
disruptive product self-select to subscribe to the disrupted distributor. In the long
run, the disrupted distributor may arise as an icon for the disruptive product and
the competing manufacturers will eventually accept the disruption as reality. They
will readjust the product assortment with emphasis on the lineups in the disrupted
product category. This rebound in product mix will be primarily associated with the
disrupted distributor because of the preferential attachment mechanism (Venkatra-
man and Lee, 2004). In the long run, competing manufacturers will try to mute down
the disruptive product by flooding the disrupted distributor’s network.
Hypothesis 4.1a In the short run, manufacturers decrease the proportion of the
disrupted product category in their product mix.
Hypothesis 4.1b In the long run, manufacturers increase the proportion of the dis-
rupted product category in their product mix particularly for the disrupted distributor.
Moving from product mix to technical details of products, we can reasonably
expect that manufacturers will attempt to enhance technical specifications for the
products supplied to the disrupted distributor compared to those supplied to other
channels. This mechanism has been studied in the competitive dynamics literature as
the Red Queen effect. One firm’s strategic competitive action triggers rivals’ reactions
that erode the impact of the original action. Firms are running as fast as they can just
to stay at status quo and they need to run twice as faster than others to stay ahead
(Derfus et al., 2008). The novelty in our theoretical formulation lies on the conjecture
that firms in one industry can leverage from the partnering industry’s intensified Red
Queen competition to create a sustainable competitive advantage. Firms are not mere
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subjects in the Alice world, but they can adjust the pace of competitive reactions in
the adjacent industry.
One possible account of this competition-induced product enhancement hypoth-
esis comes from the market expectation perspective. When a disruptive technology
becomes available through the disrupted distributor, consumers are exposed to the
new value proposition brought by the new product. Some consumers in competing
channels may even migrate to the disrupted distributor because of this new prod-
uct if multihoming is limited. Johnson et al. (1995) suggests that consumers facing
a disruptive market change caused by a new product adjust their expectations on
product performance for other products. Thus, consumers subscribing to the dis-
rupted distributor would have significantly higher expectation on the overall product
performance. Another explanation is that subscribers to the disrupted distributor
have a larger choice set simply because one new product is added. Evidently, being
chosen from a larger choice set is harder than from a smaller set unless the disrup-
tive product is a mediocre choice item in the set. In sum, the disrupted distributor
becomes a tougher contest stage for the disrupted product category due to the raised
expectation of the consumers in the network. Facing this change on the demand side,
manufacturers supplying products to both disrupted and undisrupted distributors are
expected to keep up with the rising consumer expectations (Bridges et al., 1995). In
order to stay attractive in the disrupted distributor’s network, the competing manu-
facturers need to supply technologically superior products. Moreover, as followers to
a disruptive product, manufacturers will engage in mimicry and particularly focus on
the technology areas that the disruptive product excelled in.
Hypothesis 4.2a Manufacturers provide one’s better products to the disrupted dis-
tributor.
Hypothesis 4.2b Manufacturers particularly improve the product technical specifi-
cations that the disruptive product excels in.
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Exclusive arrangements may or may not be permanent. If exclusivity is achieved
in the form of vertical integration or acquisition, such exclusivity may deem perpetual.
If two parties cooperate on a common goal only for the time being, such an exclusive
contract is likely in a limited term. If exclusive dealing is a key mechanism to intensify
competition in other partnering industries, it is a valid question to ask whether the
positive effect hypothesized by H4.2a will be canceled out or even turn negative when
the exclusive contract ends.
When an industry—as collective organization—reaches an equilibrium state, it re-
sists to change due to industry inertia (Bozzo, 2002; White and Yanamandram, 2004).
To keep inertia as a defensive barrier, industry leaders often run retention programs
to maintain customer loyalty. Customers purchasing a product or subscribing to a
service may also develop a sense of community among themselves, which serves as
an industry inertia that resists to change from the status quo (Fraering and Minor,
2006). In our context, such industry inertia can be expected to exist both on the
manufacturer and on the subscriber side. On the manufacturer side, the equilibrium
is that no single manufacturer will have a unilateral incentive to lower back the tech-
nical specification for products supplied to the disrupted distributor even when the
exclusive contract for the disruptive product ends. On the subscriber side, customers
will maintain the perception that the disrupted distributor deals superior products
than other service providers. Given these sources of industry inertia, we expect that
a manufacturer’s supply behavior change caused by an exclusive contract will persist
even if the contract ends. That is, once the disrupted distributor starts attracting
better products relative to other carriers, this new equilibrium will not be undone just
by ending the exclusive contract. We refer to this persistence over time as temporal
competitive spillover.
Suppose it turns out that the disrupted distributor indeed sources better prod-
ucts in the disrupted product category affirming H4.2a. The main driver for such
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behavioral change of manufacturers is rising consumer expectation. This also sug-
gests that tech-savvy customers self-select to migrate to the disrupted distributor
network, which makes the disrupted distributor customer base more sensitive to the
technological superiority of the product on the network. With this new customer
base, and due to the umbrella branding effect, the disrupted distributor may be per-
ceived as a network carrier that runs technologically superior products on its network
not only for the disrupted product category but also adjacent old product categories.
We can then expect that even consumers who are late in technology adoption, if their
preferences are more sensitive to technology itself, will switch to the disrupted dis-
tributor from other distributors. Assuming that manufacturers react in the same way
to such a change in customer composition, we can formulate a hypothesis describing
the horizontal (i.e., product categorical) competitive spillover effect.
Hypothesis 4.3a Manufacturers provide one’s better products to the disrupted dis-
tributor even after the exclusive contract for the disruptive product ends.
Hypothesis 4.3b Manufacturers provide one’s better products to the disrupted dis-
tributor not only for the disrupted product category but also for adjacent old product
categories.
4.3 Data and Methods
4.3.1 Data Source
Our data come from PhoneArena.com, which is a web service that collects technical
specifications of mobile handsets. It is a comparable source to GSMArena.com, which
has been used by several prior research published in academic outlets. Each handset
device is categorized as one of four types: basic phone, feature phone, smartphone,
and tablet. We excluded tablet because tablet has different value proposition and
consequently different user base. Tablet also differs from phone in a sense that access
to cellular network is not essential for its value proposition. Our primary focus in
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our study is mobile phone. When phone type is blank, we categorized them as basic
phone. We also grouped basic phone and feature phone together because smartphone
is the product category disrupted by the arrival of the iPhone. We also removed
cases when the phone was canceled not released to the market eventually. Lastly,
we manually merged duplicate entries primarily based on manufacturer, device type,
announced date, and physical dimensions. Two same type phones from the same
manufacturer announced on the same date having exactly the same length, width,
weight are regarded the same products. Final merge was done by hand to ensure
different phones remain as separate entities. In a few cases, some distinct phones
from the same manufacturer indeed do share the same dimensions and announced
date. Finally, this initial screening and classification results in 4,386 phone entries.
Each entry also contains information about manufacturer and carrier, announced
date, and detailed technical specifications. The technical specifications of each record
include physical properties (dimensions and weight), display quality (e.g., panel size,
pixel density, and panel type), computing power (e.g., CPU clock speed and number
of cores), battery performance (e.g., capacity and talk-time), camera quality (e.g.,
number of pixels, availability of secondary camera, and movie quality), connectivity
standards (e.g., cellular network speed and supported Wi-Fi standard), and number
of built-in sensors (e.g., gyroscope, and proximity sensor).
4.3.2 Sample and Variable Construction
Our initial sample contains 4,386 phones and their various technical specifications
from PhoneArena.com. For the description of the data source in full details, refer
to Chapter 3. The main focus of this study is to examine the changes in products’
technical characteristics in the advent of the iPhone. If we tested for each technical
characteristic, the analysis would be inefficient and hard to summarize generally.
Thus, we need a variable that summarizes the technological superiority of a handset in
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a quantifiable way. Similar to Chapter 3, we grouped detailed technical specifications
into seven technical property groups as briefly introduced in the previous section.
Each group contains different number of subdimensions (or technical properties). For
instance, the physical dimension contains two subdimensions: thickness and weight.
The characteristic of each subdimension is converted into standardized z-score. To
compute the z-scores, we need a benchmark set of products that serves as a underlying
distribution to which focal technical property is compared. We define all previous
phones of the same type announced before the focal phone as the benchmark set.
That is, every phone is compared against all previously announced phones. When
computing z-scores, we transformed some technical properties into logarithmic scale
if the property is highly skewed. Such technical properties include CPU clock speed,
network speed, and camera quality (number of pixels). The computed z-scores in
each technical subdimensions are then averaged within each major group. Finally,
the average z-score across the seven major groups becomes the product innovation
index of the focal phone. The innovation index was computed separately between
basic phone and smartphone. Equation (9) summarizes how the innovation index












where C = {Physical, Display, Computing, Battery, Camera, Connectivity, Sensor}
and |C| = 7. Each c ∈ C denotes the set of subdimensions belonging to each technical
property group and |c| is also size of set c. Each x ∈ c denotes specific technical
property such as thickness in the physical properties. µx(t) and σx(t) are mean and
standard deviation of x of all phones in the benchmark set launched before time t.
In essence, the innovation index of phone i is average of averages of standardized
z-scores of technical properties. It implies equal weights among subdimensions in the
same group and equal weights among seven technical property groups. For detail tech
spec classifications, refer to Chapter 3.
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Once we compute the innovation index based on the aforementioned 4,386 data
points, we further narrow down the sample to elicit our empirical setting. We first
funnel the sample by keeping only manufacturers that have announced phones both
before and after the announcement of the iPhone. Since our focus in this study is
to compare before and after the behavior of competing manufacturers of Apple, such
manufacturers must have existed and offered phones before and after iPhone. Apple
products were also removed from the dataset as we view the release of the iPhone
as an exogenous event to the industry and our goal in this chapter is to observe
other manufacturers’ reactions to the action. 3,011 phones from 26 manufacturers
remained after applying this first criterion. Next, we surveyed the list of products
launched by each manufacturer. We looked at which carriers those products were
launched. Since the marking of carrier information is important in our empirical
setting, we removed manufacturers whose products have not been associated with any
U.S. network carriers. We also removed manufacturers who have not launched any
products on the AT&T’s network because phones launched on the AT&T’s network
is the treatment group and those on other carriers’ network become control groups.
Finally, we removed phones that do not have the corresponding innovation index.
The final dataset for the main analysis contains 2,691 observations including 1,914
basic phones and 777 smartphones spanning from 1999 to 2013. The dataset ends on
June 30, 2013. The dataset contains 13 manufacturers. Top manufacturers by the
number of launched phones are Samsung (874 phones), LG (452 phones), Motorola
(376 phones), and Nokia (368 phones).
Figure 20 shows the distribution of the innovation index, our main dependent
variable, over the phone categories. Histogram shows innovation index of all phones
and kernel density plots show the index of basic phone and smartphone. First of
all, we confirm that innovation index defined by Equation (9) closely resembles the
normal distribution. The normality of the main dependent variable is a desirable
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characteristic for OLS regressions. Next, we see that the mean of the distribution
is above zero, which confirms the obvious intuition that technical properties have
improved over time. Lastly, the mean innovation index of smartphone is greater than
that of basic phone. That is, the technical leap between a new smartphone and its
benchmark of previous smartphones is larger than that between a new basic phone
and its benchmark of previous basic phones. In other words, smartphone as a product
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Figure 20: Product Innovativeness Distribution Over Phone Types
Table 9 shows the summary statistics and correlations of the main variables. Many
of our variables are dummy variables denoting time and carrier. The period during
which Apple and AT&T had an exclusivity agreement on iPhone was defined from
January 9, 2007 to January 11, 2011 when iPhone 4 was released on the Verizon’s
network (Figure 21). Two dummy variables denoting the times during or after the
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exclusive contract are defined in Equation (10) as follows.
Duringi = 1 if ti ∈ [01-09-2007, 01-11-2011) otherwise 0
Afteri = 1 if ti ∈ [01-11-2011, 06-30-2013] otherwise 0 (10)
Three carriers (AT&T, Verizon, and T-Mobile) are denoted by separate dummy vari-
ables. From the raw pairwise correlation shown in Table 9, we can make rough
observations on the trends of product innovativeness in the mobile handset domain.
First, smartphones are technically superior to basic phones as being a smartphone
is positively correlated with higher innovation index. Second, innovation index has
grown over time as seen in the positive correlation with year or during and after dum-
mies. Lastly, Verizon seems to carry more innovative products in general. Note that
these comparisons are based on raw pairwise correlation, so it only tells the pairwise
relationship between two variables without controlling for other compounding effects,
which will be the main results of this chapter.
Table 9: Summary Statistics and Pairwise Correlations
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Pairwise Correlations
Innovativeness 2,691 0.46 0.51 -2.06 2.31
(Dummy) Smartphone 2,691 0.29 0.45 0 1 0.34
(Dummy) During Exclusive Contract 2,691 0.47 0.50 0 1 0.10 -0.08
(Dummy) After Exclusive Contract 2,691 0.19 0.39 0 1 0.14 0.34 -0.46
(Dummy) AT&T 2,691 0.14 0.34 0 1 0.04 0.07 -0.08 -0.02
(Dummy) Verizon 2,691 0.11 0.31 0 1 0.18 0.06 -0.05 0.00 -0.08
(Dummy) T-Mobile 2,691 0.07 0.26 0 1 -0.01 0.06 -0.04 -0.02 0.12 -0.04
Year 2,691 2007.70 2.95 1999 2013 0.28 0.32 0.26 0.65 -0.10 -0.05 -0.06
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Figure 21: Timeline of iPhone Announcements on AT&T and Verizon
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4.3.3 Estimation
Harnessing the contrast between AT&T and other carriers triggered by the exclusive
contract of the iPhone, we use the DID method to estimate the impact of exclusive
release of iPhone on the competitive landscape of product design and innovation.
Although we tease out other major carriers in the U.S.—Verizon and T-Mobile—in
some models, our baseline estimation model is as follows in Equation (11).
Innovation Indexi =α + βjAT&T + βt1During Exclusivity + βj,t1AT&T×During
+ βt2After Exclusivity + βj,t2AT&T× After + γk + γy + γm + εi
(11)
where j and k denote carrier and manufacturer of phone i. γk, γy, γm represents
manufacturer-, year-, month-fixed effects (FEs), respectively.
Using the DID estimation, our primary focus is to look at the coefficients of
the interaction terms of AT&T×During and AT&T×After. As we are interested in
the response of handset manufacturers competing on product innovation, we include
manufacturer-FEs for all models. The manufacturer-FEs allows us to examine a
manufacturer’s product development and deployment decisions before and after the
iPhone while controlling for unobserved firm-specific idiosyncrasies. Since our hy-
potheses are structured from a manufacturer’s perspective, it is imperative to include
manufacturer-FEs in all regression models. We also include year- and month-FEs
to control for time trend and seasonality because firms’ decisions on the technical
specifications of their phones may be subject to time trend.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Product Category Mix Adjustment
The first competitive response we expect from manufacturers is the adjustment of
product category assortment between basic phone and smartphone (H4.1a and H4.1b).
Evidenced by the later success story, the iPhone was a product that redefined the
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smartphone as a product category. When the iPhone was released only on the AT&T’s
network, the competing manufacturers making both basic phones and smartphones
have counteracting incentives. In the short run, since now AT&T carries a strong
smartphone, manufacturers may want to downplay the disrupted product category
(smartphones) by focusing on old product categories (basic phones) (H4.1a). In the
long run, however, manufacturers may want to place more smartphones in the AT&T’s
network because AT&T now becomes known to consumers for better smartphones
(H4.1b).
To test these hypotheses, we estimate the change in the product category mix by
replacing the dependent variable in Equation (11) with the dummy variable denoting
whether the focal phone is basic or smartphone. Table 10 shows the results. To facil-
itate interpretation, we first report OLS estimates (Models 1-6). All models include
manufacturer-FEs and Models 1-3 do not include time-FEs. The only effect strongly
significant is that the ratio of smartphones in the product category mix has increased
over time. Only 16.9% of phone models were smartphone before the iPhone was
launched. 24.6% during the exclusive agreement period and 58.5% after the period
of launched phones were smartphones (Model 1). These differences across periods
disappear when we include year- and month-FEs (Model 4). However, we find little
evidence that manufacturers change the product category mix differentiated across
network carriers in this OLS analysis. Only Model 3 weakly suggests that manu-
facturers released relatively more smartphones on the AT&T’s network during and
after the exclusive dealing period. This effect also disappears as we control for time
trends (Model 6). Although statistically insignificant, all interaction terms except
for During × T-Mobile are positive. It suggests that the major carriers launch more
smartphones as time passes in the dataset even after controlling for the underlying
time trends.
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Table 10: Smartphone Ratio Difference in Differences among Carriers
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit
dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx
(Dummy) During 0.077** 0.068** 0.067** -0.101 -0.104 -0.103 -0.869** -0.905** -0.903** -0.108* -0.112* -0.111*
(0.011) (0.006) (0.005) (0.075) (0.075) (0.072) (0.329) (0.341) (0.338) (0.044) (0.045) (0.043)
(Dummy) After 0.416** 0.400** 0.396** -0.204 -0.208 -0.212 -1.539 -1.565 -1.645 -0.191 -0.193 -0.202
(0.057) (0.059) (0.058) (0.216) (0.221) (0.222) (1.031) (1.090) (1.058) (0.126) (0.133) (0.128)
(Dummy) AT&T -0.028 -0.031 -0.029 -0.021 -0.023 -0.021 -0.184 -0.227 -0.193 -0.023 -0.028 -0.024
(0.016) (0.020) (0.020) (0.016) (0.013) (0.012) (0.304) (0.256) (0.238) (0.037) (0.030) (0.028)
During × AT&T 0.056 0.066 0.063† 0.025 0.032 0.030 0.264 0.363 0.314 0.033 0.045 0.039
(0.034) (0.037) (0.035) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.383) (0.383) (0.388) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045)
After × AT&T 0.168 0.165 0.155† 0.127 0.124 0.117 1.427** 1.599** 1.540** 0.177* 0.197** 0.189**
(0.106) (0.104) (0.087) (0.115) (0.114) (0.097) (0.533) (0.450) (0.430) (0.069) (0.060) (0.057)
(Dummy) Verizon -0.029 -0.030 -0.018 -0.020 -0.399 -0.424 -0.049 -0.052
(0.052) (0.051) (0.041) (0.039) (0.653) (0.612) (0.082) (0.076)
During × Verizon 0.074 0.075 0.048 0.047 0.672 0.674 0.083 0.083
(0.045) (0.049) (0.038) (0.040) (0.574) (0.580) (0.071) (0.071)
After × Verizon 0.149 0.143 0.127 0.124 1.619 1.654 0.200 0.203
(0.124) (0.126) (0.113) (0.113) (1.089) (1.076) (0.139) (0.137)
(Dummy) T-Mobile -0.017 -0.018 -0.348 -0.043
(0.041) (0.043) (0.646) (0.078)
During × T-Mobile 0.010 -0.013 0.098 0.012
(0.107) (0.090) (1.023) (0.125)
After × T-Mobile 0.071 0.051 1.646** 0.202**
(0.150) (0.147) (0.472) (0.059)
Constant 0.169** 0.173** 0.175** 0.007 0.009 0.005 -14.660** -13.931** -13.741** N/A N/A N/A
(0.015) (0.018) (0.017) (0.051) (0.049) (0.045) (1.227) (1.161) (1.135)
Manufacturer FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2,691 2,691 2,691 2,691 2,691 2,691 2,589 2,589 2,589
Log pseudolikelihood -1,025.98 -1,020.52 -1,017.76
Adj. R2 or Pseudo R2 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.32 0.32 0.32
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered by manufacturer, are in parentheses. †, *, ** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively.
Since dependent variable is a dummy variable in this case, we need to run lo-
gistic regressions with the same specification for methodological rigor. The results
reveal much more conclusive evidences for H4.1a and H4.1b. Models 7-9 report raw
estimates and Models 10-12 report marginal effects. All logistic regression results
include all FEs, so they are equivalent to the OLS results in Models 4-6. Magnitudes
are similar between the two estimation methods. However, Models 10-12 show strong
statistical significance for the During dummy and the After×AT&T dummy. It means
that manufacturers reduced the portion of smartphones in their product mix at first
when the iPhone was first launched. It was only after 2011 when manufacturers fi-
nally increased smartphone portion in product mix, but those increases are mostly
attributable to phones supplied to the AT&T’s network.
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This set of results portrays the dynamism of manufacturers’ reaction to the iPhone
in terms of product assortment. At first, they tried to avoid the direct head-to-
head competition with the iPhone. As they catch up with the disruption brought
by the iPhone after a while, they quickly ramp up the smartphone ratio in their
product assortment. AT&T at this time may already have possessed a strong brand
associated with smartphones thanks to the iPhone itself and the competition-induced
effect shown by this chapter. Thus, AT&T receives higher ratio of smartphones from
manufacturers and is able to enjoy the advantage in both quality and quantity over
other carriers. Our main findings center around the quality side of the product, but
these quantity-based results are in accordance with the main findings.
4.4.2 Better Product for Tougher Competition
When AT&T started to distribute the iPhone, one of the best smartphones of the time,
consumers subscribing to AT&T had a superior choice set compared to those using
other carriers’ network service. Consequently, the AT&T’s service network becomes
much more competitive from other manufacturers’ perspective. AT&T becomes a
tougher stage for product innovation contest. In order to be chosen by consumers on
AT&T network, competing smartphones should be equipped with superior hardware
specifications than the iPhone (H4.2a).
Estimating Equation 11 using OLS regressions, we obtain the results shown in
Table 11. The overall innovativeness has increased over time. Based on Model 1, the
baseline innovation index was 0.301 before the iPhone. It increased to 0.489 and 0.590
during and after the exclusive period, respectively. Controlling for the year-FEs, we
can see that overall innovativeness actually declined after the exclusivity period.
The coefficient of our primary interest, During × AT&T, is strongly significant
in both statistical and economic sense in all models. The results are qualitatively
invariant to teasing out major carriers from the baseline (Compare Model 1 to 2-3 or
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4 to 5-6). Magnitudes do not vary considerably across different models. This effect
that AT&T becomes destination of better products is also robust to controlling for
time trends (Compare Models 1-3 to 4-6). During the exclusive contract period, man-
ufacturers supplied phones with the similar level of technical superiority to Verizon
and non-major carriers.
Table 11 suppresses the coefficients for time dummies. Usually, time dummies
are not to be interpreted, but we find visualizing the DID results overlaid on the
time trends helpful to understand the implications of the findings. Figure 22 is
constructed using the coefficients within 10% statistical significance from Model 4 in
Table 11 with manufacturer-FEs controlled for. This figure succinctly captures how
manufacturers become more inclined to launch their better products on the AT&T’s
network. Surprisingly, the product innovation gap between AT&T and other carriers
became even wider after the exclusive contract had ended.

































Figure 22: Product Innovativeness Temporal Difference in Differences between AT&T
and Other Carriers
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Table 11: Product Innovativeness Difference in Differences among Carriers
1 2 3 4 5 6
(Dummy) During 0.188** 0.196** 0.187** 0.028 0.018 0.011
(0.042) (0.039) (0.041) (0.055) (0.053) (0.053)
(Dummy) After 0.289** 0.285** 0.272** -0.384* -0.350* -0.361*
(0.057) (0.051) (0.059) (0.139) (0.139) (0.134)
(Dummy) AT&T -0.116* -0.078† -0.065† -0.108* -0.064 -0.053
(0.038) (0.040) (0.034) (0.045) (0.043) (0.038)
During × AT&T 0.263** 0.264** 0.251** 0.239** 0.239** 0.228**
(0.031) (0.027) (0.029) (0.040) (0.037) (0.039)
After × AT&T 0.528** 0.473** 0.441** 0.482** 0.425** 0.399**
(0.094) (0.090) (0.077) (0.103) (0.099) (0.087)
(Dummy) Verizon 0.264** 0.256** 0.290** 0.283**
(0.048) (0.049) (0.041) (0.042)
During × Verizon 0.043 0.051 0.010 0.018
(0.062) (0.060) (0.056) (0.054)
After × Verizon 0.166 0.156 0.125 0.118
(0.127) (0.133) (0.122) (0.125)
(Dummy) T-Mobile -0.099 -0.086
(0.071) (0.072)
During × T-Mobile 0.112** 0.098**
(0.018) (0.028)
After × T-Mobile 0.236 0.196
(0.151) (0.150)
Constant 0.301** 0.261** 0.269** 0.438** 0.381** 0.367**
(0.032) (0.031) (0.037) (0.115) (0.116) (0.110)
Manufacturer FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Month FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
N 2,691 2,691 2,691 2,691 2,691 2,691
Adj. R2 0.17 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.24 0.24
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered by manufacturer, are in parentheses. †, *, ** denotes
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Table 11 is based on the innovation index that summarizes the overall goodness
of a phone relative to all other preexisting phones. This index consists of seven
technology groups: physical, display, computing, battery, camera, connectivity, and
sensors. Since each of these technological aspects practically matters in its own way,
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Figure 23: Hardware Strength of the iPhone Relative to Previous Smartphones
it is needed to decompose the measure and trace back which technological aspects
drive the observed surge of the innovation index before and after the iPhone’s arrival
in order to test H4.2b. Before presenting the results decomposed around seven dif-
ferent technology groups, we first show what the iPhone’s relative strength is. We
expect that competing manufacturers try to keep up with the technology areas that
the iPhone excelled in (H4.2b). Figure 23 shows the level of technologies built into
the iPhone relative to preexisting smartphones. Each subplot represents one of the
seven technological groups. Blue histograms are the distribution of preexisting smart-
phones’ score in each technological group. Thick gray vertical lines are the iPhone’s
score. The x-axes are z-scores, i.e., standardized scores using the normal distribution.
The technological aspects that the iPhone excelled beyond one standard deviation are
physical, computing, battery, and sensors.
The sensors chart in particular shows non-normal underlying distribution of pre-
existing smartphones before the iPhone. This is because many mobile phones before
the iPhone did not have built-in sensors, which makes the underlying distribution look
like zero-censored. This brings up the concern of inflation of the innovation score of
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those phones with a number of sensors. To address this concern of measurement, we
created an alternative measure of innovativeness not relying on the normality assump-
tion for underlying distribution. We tried percentile scores instead of standardized
scores for each technology group, which mitigates non-normal underlying distribu-
tion. The results remain robust to this change as correlation of the percentile-based
measure to our standardized-score-based measure is above 0.95.
Another way to measure the disruptiveness of the iPhone is to see what new
technologies it brought to the market. By “new technologies,” we mean the level
of technology that the market as a whole has not achieved before the arrival of the
iPhone. Comparing the iPhone with other smartphones launched beforehand, we
find that the iPhone has introduced new elements in display, computing, and sensors
technologies.
With these two ways of capturing the iPhone’s technology level in mind, we in-
terpret the results of estimating the same equation with each dependent variable re-
placed with innovativeness of each individual technology component. Table 12 shows
the change in each technological component before and after the exclusive contract
began and ended. We find that computing and sensors technologies have improved
by a great deal, which should have driven our main results. Three of these four
technological domains correspond to the areas that the iPhone had pioneered by in-
corporating new levels of technologies unachieved by the market beforehand. These
results agree to H4.2b in general and tell an in-depth empirical narrative that de-
scribes how smartphone technologies have evolved around the exclusive release of the
iPhone.
4.4.3 Spillover Beyond Exclusivity Period and Product Category
We interpreted that the innovation boost effect during the exclusive period is due
to competition-induced product innovation contest on service network. We expect
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Table 12: Component Analysis
1 2 3 4 5 6 7




(Dummy) During 0.688* -0.214 -0.274* 0.750** -0.246† -0.134 0.186
(0.255) (0.159) (0.115) (0.114) (0.114) (0.085) (0.330)
(Dummy) After 0.963** -1.215* -0.637† 0.565* -1.114** -0.285* -0.340
(0.288) (0.439) (0.316) (0.255) (0.274) (0.127) (0.406)
(Dummy) AT&T 0.154 0.048 -0.282† 0.310 -0.171 -0.083 -0.535*
(0.132) (0.129) (0.129) (0.202) (0.205) (0.133) (0.218)
During × AT&T -0.112 0.072 0.593* -0.216 0.158 0.180 0.656**
(0.098) (0.125) (0.211) (0.229) (0.251) (0.138) (0.196)
After × AT&T -0.187 0.564* 0.899** -0.045 0.652* 0.199 0.774*
(0.134) (0.195) (0.242) (0.183) (0.234) (0.162) (0.282)
Constant -0.060 -1.115** 0.191 -0.199 1.141** -0.904** 1.681**
(0.750) (0.115) (0.337) (0.948) (0.126) (0.257) (0.383)
Manufacturer FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 771 773 750 765 712 760 771
Adj. R2 0.11 0.21 0.21 0.24 0.17 0.11 0.27
Note: Manufacturer-, year-, and month-FEs are included in all models. Robust standard errors, clustered by manufacturer, are
in parentheses. †, *, ** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
that this boost effect, if exists, would persist even after the exclusivity is termi-
nated (H4.3a). One explanation we developed in H4.3a is that as better products
are launched on the AT&T’s network, a larger number of technology-sensitive con-
sumers subscribe the AT&T service. A larger tech-savvy consumer base of AT&T
gives incentive to manufacturers that they deploy their better products on the AT&T
network. Thus, the product innovativeness gap among carriers, although triggered by
the iPhone, becomes to have nothing to do with the existence of the iPhone on the
focal carrier after a certain amount of time passes. Such gap sustains itself through
a virtuous cycle created by cross-side feedback links that maintains manufacturers’
tendency to supply their better products to AT&T even after the exclusive period.
Table 11 not only shows that the boost effect during the exclusivity period but also
after the period. The boost effect after the period (0.528) is actually even greater than
the difference during the period (0.263). Note that both numbers measure difference
of product innovativeness referencing the pre-exclusivity period as a baseline. This
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sustained boost effect is robust to different specifications including teasing out other
major carriers from the baseline.
Another dimension in which the spillover can occur is product category (H4.3b).
We have two product types in our dataset: basic phone and smartphone. Obviously,
the product type impacted most by the iPhone would be smartphone. Therefore,
it is reasonable to expect innovation boost effect exists for smartphone, while the
existence of similar effect for basic phone is ambiguous. It can be positive because
manufacturers think AT&T subscribers become more tech-savvy in general. Or, there
may be no innovation boost effect for basic phone because each consumer usually has
only one phone. So, smartphone users of AT&T are more tech-savvy, while we do
not have grounds to think basic phone users are tech-savvy as well. The bottom line
is that the difference in innovation index will not be negative.
To examine the spillover across product categories, we run the DID estimation for
basic and smartphone separately. Table 13 presents the results from the split-sample
analysis. Models 1-3 and 4-6 show the estimation results for smartphone and basic
phone, respectively. We confirm AT&T receives not only better smartphones but
also better basic phone during and after the exclusive period consistently throughout
all models. The magnitude of AT&T’s differential gain in product innovativeness
of basic phones is about 10% larger than that of smartphones. Another important
observation comes from the impact on other major carriers, Verizon in particular.
Models 2-3 show that Verizon was supplied with smartphones with relatively inferior
technical specifications. The size of drop for Verizon is about the same as the size of
gain for AT&T during the same period. When comparing AT&T and Verizon directly,
the gap during the exclusive period is much wider than the gap in basic phone.
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Table 13: Split Sample Analysis between Smartphone and Basic Phone
1 2 3 4 5 6
Smart Smart Smart Basic Basic Basic
(Dummy) During 0.130 0.187 0.190 0.029 -0.006 -0.010
(0.096) (0.144) (0.145) (0.073) (0.066) (0.069)
(Dummy) After -0.260 -0.198 -0.188 0.151 0.116 0.111
(0.174) (0.171) (0.170) (0.153) (0.160) (0.166)
(Dummy) AT&T -0.084 -0.052 -0.029 -0.095 -0.053 -0.048
(0.080) (0.094) (0.077) (0.059) (0.057) (0.053)
During × AT&T 0.193* 0.197* 0.168† 0.210** 0.211** 0.205**
(0.075) (0.086) (0.077) (0.048) (0.046) (0.046)
After × AT&T 0.414** 0.366* 0.330** 0.468** 0.473** 0.470**
(0.114) (0.120) (0.097) (0.118) (0.109) (0.108)
(Dummy) Verizon 0.279** 0.274** 0.288** 0.284**
(0.060) (0.064) (0.042) (0.042)
During × Verizon -0.168* -0.158† 0.087 0.089
(0.076) (0.075) (0.087) (0.084)
After × Verizon 0.070 0.064 0.079 0.084
(0.124) (0.134) (0.098) (0.097)
(Dummy) T-Mobile -0.089 -0.047
(0.138) (0.088)
During × T-Mobile 0.161 0.024
(0.148) (0.069)
After × T-Mobile 0.168 0.079
(0.183) (0.081)
Constant -0.186 -0.203 -0.198 0.409** 0.361* 0.352**
(0.212) (0.198) (0.198) (0.115) (0.114) (0.104)
Manufacturer FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 777 777 777 1,914 1,914 1,914
Adj. R2 0.27 0.30 0.30 0.14 0.18 0.17
Note: Manufacturer-, year-, and month-FEs are included in all models. Robust standard errors,
clustered by manufacturer, are in parentheses. †, *, ** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5%,




4.5.1 Robustness Check with Narrower Split Time Window
In the following sections, we examine the validity of our setting with several robust-
ness checks and present a detailed look into the competitive landscape by showing
responses of key individual manufacturers. Since we rely heavily on the empirical
setting given by the exclusive dealing, it is imperative that we run a few standard
robustness checks for the DID estimation. We run a series of three robustness checks:
(1) estimation with narrower time windows, (2) estimation with placebo events, and
(3) estimation of prior difference between two groups. First, we start with the esti-
mation using narrower time windows.
The analysis so far has included phones announced during all 14 years between
1999 and 2013. This wide time frame has served its purpose by portraying the overall
change in industrial and competitive landscape of product innovation. However, it
comes at a cost of blurring the setting for the DID method. Therefore, in order to
show the robustness of the results, we need to sharpen our empirical setting. Thus,
we estimate Equation (11) on the narrower three-year window around each of the
start (Jan 9, 2007) and the end (Jan 11, 2011) of the exclusive contract. One sample
consists of phones announced in 2006, 2007, and 2008; the other sample consists of
those announced in 2010, 2011, 2012. We lose some statistical power as we have less
number of samples to estimate coefficients, but we have a much sharper setting.
Table 14 shows the results from the two-sample analysis. Models 1-3 are from the
2006-2008 sample (N = 895), while Models 4-6 from the 2010-2012 sample (N = 737).
Note that the sample size has reduced about a half compared to the full sample. We
identify 53% of product innovation gain for AT&T in smartphone category at the
beginning of the exclusive period. We also find similar effect in weaker size and sig-
nificance when the period ended. On the other hand, we do not find such boost effect
for basic phones. Boost effects are mainly attributable to technical specifications of
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smartphones. This robustness check result is contrary to our main results and we in-
terpret that the sharpened setting produces clear distinction between manufacturers’
response in smartphone and basic phone. Comparing the results from the two sam-
ples, we make another noteworthy observation regarding the status of AT&T. When
the iPhone first appeared in the market by the exclusive contract, phones released on
the AT&T network is no better than those on the other carriers’ network for both
smartphones and basic phones. However, in 2011, AT&T has higher baseline for tech-
nical superiority in both product categories. This robustness check result supports
our main findings.
Table 14: Robustness Check with Narrower Three-Year Time Window
1 2 3 4 5 6
All Smart Basic All Smart Basic
(Dummy) AT&T -0.102 -0.178 -0.107 0.169** 0.131† 0.186**
(0.060) (0.130) (0.061) (0.038) (0.067) (0.052)
(Dummy) During 0.086 0.148 0.109
(0.069) (0.201) (0.062)
During × AT&T 0.152† 0.340** 0.118
(0.071) (0.080) (0.071)
(Dummy) After -0.338* -0.379** 0.102†
(0.130) (0.113) (0.051)
After × AT&T 0.151 0.134* 0.065
(0.086) (0.053) (0.174)
Constant 0.364** 0.644** 0.326** 0.512** 0.761** 0.357**
(0.058) (0.121) (0.061) (0.038) (0.078) (0.022)
Manufacturer FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 895 159 736 737 379 358
Adj. R2 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.24 0.18 0.17
Note: Manufacturer-, year-, and month-FEs are included in all models. Robust standard errors,
clustered by manufacturer, are in parentheses. †, *, ** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5%,
and 1%, respectively. Models 2 and 5 contain smartphones; Models 3 and 6 contain basic phones;
Models 1 and 4 contain both types of phones.
Figure 24 is an alternative representation of the results in Table 14. It emphasizes
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the difference in product superiority between AT&T and other carriers at two time
points of interest. Coefficients significant at least at 10% are used to construct the
graphic. All y-axis are drawn to the same scale for convenient comparison. Man-
ufacturers clearly supply to AT&T their best smartphones equipped with superior
technical components after the iPhone’s exclusive launch on the AT&T network.
4.5.2 Robustness Check with Placebo Events
In addition to narrowing the time window, we measure the estimated effects for
placebo events. Estimating the impact on placebo events is a way to check the
validity of using the DID method. In order to prevent window overlaps, we further
narrow down the time window to the length of one year (180 days before and after
the event). Placebo events are arbitrarily chosen as 360 days before and after the
actual event dates. We expect not to see significant differences across those placebo
event dates.
Table 15 shows the results. Models 1-3 are estimated around the iPhone’s exclusive
announcement on the AT&T network, while Models 4-6 are around the end of the
exclusive period. Note that the number of observations in each model becomes much
smaller by an order of magnitude than previous models. These models are estimated
on the much more refined scale at the cost of losing statistical power.
Let us first examine the tests around the onset of exclusivity (Models 1-3). Model
2 shows a clear difference in overall product innovativeness before and after the exclu-
sive contract begins. The estimated difference is strongly significant in both statistical
and economic senses. Comparing to previous models, the further we narrow down
time window, the larger the estimated difference is. This supports our argument
that there was a discontinuity in product innovativeness triggered by the introduc-
tion of the iPhone. AT&T had been receiving technologically worse smartphones




















































































Figure 24: Analysis with 3-year Window
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Table 15: Robustness Check with Placebo Events
1 2 3 4 5 6
Placebo Actual Placebo Placebo Actual Placebo
Pre Post Pre Post
(Dummy) AT&T 0.118† -0.359† 0.414 0.332† 0.176* 0.306**
(0.059) (0.167) (0.257) (0.168) (0.078) (0.093)
(Dummy) During -0.026 0.098 -0.012
(0.098) (0.606) (0.087)
During × AT&T -0.433* 0.805** -0.324
(0.147) (0.159) (0.239)
(Dummy) After 0.344 -0.553* 0.328**
(0.458) (0.243) (0.068)
After × AT&T -0.107 0.054 -0.170
(0.320) (0.236) (0.170)
Constant 0.307** -0.005 0.663** 1.034** 1.215** 0.954**
(0.060) (0.051) (0.042) (0.230) (0.063) (0.154)
Manufacturer FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 39 54 60 96 126 138
Adj. R2 0.23 0.16 0.12 0.04 0.15 0.16
Note: Manufacturer-, year-, and month-FEs are included in all models. Robust standard errors,
clustered by manufacturer, are in parentheses. †, *, ** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5%,
and 1%, respectively.
smartphones released on the AT&T network after the iPhone. Models 1 and 3 are
estimated around placebo events on January 7, 2006 and 2008, respectively. The
interaction term in Model 3 is insignificant as expected, while that in Model 1 is
significantly negative. Manufacturers provided technologically inferior smartphones
to AT&T over one year prior to the introduction of the iPhone.
We then examine the next set of tests around the end of the exclusive period
(Models 4-6). The interaction terms are all insignificant and the magnitude is also
negligible compared to those in Models 1-3. Signs are the same: the actual is positive
and the placebos are negative. AT&T dummy is positive in all models, suggesting
that AT&T in 2010-2012 has already accumulated advantage of carrying superior
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smartphones from manufacturers. Although we lose significance for the actual event
(Model 5), it does not mean that AT&T loses advantage it accumulated during the
exclusive period. After all, the sign and magnitude are still largely positive. Unless
the sign is significantly negative, the results support that the AT&T’s advantage of
sourcing superior products continues after the exclusive contract ends.
4.5.3 Comparing Prior Difference as a Robustness Check
Lastly, another robustness check is to see if there are any prior differences across
carriers before the iPhone appeared. Although the DID method is designed to take
care of prior differences between groups in comparison, it is reassuring to find the
groups are relatively homogeneous before a focal event occurs. In our context, what
we test is whether manufacturers were already providing AT&T with mobile phones
substantially different from those supplied to other carriers in terms of technical spec-
ifications. To empirically check for prior differences, we run similar OLS regressions
for the subsample defined as for the period before January 9, 2011. We regress the
product innovativeness measure onto the sets of dummy variables denoting carrier as-
sociation and all FEs—manufacturer-, year-, and month-FEs—included. Thus, this
test identifies from a manufacturer’s perspective whether it was providing different
phones to different carriers before the iPhone. Table 16 shows the results.
Each of Models 1-3 show the results when only a dummy variable for major in-
dividual carriers used in the main analysis—AT&T, Verizon, and T-Mobile—is in-
cluded. Manufacturers were supplying slightly inferior products (p < 10%) to AT&T
beforehand than other carriers, which is congruent to Figure 22. On the other hand,
Verizon was sourcing significantly better products from each manufacturer (p < 1%).
Lastly, T-Mobile was treated the same as other carriers on average. These patterns
are consistent through Models 4-7 as we recombine carrier dummies in different ways
to see if a change in baseline makes any difference. The only noticeable change is that
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Table 16: Checking Prior Differences in Product Specifications across Carriers
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
(Dummy) AT&T -0.077† -0.038 -0.064 -0.029
(0.042) (0.040) (0.038) (0.035)
(Dummy) Verizon 0.282** 0.274** 0.273** 0.268**
(0.051) (0.054) (0.051) (0.053)
(Dummy) T-Mobile -0.123 -0.109 -0.089 -0.083
(0.081) (0.080) (0.083) (0.080)
Constant 0.243† 0.163† 0.156 0.198 0.214† 0.150 0.177
(0.114) (0.086) (0.094) (0.112) (0.111) (0.087) (0.106)
Manufacturer FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 896 896 896 896 896 896 896
Adj. R2 0.10 0.14 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.14 0.14
Note: Manufacturer-, year-, and month-FEs are included in all models. Robust stan-
dard errors, clustered by manufacturer, are in parentheses. †, *, ** denotes statistical
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
AT&T dummy now even loses the 10%-level significance as we tease out Verizon or
T-Mobile from the baseline group. In sum, these results confirm that manufacturers
did not specially treat AT&T by supplying technologically better products before the
iPhone appeared on the AT&T’s network. Even if there was any prior difference,
AT&T was at a disadvantage relative to other carriers—notably Verizon. Therefore,
this finding of no prior difference across carriers bolsters our main results signified by
the crossing pattern shown in Figure 22.
4.5.4 Manufacturer Heterogeneity in Product Design Responses
All analyses so far included manufacturer-FEs to control for idiosyncrasies of differ-
ent manufacturers. In order to exploit the factual context of our study—the mobile
phone industry, we turn to individual manufacturers and how their product design
patterns for AT&T and other carriers evolve differently over time. Top four manu-

















































































Figure 25: Heterogeneous Responses Across Different Firms
LG (N = 452), Motorola (N = 376), and Nokia (N = 368). All these four compa-
nies account for more than 77% of the whole sample, cover the entire time period
from 2000 to 2013, and have produced both basic phones and smartphones. Thus,
these four manufacturers adequately represent the context of the mobile phone in-
dustry. Moreover, we now know the performances and consequences of these four
manufacturers in the real-world mobile phone industry in retrospect. Samsung grew
as a strong opponent of Apple and LG remained competitive in the market, while
the mobile phone division of Motorola was acquired by Google in 2011 and that of
Nokia was sold to Microsoft in 2013. Thanks to these factual industrial changes, we
believe that it is a meaningful exercise to interpret and draw implications from these
manufacturers’ design changes over the years.
To operationalize individual manufacturer comparison, we create subsamples for
each of four companies. We run the OLS regressions of product innovativeness onto
year dummies interacted with the AT&T dummy. Month-FEs are included to control
for within-year seasonality. Using coefficients gathered from the regressions, Figure
25 shows different patterns of product characteristics provided to AT&T and other
carriers for these four manufacturers.
Representing the largest portion of the sample, Samsung clearly shows a similar
pattern to the overall pattern shown in Figure 22. However, its temporal differential
pattern exhibits more drastic gap between AT&T and other carriers than the whole
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sample particularly for the recent years. Two lines are virtually on top of each other
from 2004 to 2008 and they diverge afterwards. We identify a similar crossing pattern
for LG except that LG shows a relatively wide prior difference before 2008. Motorola
had a spike in products given to AT&T in 2011, but the gap reduces back in 2012.
On the other hand, Nokia has both lines flat across all years and to our surprise
these two lines are in essence the same lines. One consistent feature to note across
all subfigures is that the dotted blue lines (technological level of products provided
to non-AT&T carriers) are on a similar trend for all four manufacturers. Given that
each of four manufacturers accounts for a significant portion of the whole sample,
a variety of strategic reactions we observe from this result are noteworthy. While
we cannot predicate that these patterns are antecedents of the consequences of the
four firms in the current industry, we can entertain the possibility that these patterns
coincide with the current standings of the four companies.
4.5.5 Practical Implications
This chapter presents multiple points to reckon for managers working at manufac-
turers and service providers alike. Manufacturers need to realize the importance of
keeping up with other competing products on the service network. The responsive-
ness is even more critical when a new potentially disrupting product appears in the
service network. Once the market starts to get swayed into one direction, it is ex-
tremely hard to reverse the trend because of industry and consumer inertia shown
in this chapter. Therefore, manufacturers need to keep an eye on new products from
competing manufacturers. A disruptive innovation may come from a company that
was not deemed as a competitor beforehand. Thus, it is important to possess a wide
view on the competitive landscape of the product market and develop comprehensive
business intelligence capabilities.
Next, managers working at service providers need to stay in awareness of what
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new technologies and products are emerging in the neighborhood of the focal service
domain. Securing a disruptive innovation for their service network exclusively can
ignite the virtuous self-sustaining cycle based on the intensified competition on the
manufacturer side. Thus, they can try to source new technologies and products
with more aggressive and progressive attitude because of the temporal and horizontal
spillover effects shown in this chapter. Once the industry is settled after a disruptive
innovation, it stays there for longer than managers imagine. Therefore, it is extremely
important for a service provider to secure a good position before a new disruption
comes along.
Finally, the result that is new to our previous knowledge is the confirmation of
H4.1a and H4.1b that hypothesized about competitive responses to a disruptive inno-
vation by adjusting product mix in short and long terms. It turned out that competing
manufacturers first try to avoid the competition with the disruptive technology at the
early stage. However, they have to eventually accept the reality transformed by the
disruptive technology once the technology landscape is changed. Although we hy-
pothesized about this dynamism, the empirical findings that confirm this hypothesis
were refreshing to us.
4.6 Conclusion
Exploiting the effectuation and nullification of the exclusive contract between Apple
and AT&T releasing the iPhone, we empirically examine how other manufacturers
respond to the abrupt events in terms of their new product design and innovation
patterns. We find that a manufacturer first avoided competition with the iPhone
by shifting focus to basic phones in product mix, but eventually pursued head-to-
head competition in smartphones. In terms of technical specifications, a given man-
ufacturer supplied technologically superior products among all their products, both
smartphones and basic phones, to AT&T when the iPhone arrived to the scene.
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This imbalance not only persisted but also increased when the exclusive contract had
ended.
It is this rare setting of exclusive dealing that allows empirical investigation on
manufacturers’ responses to the appearance of a disruptive and innovative product
on a service network exclusively. Although the setting in this chapter is unique to
the mobile technology and industry, the implications of our findings can be applied
to other platform-based businesses or two-sided markets. Our study is particularly
timely as many exclusive relationships are developing in many industries. In addition
to the video game console industry mentioned earlier, Apple TV recently contracted
with HBO to exclusively air their content through the device although only for a lim-
ited time. Netflix once declining now rejuvenates itself partly thanks to the success
of its own development of TV series, “House of Cards.” Although there are rooms to
study further under what condition developing own exclusive content or having exclu-
sive partnership is good, our findings provide another reason to be more optimistic at
the prospect of soliciting an innovative product or partner into the service network.
For instance, if you are in the video game console business, you must be particularly
aggressive in seeking an exclusive sourcing of high-quality game titles because such
arrangement will induce other game developers to exert more effort on the games
released on your network as your network becomes an arena of fierce competition.
The direct benefit to AT&T of exclusively introducing the iPhone must have
been the increase in subscribers. Subscribers fond of the iPhone may have switched
from other network operators or upgraded from a lower-tier product. The former
is a new revenue source and the latter contributes to increasing existing revenue
streams. Thus, the introduction of the iPhone must have had direct positive revenue
implications. What we provide in this chapter evidences that there is a competition-
induced secondary spillover benefits of introducing a disruptive product in the service
network. Having a strong product in the service network implicitly forces other
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competing product manufacturers to submit products of a higher caliber in order to
stay in business in that particular service network. More important, realizing that
firms in one industry can influence the pace of competition among firms in another
industry and even harness benefits of that competition will help differently frame the
product sourcing strategy in a novel way.
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CHAPTER V
ASYMMETRIC FIRM VALUE OF PRODUCT
INNOVATION IN THE TRIAD ECOSYSTEM
5.1 Introduction
The value delivered by many products today is not the result of a single firm’s en-
deavor. Rather, a product serves as a conduit of additional value created by service
companies in the industry ecosystem. Depending on the roles that each firm assumes
in the ecosystem for the product, it derives revenue and profit in different ways.
The previous two chapters looked at how manufacturer-designed product technical
specifications evolve dynamically in interaction with platform developer and service
provider, respectively. This chapter shifts focus to how the market perceives those
technological advancements in product characteristics. In the end, we need to evalu-
ate whether product innovation matters at all in dollar terms. We measure the impact
of product innovativeness on firm value reflected in the stock market.
The previous two chapters explored bilateral relationships around product inno-
vativeness. Chapter 3 investigated how new product development strategy and new
product specifications are influenced by the existence and availability of digital plat-
forms, thus focused on the dyadic relationship between manufacturer and platform
developer. Chapter 4, on the other hand, turned to another type of dyadic relation-
ship between manufacturer and service provider by examining how sourcing a highly
innovative product benefits service provider as it intensifies product technical specifi-
cations competition among manufacturers supplying to the service provider. In this
chapter, we close the loop and provide a holistic view of the triadic relationship by
looking at all three types of firms in the same setting at once. More specifically, our
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goal is to quantify the financial rewards of new product introduction by looking at
the stock market reaction to the announcement and release events of new products.
This chapter focuses on the firm value of product innovation and aims to identify
potentially differential impacts of new product introduction for different types of
firms involved in the process. The new product development (NPD) literature widely
agrees that new product introduction exerts a positive impact on the manufacturer’s
stock returns (Bayus et al., 2003). Kalaignanam et al. (2007) extends from single-
firm NPD to collaborative NPD and establishes asymmetric firm value implications
of NPD to small and large firms, although they do not specifically interpret different
roles assumed by alliance participants in the NPD process. This chapter adds to the
literature by examining a product category that involves three clearly demarcated
roles played by companies from large industries. Similar to the previous two chapters,
this chapter examines the smartphone industry where manufacturer, service provider,
and platform developer collaborate and compete anchored around the focal product.
The value delivered to the end consumer is orchestrated by these three roles of firms.
Moreover, only a few studies including Koski and Kretschmer (2010) take into account
the technological characteristics of the product of interest. We contribute to the
NPD firm value literature by taking into account as many technical specifications as
possible, leveraging the product innovativeness measure developed in Equation (7) in
Chapter 3. Lastly, our setting affords examination around not only the announcement
events of new products but also the release events of the same products, which enables
us to empirically and quantitatively measure hype formed by the market when new
products are introduced.
Based on aforementioned research focus, the three driving research questions for
this chapter are as follows. First, we look for the existence of asymmetric abnormal
returns to different roles that the firm assumes in the triad. Following previous
evidences (Bayus et al., 2003), we expect positive firm value upon announcement of
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new products. Then, Kalaignanam et al. (2007) demonstrate such positive abnormal
returns to firm value do not occur equally across participants of an NPD alliance.
Drawing on their arguments and findings, we also expect that the existence and
magnitude of abnormal returns differ across different roles in the triad. Second, we
test if such abnormal returns are correlated with the technological superiority of new
products. The relationship between product innovativeness and abnormal returns
to firm value is relatively under-explored in the current literature of firm value of
NPD. Third, we investigate market reactions to the announcement and release of
new products separately. The literature documents positive market reactions upon
new product announcements. However, it lacks follow-up studies that look at actual
release of the products. Since the market can overshoot with hype when a new
product is announced, it is worth checking the market reaction when the new product
is released into the market.
To operationalize our approach to address the research questions above, we adopt
a multi-country event study methodology. While the event study methodology in gen-
eral has a long history and has been adopted to many different fields of study, running
event study in a multi-country setting started receiving attention from the research
community only about a decade ago (Park, 2004; Campbell et al., 2010). Event study
constructs linear models for individual stock prices with a few market-level factors
to define normal behavior on a given day. The deviation from the estimated normal
behavior is called abnormal returns and the method statistically tests whether the
cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) over the event period significantly differ
from zero. It is the standard methodology employed by the studies investigating the
impact of a certain types of events on the firm value. Our multi-country event study
method uses three factors (local market index returns, global market index returns,
and trade-weighted exchange rates) following Park (2004).
We confirm strong positive impact on firm value to the manufacturer when a
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new product is announced. On average, the cumulative average abnormal returns
(CAAR) is 0.87% throughout the whole ±10 days around the event day and 0.48%
for the (0,+1) window. However, we also find negative market movements (−0.81%)
upon actual release that cancel out a significant portion of positive abnormal returns
accumulated during the announcement period. The magnitude of negative change
upon release is smaller than that of positive impact upon announcement. Still, this
up-and-down pattern between announcement and release calls for a conservative in-
terpretation of the positive impact of NPD when only announcement is accounted
for. We then observe the relationship between CAAR and technological superiority
of the new products measured by product innovativeness. We find strong positive
correlations between the two. Thus, when the new product is high in product in-
novativeness, the positive CAAR for announcement is even greater and the negative
CAAR for release is mitigated. For service providers, we find no impact from new
product announcement and release on its firm value. The platform developer firm
value seems to weakly benefit throughout both announcement and release events. We
interpret this asymmetry through the lens of different roles assumed by the firms in
the triad relationship in the smartphone industry ecosystem.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 reviews the methodological
literature on multi-country event study and domain literature on the firm value of
NPD. Section 5.3 describes our data sources and analysis setups. Section 5.4 reports
our main results on abnormal returns to firm value. Section 5.5 discusses implications
of our findings and Section 5.6 concludes the chapter.
5.2 Theoretical Background
5.2.1 Multi-Country Event Study Methodology
Event study is an oft-used causal identification methodology to infer monetary val-
uation of the events having a certain set of characteristics by quantifying abnormal
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stock market reactions. Since Fama et al. (1969), the methodology has matured and
gained sufficient traction in many fields. MacKinlay (1997) provides even a tuto-
rial for how to execute an event study and Binder (1998) reviews a summary of key
methodological developments since 1969. The basic premise of event study is that
there exists normal behavior of an individual stock price based on a variety of factors
such as overall market movement. On top of this normal behavior, each stock price
reacts to the new abrupt set of information about the company such as launching a
new product or implementing a new policy. Based on the efficient market hypothesis
(Fama, 1970), it is assumed that market participants foresee the long-term effects of
a certain event, market price absorbs the news, and it reflects such expectations of
the market participants. Given the normal behavior, the size of abnormal reaction
can be measured.
While providing an essential tool for quantifying the financial value of events, the
standard event study has two limitations. First, event study can be used only for
companies that are publicly traded. By definition, event study requires time-series
price information representing the underlying valuation of the companies of interest.
Public stock exchanges provide an excellent setting to conduct an event study. On the
other hand, this means that an event study using the stock market reactions cannot
examine similar effects on private companies. This is a particularly limiting condition
if research questions involve early-stage companies or entrepreneurship ecosystem.
This is a fundamental limit that any extension of event study methodology cannot
escape. Second, the standard event study model considers only stock markets in a
single country. Because of this particular challenge, the literature employing the event
study methodology has accumulated empirical evidences mostly from the U.S. stock
market only. To overcome this second limitation, the standard event study model can
be extended to the multi-country setting. Recent methodological developments have
attempted to address this second issue.
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In order to extend the standard single-country event study model for a multi-
country setting, two challenges arise. First of all, the stock market in a major de-
veloped country has its own market index and such local index does not necessarily
move in synchronization with other countries’ stock market indices due to political,
socio-cultural, and macroeconomic differences. Moreover, individual stock price in
a local market is often quoted in the corresponding local currency. Thus, a multi-
market event study model must address the issues of the local market index as well
as the local currency.
Park (2004) outlines an extended event study model for multi-country setting. It
takes into account three factors—local market index, global market index, and trade-
weighted exchange rate—to model the baseline normal behavior of the individual
stock returns. Campbell et al. (2010) further validates the multi-country non-U.S.
event study methodology using simulation. As the multi-country event study method-
ology matures, a new set of research opportunities in the global setting is emerging.
5.2.2 Firm Value of Innovation and Interfirm Alliances
Event study has been extensively used for a variety of management and business
policy issues. For instance, measuring the economic value of being an Olympic sponsor
(Samitas et al., 2008; Molchanov et al., 2010) or the reputation risk from celebrity
endorsement when a scandal breaks out (Knittel and Stango, 2014) are typical issues
examined by event study.
Even with the scope narrowed to technology management, NPD, and product
innovation, researchers have actively produced a number of articles employing event
study up to recent years. The major theme in this literature is to evaluate the impact
of a certain type of NPD practices on the stock market performance. Hendricks and
Singhal (1997) examine how much missing the promised product introduction date
harms the firm value and confirm the negative influence of such delays. Bayus et al.
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(2003) investigate the PC industry to find empirical evidence on the positive impact
of new product introductions on profitability of the firms. In the pharmaceutical
industry where obtaining approval from the regulatory authorities is critical for NPD,
Girotra et al. (2007) demonstrate the value of a new drug development project by
exploiting the failures in clinical trial as a natural experiment setting. Sood and
Tellis (2009) advocate a holistic viewpoint for innovation projects and argue that the
total stock market returns for aggregated innovation projects surpass the returns for
individual innovation events.
In this literature, a relatively small number of studies specifically focus on the
technological characteristics of products. Koski and Kretschmer (2010) conduct an
event study in the mobile handset product category. They separate truly innova-
tive new products from imitative new products and find both types of new product
introduction have a positive impact on firm value. They operationalize the separa-
tion by encoding talk time as technological lead. However, such a measure may be
appropriate for mobile phones with only basic functionality (voice communication),
but it is rather simplistic for complex products such as smartphones that serve not
only voice communication but also data processing and ship with various built-in
and third-party applications for diverse tasks. Our study is thus differentiated by
associating firm value with the level of technological advancement in multi-faceted
technical specifications.
On the other hand, many modern products are embedded in service networks and
often times most of their value is realized only when the services are available. Accord-
ingly, innovation in new product offering is increasingly resulting from collaborations
or acquisitions among multiple companies. Recognizing the importance of intercon-
nectedness and interdependence between firms in a network setting, researchers have
extensively studied the firm value of partnership, alliances, and M&A using event
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study in the past decade. Seth et al. (2002) are one of the early studies that dis-
tinguish positive and negative types of cross-border acquisitions. They empirically
demonstrate that an acquiring firm may gain or lose shareholder value depending
on the underlying motif of the acquisition. While acquisitions are directional rela-
tionships between the acquirer and the target, alliances are more bidirectional where
participating firms remain independent after the relationship is established. Forming
alliances is viewed favorably from the market and expected to result in overall posi-
tive impact on firm value (Anand and Khanna, 2000; Kale et al., 2002). Oxley et al.
(2009) even extend the scope to examine how a new alliance influences firm value of
the partnering firm’s rivals.
Kalaignanam et al. (2007) fuse these two streams of research: firm value of NPD
and firm value of alliances. They are first to explore the asymmetric firm value
implication from NPD alliances between large and small firms. Our study is in line
with the research question they address, but we focus on the asymmetry in the roles
that firms assume in such an alliance: manufacturer, service provider, and platform
developer. We complement the traditional dyadic analysis (Anand and Khanna, 2000;
Kale et al., 2002; Seth et al., 2002) by extending towards the triad perspective in the
mobile ecosystem. Our study additionally contributes to this literature by taking into
account detailed technological characteristics of the product.
Lastly, an additional angle we bring to the literature is the differentiation between
announcement and release of new products. This setting allows us to quantitatively
compare market reactions to these two events. The issue of marketing hype—new
product announcement as a signaling strategy (Popma et al., 2006; Su and Rao,
2010)—has received a high level of attention from the marketing literature that focuses
on NPD practices (Wind and Mahajan, 1987) particularly in the high-tech industry
ranging from software such as vaporware (Bayus et al., 2001) to hardware such as
DRAM (Popma et al., 2006). Many attempts have been made to develop a theoretical
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framework for technological hype cycles until recently (van Lente et al., 2013), but
most studies examine the effect of the new product announcement (Calantone and
Schatzel, 2000; Schatzel and Calantone, 2006) leaving what happens after the actual
release of the announced products largely unexplored. We expect to contribute to
the understanding of the complete cycle of announcement and release and how the
market reacts in the cycle.
5.3 Data and Methods
Table 17 summarizes our data sources. Our dataset largely consists of two parts.
The first part is the market data including historical stock prices for individual com-
panies, global and local stock market indices, historical exchange rates, and world
trade flow data. Most of the market data comes from the Wharton Research Data
Services (WRDS). WRDS is a data service that curates multiple sources of economic
and financial data. It provides both web-based and command line interfaces for con-
venient retrieval of desired datasets. Among many data sources available via WRDS,
Compustat Global provides most of global stock market information for our dataset.
We obtain stock returns for individual companies listed in the U.S. stock market
from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) maintained by the University
of Chicago. For non-U.S. companies, we retrieve individual stock prices from Com-
pustat Global. They conveniently adjust the individual stock prices for dividends
and splits. CRSP also provides equally-weighted U.S. market index and Compustat
Global provides non-U.S. local market indices. Morgan Stanley Capital International
(MSCI) publishes global market index that includes both U.S. and non-U.S. markets
and make the data available through Compustat Global as well. We retrieve the
MSCI World Index to represent the global market.
The second part of the dataset is event list and product characteristics: announce-
ment and release dates and detailed technical specifications of smartphones. As in
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Table 17: List of Data Sources for Multi-Country Event Study
Stock Market Stock Returns for Individual Companies (Dividend and Split Adjusted)
U.S. Companies: CRSP (University of Chicago)
Non-U.S. Companies: Compustat Global
Local Market Indices
U.S. Market Index: Equally-Weighted Index from CRSP
Non-U.S. Market Indices: Compustat Global
Global Market Index
MSCI World Index: Compustat Global
Trade-Weighted Exchange Rate
Daily Exchange Rate: Compustat Global
Consumer Price Index (CPI): Compustat Global
Annual World Trade Data: UN Comtrade
Product Event and Product Characteristics
Announcement and Release Dates: PhoneArena.com
Detailed Technical Specifications: PhoneArena.com
Note: CRSP = Center for Research in Security Prices
the previous chapters, the smartphone dataset comes from PhoneArena. It contains
the announcement and release timing in date-level resolution. Announcement date
is manufacturer-specific information, while release date is carrier-specific informa-
tion. Thus, if a certain smartphone model is released on multiple carriers, only one
announcement date exists for the model but multiple release dates may exist for dif-
ferent carriers. It is also possible that the model was released for different carriers on
the same date. The technical specifications break down into seven technology groups:
physical (thickness and weight), display (display diagonal, resolution, pixel density,
and display panel type), computing (number of cores, CPU clock, RAM, Storage),
battery (talk time, stand-by time, battery capacity), connectivity (cellular network
speed, Wi-Fi standard speed, and Bluetooth version), camera (main camera resolu-
tion, video resolution, and sub camera resolution), and sensors (number of sensors).
For the definition of the innovation index, refer to Equation (7) in Chapter 3.
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5.3.1 Sample and Variables
Our sample of announcement and release events is constructed from the smartphone
data. We start from 1,227 smartphone models from 83 manufacturers. After removing
manufacturers that have not released any models in a U.S. carrier service network,
we obtain 956 smartphone models. Next, we further refine the sample by excluding
observations without both announcement and release dates information. The final
smartphone-level sample contains 720 models from 27 manufacturers from both the
U.S. and other countries.
We make two further refinements as we proceed to create the lists of events. First,
we exclude events if corresponding local and global market indices are not available.
Note that we need market data up to about one year prior to the focal event date
in order to estimate global market model parameters. Second, we exclude events if
multiple products were announced or released on the same day for a given firm in
order to avoid confounding effects. Table 18 shows our final event sets in a two-by-
three matrix. An event pair is encoded as a line in a file separated by space such
as “104604 20050214” where company data item code is followed by date. In this
example, “104604” stands for Samsung Electronics.
Table 18: Size of Final Event Sets
Manufacturer Service Provider Platform Developer
Announcement 351 pairs 323 pairs 305 pairs
Release 362 pairs 268 pairs 356 pairs
Table 29 shows the breakdown of companies by country or stock market exchange.
Most companies in our sample are listed in the U.S. stock exchanges, while we have
significant manufacturers outside the U.S. A few companies play more than one role
in product development. For instance, Nokia, BlackBerry, and Apple are both man-
ufacturers and platform developers at the same time. T-Mobile is both manufacturer
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and service provider. Apart from these notable exceptions, most companies play a
single role.













M SP PD A R
US (USD) Google 335 6 0 329 135 200
Nokia 204 99 0 105 116 88
Microsoft 148 1 0 147 66 82
AT&T 137 0 137 0 77 60
Verizon 119 0 119 0 62 57
Sprint 107 2 105 0 63 44
BlackBerry 94 47 0 47 54 40
Motorola 77 77 0 0 37 40
U.S. Cellular 70 0 70 0 35 35
Alltel 63 0 63 0 32 31
Virgin Mobile 30 0 30 0 16 14
Apple 26 13 0 13 14 12
MetroPCS 24 0 24 0 9 15
Palm 19 14 0 5 15 4
HP 15 8 0 7 6 9
Southern LINC 6 0 6 0 3 3
Dell 4 4 0 0 2 2
Alcatel 4 4 0 0 1 3
CellularOne / Dobson 4 0 4 0 4 0
Qualcomm 2 0 0 2 1 1
Qwest 2 0 2 0 2 0
TerreStar 1 1 0 0 1 0
KR (KRW) Samsung 164 158 0 6 73 91
LG 77 77 0 0 36 41
JP (JPY) Sony 13 13 0 0 6 7
Kyocera 10 10 0 0 4 6
Casio 3 3 0 0 1 2
CN (CNY) ZTE 19 19 0 0 12 7
Huawei 18 18 0 0 10 8
TW (TWD) HTC 112 112 0 0 52 60
DE (EUR) T-Mobile 143 28 115 0 75 68
Note: M, SP, PD, A, R stands for manufacturer, service provider, platform
developer, announcement, and release, respectively.
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U.S. individual stock returns are precomputed by CRSP. Individual returns for
non-U.S. companies reported by Compustat Global need to be adjusted. Compustat
Global provides daily closing prices (prccd) along with cumulative adjustment factors
(ajexdi) and total return factors (trfd). The formula to compute the adjusted price






Market indices are straightforward variables to define. CRSP provides precom-
puted daily returns of the U.S. market and we compute daily index returns for global
market index and non-U.S. local market indices using the market index data from
Compustat Global. We have both local and global market indices needed for es-
timating the world market model. Since global market by definition includes any
local market component, we use orthogonalized global market index with respect to
the corresponding local market index. In other words, we take the residuals of the
global market index (MSCI World Index) regressed on the local market index. The
orthogonalization process is standard in financial studies (Gelos and Wei, 2005).
The last factor for our world market model, trade-weighted real effective exchange
rate, warrants detailed explanation on how to construct the variable. Exchange rates
are by definition bilateral ratio between one country and another. If we were to include
bilateral exchange rates into the market model, the model would be highly crowded
with more than two hundred variables. The trade-weighted effective exchange rate
aims to solve this problem by computing a single number that representatively sum-
marizes all bilateral exchange rates of the home country. The key idea is to use the
trade partner compositions as weighting scheme to take the average of bilateral ex-
change rates. The standard is to use the geometric mean instead of the arithmetic
mean (Buldorini et al., 2002; Loretan, 2005). In addition, the trade-weighted real
effective exchange rate even reflects the ratio of consumer price changes between the
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two countries. The final formula is as follows.





















where j is a focal country, k is a partner country, and FXj,k,t denotes one unit of
currencyj denominated in currencyk at time t. CPIj is the annual consumer price
index of country j computed from the consumer price index inflation rate in percent.
wk is the ratio of the trade between j and k with respect to the total trade of j.
In theory, for the purpose of running an event study, using real effective exchange
rate is contended because of the strong assumption that investors anticipate long-term
inflation rate when making investment decision (Park, 2004). In practice, nominal
and real effective exchange rates do not make a big difference because we use changes
in the exchange rates. CPI is computed annually and does not change within a year.
Thus, we use the nominal effective exchange rate for running an event study in this
chapter.
Along with product innovativeness as the main explanatory variable, we add con-
trol variables that describe firm characteristics. These control variables sourced from
Compustat include total assets, capital intensity (capital expenditures divided by
total assets), R&D intensity (R&D expenditures divided by total assets), and the
number of employees. Compustat records these firm-specific variables on an annual
basis. Table 20 shows summary stats for variables used for regressions.
5.3.2 Estimation
We model the normal behavior of individual stock returns based on three factors as
follows.
Rijt = αi + βiRmjt + γiRwmt + δiZjt + εijt (15)
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Table 20: Summary Statistics and Pairwise Correlations
Variables Pairwise Correlations and Descriptive Statistics
CAR
Product Innovativeness 0.03
(Dummy) Manufacturer -0.01 -0.02
(Dummy) Service Provider -0.01 0.05 -0.49
(Dummy) Released -0.03 0.09 0.01 -0.06
(Log) Total Assets 0.03 0.14 -0.36 0.30 0.05
Capital Intensity 0.01 0.08 -0.03 0.31 0.02 0.20
R&D Intensity 0.04 -0.13 0.05 -0.60 -0.06 -0.28 -0.38
# Employees -0.02 0.00 -0.09 0.65 -0.07 0.74 0.13 -0.78
Year 0.01 0.34 0.02 0.01 0.15 0.13 0.12 -0.37 -0.15
Month 0.08 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.13 -0.01 0.04 0.01 -0.04 -0.11
N 1,965 1,965 1,965 1,965 1,965 1,839 1,823 711 1,011 1,965 1,965
Mean 0.21 0.87 0.36 0.30 0.50 10.36 0.06 0.08 112.03 2010.12 6.80
Std. Dev. 9.89 0.47 0.48 0.46 0.50 1.37 0.04 0.06 94.45 1.95 3.24
Min -41.73 -0.51 0 0 0 4.47 0.01 0.00 6.70 2001 1
Max 95.57 2.19 1 1 1 12.12 0.16 0.17 309.05 2013 12
where Rijt is return of company i in country j at time t. Rmjt is return of local
market index in country j at time t. Rwmt is return of global market index at time
t orthogonalized with respect to the local market index of the corresponding country
j. Zjt is daily change in trade-weighted exchange rate of country j at time t. We
estimate the parameters using observations from −300 days to −46 days of a given
event date. Given this market model and estimated parameters, we can define the
abnormal return ARijt of company i in country j on a given day t in the event window
as follows.
ARijt =Rijt − R̂ijt
=Rijt −
(
α̂i + β̂iRmjt + γ̂iRwmt + δ̂iZjt
)
(16)
where α̂i, β̂i, γ̂i, δ̂i denotes estimated parameters for company i from observations in
the estimation window. Our event window is from −10 days to +10 days around the
focal event date.
We run several event studies for the predefined six sets of events using Eventus, a
software that can take in custom stock and market data to run event study. WRDS
provides a convenient interface to execute Eventus. The main parameters we input
to Eventus are listed in Table 21 and Figure 26 graphically illustrates our estimation
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and event periods around an event date.
Table 21: Inputs used for Eventus
Parameters Our Settings
Model Custom Factor Model
Estimation Period End (EST) −46 days
Minimum Estimation Length (MINESTN) 10 days
Maximum Estimation Length (ESTLEN) 255 days
Estimate Method OLS
Event Period Start (PRE) −10 days
Event Period End (POST) +10 days







(Min: 10 days, Max: 255 days)
Figure 26: Event and Estimation Periods
Although Eventus is equipped with the capability to run event studies for U.S.
companies off the shelf using CRSP data, our purpose is to run event studies in a
multi-country setting which is not accommodated by default. We come up with a work
around solution to run multi-country event studies using Eventus by constructing data
files in a clever way. Eventus provides the custom factor model mode to which we
can supply linear factors. The problem is that each company return needs to be
estimated based on the corresponding market index. However, the equation to be
estimated cannot be modified depending on company attributes such as country.
As a work around, we constructed our dataset supplied to Eventus as shown in
Table 22. We assign unique serial integers s for each country for our analysis (U.S.:
0, South Korea: 1, Japan: 2, China: 3, Taiwan: 4). We then shift observations for
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each country by −30s years (i.e., 10,950 days = 365 days/year × 10 years). Since our
smartphone dataset spans for about 15 years, the spacing of 30 years clearly avoids
overlaps between countries after shifting. Event dates are shifted using the same logic
depending on the country membership of the focal firm.
Table 22: Illustration of Custom Factor Data File for Eventus
Country Date Factor1 Factor2 Factor3
US 1997-01-03 0.012477 −0.003246 0.001628
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
2013-12-31 0.003915 0.000155 −0.000807
KR 1967-01-16 0.003946 0.002258 −0.002410
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
1984-01-10 0.004525 0.002784 0.002032
JP 1937-01-26 0.004372 0.001444 0.003672
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
1954-01-19 0.006945 0.003020 −0.002397
CN 1907-02-01 −0.000068 0.006484 0.001916
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
1924-01-29 0.000802 0.002826 0.000667
TW 1877-02-13 −0.012863 0.001437 −0.001238
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
1894-02-06 0.010356 0.002810 0.000938
DE 1847-02-19 0.003689 0.004777 −0.003120
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
1864-02-15 0.006675 0.002632 0.002363
Once we obtain abnormal returns for ±10 days around event dates, we can ag-
gregate them in both temporal and cross-sectional ways. Such aggregated measures
are useful to summarize and report findings. Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is
simply the sum of all abnormal returns over the period of interest. CAR over the full





Cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) is computed similarly to CAR except
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for it averages cross-sectional average of abnormal returns called the average abnormal









Once we obtain abnormal returns from event studies and compute cumulative
measures, we can compute test statistics on the collections of CARs. We report three
test statistics: time-series standard deviation test (CDA), cross-sectional standard
deviation test (CSectErr), and generalized sign test (GSignTest). Each test is devel-
oped for different purpose. CDA computes a single variance estimate for the entire
selection of companies, thus does not take into account unequal variances across com-
panies but avoids cross-sectional correlation problems. CSectErr, on the other hand,
estimates variance for each day. Lastly, GSignTest considers only the sign of abnor-
mal returns and gives statistics for whether a significantly more number of companies
experience positive abnormal returns on a given day. For a detailed explanation, see
Cowan (2007).
After running cross-sectional statistical testings on the collections of CARs, we
first test whether product innovativeness has any correlations with CAR. We start
with parsimonious models including firm-fixed effects taking care of idiosyncratic firm
heterogeneity as follows.
CARijt =α + βProduct Innovativeness + γj + δt + θt + εi (19)
where i, j, t stands for product, company, event time, respectively. α is constant, γj
is firm-fixed effects, δt is year-fixed effects, and θt is month-fixed effects. εi is the
idiosyncratic error term per observation. As an extension to this base model, we add
firm-type (manufacturer, service provider, or platform developer) and event-type (an-
nouncement or release) dummies and interaction terms with product innovativeness.
We can then relate CARs to various firm-specific predictors of interest by replacing
firm-fixed effects with less restrictive country-fixed effects. Since our interest lies in
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relating product innovativeness with market reactions, innovation index is still the
main explanatory variable. Other firm-specific variables such as total assets, number
of employees, R&D intensity, and capital intensity are also used. We define the full
model as follows.
CARijt =α + βProduct Innovativeness + β
′X + γ′j + δt + θt + εi (20)
where all other notations remain the same with Equation (19) except for X being the
matrix of firm-specific control variables and γ′j being the country-fixed effects.
5.4 Results
5.4.1 Abnormal Returns to Manufacturers
We first examine abnormal returns that occur to manufacturers upon the announce-
ment and release of a smartphone. Figure 27 shows the CAAR accrued to manufac-
turers over the full event period from -10 to +10 days around the event date. The
solid blue line denotes CAAR around the announcement of products, while the dotted
red line around the actual release in the network of one of the service providers. After
day 0, the solid blue line clearly moves upward, while the dotted red line downward.
We can interpret that market reaction is generally positive when a manufacturer an-
nounces a new smartphone, while it turns negatively overall when people can actually
see can use the product released in the market. Note that the initial negative move-
ment upon release is delayed by 3 days from the event date, which implies that it takes
some time for the market to evaluate an actual product and digest how the general
public rates the product after using it. The magnitudes are symmetric between two
types of events (+0.87% for announcement and -0.81% for release), which suggests
that the positive impact measured at the announcement of a new product may not
as high as estimated unless disappointment upon release is not accounted for.
Table 23 shows the results from the statistical tests for CAAR on different subsets
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Figure 27: CAAR to Manufacturer
look into the narrow time window around the event date. Periods such as (-10,-2)
and (-1,0) are chosen to examine abnormal returns before the event, while others are
for post-event examination.
We start with the market reaction to the announcement events, the upper pane
of the table. CAAR between day 0 and day 1 is significantly positive (0.48%) on new
product announcement. Other post-event periods, (0,+3) and (0,+5), also indicate
positive market movements. Overall, the (-10,10) window summarizes CAAR over
the full 21 days as 0.87%. On the other hand, the market responds in the opposite
way when a new product is actually released in the service network as shown in the
lower pane of the table. We observe a small positive effect (0.11%) in the (-1,0)
window, followed by a strong and large negative reaction (-0.86%) in the (+2,+10)
window. In sum, we observe from the (-10,+10) window a significant negative impact
(-0.81%) on manufacturer firm value upon actual release of the new smartphone.
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Table 23: Statistical Tests on CAR to Manufacturer
Event Type Days N Mean CAR CDA CSectErr GSignTest
Announced (-10,-2) 351 0.12% 0.323 0.383 1.620†
(-1,0) 351 0.21% 1.16 1.006 0.766
(0,+1) 351 0.48% 2.667** 1.411† -0.089
(+2,+10) 351 0.28% 0.733 0.708 0.552
(0,+3) 351 0.38% 1.506† 0.973 0.872
(0,+5) 351 0.40% 1.299† 0.849 0.231
(-10,+10) 351 0.87% 1.507† 1.370† 1.193
Released (-10,-2) 362 -0.15% -0.421 -0.439 -0.651
(-1,0) 362 0.11% 0.628 0.622 1.874*
(0,+1) 362 0.04% 0.226 0.22 1.033
(+2,+10) 362 -0.86% -2.425** -2.242* -0.335
(0,+3) 362 0.19% 0.784 0.642 1.453†
(0,+5) 362 -0.34% -1.156 -1.032 0.086
(-10,+10) 362 -0.81% -1.498† -1.444† -0.861
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. †, *, ** denotes statistical
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
5.4.2 Abnormal Returns to Service Providers
Next, we turn to the impact of new product introduction the service provider side.
Figure 28 shows CAAR on service provider firm value. Unlike the manufacturer’s
case, the solid blue line is largely flat across all 21 days. The small peak that turns
positive on +2 day is eroded afterwards. On the release side, we detect more variation
than the announcement case. We discover a strong peak about a week (-6 day) ago
from the event date, followed by a negative movement occurs after the actual release
date and cancels out the initial positive effect. One possible reason why we do not see
any abnormal returns across the event window is that the market does not know the
carrier information at the time of announcement of the product. This is especially
the case when a new product is released on multiple carriers in a staged manner.
The iPhone is a good example of such a case. The iPhone was released only on
the AT&T’s network initially and on the Verizon’s network four years later. It is
not plausible that market at the time of announcement expected the iPhone would
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be eventually released on other service providers than AT&T. However, unlike the
iPhone, many usual phones are not specifically and exclusively targeting a certain
set of service providers in advance. In this case, it is more plausible to assume that
market just does not pay much attention to such a usual new product. In general,
it is understandable that service provider firm value is influenced only when a new









-10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Day
Announcement Release
Figure 28: CAAR to Service Providers
Table 24 shows the results of statistical testing for service provider firm value.
As we expected by inspecting Figure 28, the CAR is almost indistinguishable from
zero when a new smartphone is announced. The different time windows report the
mean CARs smaller in magnitude than the manufacturer case. We still obtain a few
significant observations from the generalized sign tests (GSignTest) for the post-event
windows: (0,+3) and (0,+5). Note that the signs of GSignTest and the other two test
statistics are opposite. During the post-event period, CAR tends to be positive but
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the mean value is insignificantly negative probably because of a few large negative
CARs in that time window.
For release-type events, we identify a strong positive (0.60%) bump during the
period of (-10,2). Although statistically insignificant, this positive impact in the
pre-event period is canceled out with negative impact over post-event periods. The
positive impact is about twice larger in magnitude than the negative impact, leav-
ing us with the overall positive impact (0.30%) for the period of (-10,10) window.
The significant positive abnormal returns before the release date suggests that the
information is leaked to the market about a week before the actual release.
Table 24: Statistical Tests on CAR to Service Provider
Event Type Days N Mean CAR CDA CSectErr GSignTest
Announced (-10,-2) 323 0.00% -0.015 -0.02 -0.012
(-1,0) 323 -0.07% -0.431 -0.412 0.545
(0,+1) 323 -0.05% -0.32 -0.322 0.322
(+2,+10) 323 0.09% 0.286 0.329 0.879
(0,+3) 323 -0.07% -0.33 -0.346 1.769*
(0,+5) 323 -0.12% -0.441 -0.485 2.103*
(-10,+10) 323 -0.02% -0.043 -0.048 0.545
Released (-10,-2) 268 0.60% 1.575† 1.482† 2.634**
(-1,0) 268 -0.07% -0.414 -0.41 0.8
(0,+1) 268 0.09% 0.521 0.512 -0.3
(+2,+10) 268 -0.31% -0.821 -0.986 -0.911
(0,+3) 268 -0.31% -1.219 -1.234 0.067
(0,+5) 268 -0.06% -0.184 -0.197 0.067
(-10,+10) 268 0.30% 0.519 0.478 1.167
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. †, *, ** denotes statistical
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
5.4.3 Abnormal Returns to Platform Developer
Lastly, we investigate the impact of new smartphone announcement and release on
the platform developer firm value. Figure 29 shows overall upward trends in CAAR
for platform developers when a new smartphone is both announced and released.
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We observe a positive bump about a week ahead of the release event. Such early
reactions are not detected for manufacturers. Also, overall positive reaction after
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Figure 29: CAAR to Platform Developer
Table 25 shows the results from statistical tests on the CARs to platform devel-
opers. Although upward patterns are identified from the figure, we do not have much
statistically significant result on the other hand. This insignificance is rather surpris-
ing as mean CAR clearly suggests positive abnormal returns for both announcement
and release events. It suggests that the standard errors of CARs are greater than
the mean value. That is, platform developers experience large positive abnormal re-
turns as often as large negative abnormal returns. In sum, based on the mean CAR,
the magnitude of positive market reactions upon announcement (0.48%) and release
(0.48%) is about a half of that of manufacturers.
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Table 25: Statistical Tests on CAR to Platform Developer
Event Type Days N Mean CAR CDA CSectErr GSignTest
Announced (-10,-2) 305 0.17% 0.526 0.521 1.298†
(-1,0) 305 0.06% 0.38 0.361 0.381
(0,+1) 305 0.17% 1.15 0.97 0.725
(+2,+10) 305 0.21% 0.677 0.624 -0.191
(0,+3) 305 0.13% 0.595 0.55 -0.077
(0,+5) 305 0.21% 0.812 0.7 -0.077
(-10,+10) 305 0.48% 1.003 0.941 0.954
Released (-10,-2) 356 0.25% 0.82 0.922 0.79
(-1,0) 356 0.03% 0.189 0.184 1.744*
(0,+1) 356 0.00% 0.01 0.01 -1.012
(+2,+10) 356 0.20% 0.659 0.677 -0.694
(0,+3) 356 0.21% 1.038 0.834 -0.164
(0,+5) 356 0.07% 0.292 0.264 0.684
(-10,+10) 356 0.48% 1.036 1.056 -0.164
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. †, *, ** denotes statistical
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
5.4.4 Relationship between Abnormal Returns and Product Innovative-
ness
The previous subsections examine abnormal returns for each type of firms and events.
In those subsections, we focus on whether abnormal returns are detected upon events
and the magnitude of such abnormal returns. We are interested not only in the
abnormal returns but also in the relationship between the abnormal returns and the
technological innovativeness of the corresponding product. Accordingly, we perform
regression analyses with CAR on the left-hand side and product innovativeness on
the right-hand side along with other control variables following Equation (19).
We construct the full sample dataset by merging all types of firms and events and
include dummy variables denoting firm types and event types. Platform developer
dummy and announcement event dummy form the baseline for estimation. Table 26
reports the overall effect of product innovativeness on CAR occurring from different
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Table 26: Overall Relationship between Product Innovativeness and CAR
1 2 3 4
Innovation Index 1.639** 1.816† 1.637** 2.149†
(0.501) (1.002) (0.500) (1.252)
(Dummy) Manufacturer 0.461 -0.851 1.030 -0.670
(1.182) (1.442) (1.273) (1.801)
Index × M 1.690 2.266
(1.136) (1.762)
(Dummy) Service Provider 0.597 1.167 0.362 1.988
(1.755) (1.989) (1.807) (2.168)
Index × SP -0.833 -2.043
(1.092) (1.450)
(Dummy) Released Event -0.568 0.183 -0.202 1.168
(0.481) (0.974) (0.693) (1.504)
Index × Released -0.835 -1.538
(0.937) (1.524)
(Dummy) M × Released -1.290 -0.623
(1.035) (2.110)
Index × M × Released -0.903
(2.207)
(Dummy) SP × Released 0.362 -2.056
(1.034) (2.285)
Index × SP × Released 2.769
(2.126)
Constant -23.436** -22.922** -23.728** -23.130**
(1.696) (1.799) (1.734) (1.871)
Firm-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-FE N/A N/A N/A N/A
N 1,965 1,965 1,965 1,965
F -stat 35.52 30.88 29.02 29.20
Adj. R2 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. †, *, ** denotes statistical
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
types of events. All models include firm-, year-, and month-fixed effects. Firm-
FE controls for unobserved heterogeneity in firm characteristics and idiosyncrasies.
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Year-FE is supposed to control for year-by-year time trends and month-FE is to
control for seasonality in product announcement and release. We find a strong positive
correlation between product innovativeness and abnormal returns in firm value. Based
on the estimate from Model 1 (1.639, p < 0.01), a new smartphone with one standard
deviation superior technical specifications compared to preexisting historical models
is associated with 1.639%p higher CAR over the event period. According to the
estimates of the interaction terms, we do not find a differential impact of product
innovation across different firm types or event types (Models 2-4).
To take a closer look at the differential impact of product innovativeness on differ-
ent types of firms and events, we run split-sample analyses. Instead of controlling for
firm types with dummy variables, we split the full sample into subsamples based on
the types of firms and events. Models 1-6 in Table 27 correspond to Cartesian prod-
uct combinations of three firm types (manufacturer, service provider, and platform
developer) and two event types (announcement and release). We find a significant
positive relationship between product innovativeness and CAR only for manufacturer
firm value. One thing to note is that such positive relationship exists not only for
the announcement events but also for the release events. Recalling that manufacturer
firm value suffers negative CAAR upon new product release overall, we find that such
negative impact is mitigated if the product is highly innovative in its technical speci-
fications. For other types of firms, products with higher innovativeness are associated
with higher CAR, although statistically insignificant.
The regression models so far include firm-FE, which prevents us from examin-
ing how firm characteristics are interacting with product innovativeness on CAAR.
As a next step, we want to understand how firm characteristics are interacting with
product innovativeness to influence CAR. Table 28 reports regression models with
firm characteristics such as total assets, capital intensity, R&D intensity, and number
of employees. Instead of the firm-fixed effects, we include the country-fixed effects
165
Table 27: Split Sample Analyses across Firm Types and Event Types
1 2 3 4 5 6
Manufacturer Service Provider Platform Developer
Announced Released Announced Released Announced Released
Innovation Index 4.814** 2.151† 0.171 0.478 1.522 1.074
(1.842) (1.200) (0.930) (1.367) (1.242) (0.948)
Constant -21.077** -2.319 -2.305 -4.719† -23.136** -3.028†
(3.507) (2.643) (2.558) (2.432) (2.512) (1.623)
Firm-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-FE N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
N 351 362 323 268 305 356
F -stat 16.83 1.47 2.37 2.96 25.11 3.87
Adj. R2 0.14 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.14 0.11
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. †, *, ** denotes statistical
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
to control for market-specific idiosyncrasies. Model 1 confirms our previous results
that product innovativeness is positively correlated with CAAR. Model 2 shows the
interactions between product innovativeness and various firm characteristics. It turns
out that firms with high R&D intensity have an even stronger association between
product innovativeness and CAAR. In other words, when firms with high R&D inten-
sity announces or released a new smartphone technologically superior to preexisting
models, the market reacts strongly positively to such news.
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Table 28: Firm Characteristics
1 2
Innovation Index 1.372** 6.780
(0.489) (4.420)
(Log) Total Assets -0.254 0.346
(0.328) (0.364)
Capital Intensity -8.384 1.790
(9.623) (13.602)
R&D Intensity 6.468 -27.937**
(6.007) (9.684)
# Employees 0.002 -0.006
(0.003) (0.005)
Innovation Index -0.609
× (Log) Total Assets (0.419)
Innovation Index -11.757
× Capital Intensity (10.613)
Innovation Index 44.252**
× R&D Intensity (11.951)
Innovation Index 0.008†
× # Employees (0.004)
(Dummy) Manufacturer -0.027 0.111
(0.774) (0.767)
(Dummy) Service Provider -0.219 -0.101
(0.695) (0.695)









F -stat 509.98 439.81
Adj. R2 0.08 0.09
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. †, *, ** denotes statistical
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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5.5 Discussion
5.5.1 Three Different Roles for a Single Product Category
We have examined abnormal returns to firm value of manufacturers, service providers,
and platform developers upon announcement and release of a new product. We have
also looked at the relationship between technological superiority measured by prod-
uct innovativeness and market reaction captured as abnormal returns. The results
clearly demarcate differential impacts of new product launches across different types
of companies involved in the NPD process. Table 29 summarizes the abnormal re-
turns we identify using event study. We discuss interpretation and potential reasons
for the asymmetric results across three different roles around the smartphone product
category.
Table 29: Summary of Identified Abnormal Returns
Manufacturer Service Provider Platform Developer
Announcement Strongly Positive Neutral Weakly Positive
Release Strongly Negative Neutral Weakly Positive
A strongly positive CAAR for the manufacturer upon announcing a new product
is rather expected and confirms our intuition. What is less obvious is a strong nega-
tive CAAR when the product is actually released into the market. Manufacturer firm
value is net positive throughout announcement and release events, but such positive
effects may be exaggerated if only announcement events are taken into account. Our
findings confirm that the market can be hyped and potentially overshoot when a new
product is announced particularly if technical specifications are breakthrough to the
current innovation landscape. When the product does not meet the expectation of
consumers, such a product launch may do more harm than good for the manufacturer
firm value because of disappointment after release. Furthermore, the positive corre-
lation between product innovativeness with CAR is amplified for the companies with
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high R&D intensity. Given that companies with high R&D intensity are likely to have
generated technologically superior products, the market reacts more enthusiastically
when these companies meet the expectation by launching uber products.
Nonexistence of significant CAAR for service providers upon new product launches
warrants further discussion. One possible reason is that the business model of service
providers is not much related to the product itself. Service providers derive revenue
primarily based on subscription fees for access to cellular networks. Unless the product
is clearly disruptive to the market like the iPhone as seen in Chapter 4, the market
does not seem to view that announcement and release of a new smartphone are
relevant to the core for the profitability of the service providers. Moreover, the main
service that network carriers provide to consumers is calling and data connection
service through cellular networks. For most smartphones, technological advancement
of the product itself is not a limiting factor for the quality of these cellular network
services.
On the other hand, platform providers are more closely dependent on the technical
specifications of smartphones. Both operating systems as a platform and third-party
apps available on the OS are bounded by various technological components built
into the product. Thus, we can expect that firm value of platform developers reacts
more sensitively to new product rollouts than that of service providers does. More
importantly, unlike network services provided by carriers, OS and apps are not device-
agnostic. Some apps available in one device are not necessarily available in other
devices. Thus, offering the platform through many device models to maintain network
effects is critical to the platform developer’s business. That may be why the market
reacts positively in general to the news that a new product will ship with a certain
OS.
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5.5.2 Differential Effects across Countries
We employ the multi-country event study as a central methodology for this chap-
ter. This approach operates on the premise that stock markets around the world are
connected and synchronized via instantaneous information propagation. It is worth
checking heterogeneous market reactions across different countries, particularly com-
paring U.S.-based companies to non-U.S. ones because our dataset can be nearly
bisected by the U.S. vs. non-U.S. dichotomy. We thus run another event study with
split samples of manufacturers divided by whether the company is listed on the U.S.
stock exchanges or on the non-U.S. markets. Figure 30(a) shows CAAR to U.S.





























Figure 30: Differential CAAR to Manufacturers by Country
For announcement events, we can see that the positive CAAR is mainly from
smartphones released by U.S. manufacturers. The firm value of the non-U.S. manu-
facturers is almost insensitive to announcement of new products. On the other hand,
the release of new smartphones negatively affects firm value of both types after the
event date. The difference is that the U.S. manufacturers accumulate positive abnor-
mal returns before the actual release of the product, while the non-U.S. manufacturers
suffer from successive negative abnormal returns all the way through the event pe-
riod. One possible account for this stark difference is U.S. manufacturers tend to
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launch new smartphones with relatively superior technical specifications. This ex-
planation relates this cross-country difference to the positive relationship between
product innovativeness and CAR.
5.5.3 Practical Implications
In this study, we identify three types of firms involved in the value proposition of
smartphones. In practice, however, the same firm may play multiple roles in the
triad. Apple is a representative example of such companies. Apple is a smartphone
manufacturer without doubt, but it is also a digital platform developer at the same
time. In a sense, it is specialized in building products that are seamlessly fused with
digital platforms. Moreover, Apple is the largest public company in terms of market
capitalization as of 2015, which suggests it has a disproportionate amount of influence
to the market by launching a new product or service. This chapter does not explicitly
consider the unique impact posed by giant companies like Apple.
This chapter also has relevant to individual investors managing portfolio focusing
on technology companies. The stock price of manufacturers in particular exhibit up
and down around a cycle of new product introduction. Investors may be able to reap
profits over the cycle of patterns. For managers working at individual companies
in the triad, our study in this chapter gives a warning that introducing premature
or below-average products may lead to severely negative impact on the firm stock
performance.
Three findings from this chapter are unexpected to us. First, the stock prices of
service providers and platform developers are statistically insensitive to new product
announcements and releases after all. As a result, we have weaker empirical results
in terms of statistical significance than we hoped for. We attributed this insensitivity
to different business models around the smartphone product category. Second, the
stock prices of companies in all three different roles react in different directions upon
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announcements and releases of new products. Lastly, we did not expect significant
negative reactions on the manufacturer stock prices after product releases.
5.6 Conclusion
The smartphone industry is a unique setting in that it involves three large industries
centered around a single product category. Manufacturer designs physical devices,
service provider provides cellular network services, and platform developer builds
software that runs the devices. Each type of firms reaps profit from this product
in three different ways. The manufacturer sells products based on one-time unit-
based pricing. The service provider generates revenue streams from subscription-
based fee structure. The platform developer takes cut from sales of third-party apps.
Depending on these different business models, new product launches have varying
implications on firm value across different types of firms.
We adopt a multi-country event study method to examine such differential impact
of new product launches around the announcement and release events. The smart-
phone industry is a plausible setting to apply event study because firms involved in
the industry are relatively large and in many cases publicly listed on a stock market
around the world. We find that strong positive abnormal returns to the manufacturer
firm value upon announcement, but we also find strong negative abnormal returns
when the product is actually released. The positive effect is boosted and the negative
effect is mitigated when the product is technologically superior to preexisting mod-
els. The positive impact of product innovativeness on firm value is mainly channeled
through companies with high R&D intensity. Thus, our findings have stronger impli-
cations to companies with high R&D intensity than to those with low R&D intensity.
Service provider firm value turns out to be unrelated to new product launches and
platform developer firm value is affected weakly positively.
Our study contributes to the mobile ecosystem literature and the new product
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announcement marketing literature in two ways. First, we are first to systematically
analyze differential impacts of new product introduction on firm value depending on
firm types in the industry triad. Second, we measure the impact of not only an-
nouncement events but also release events. The literature on new product launching
strategy has accumulated theories and empirical evidences that warn of potential
harm of not meeting market expectations when a new product is introduced to the
market. We quantify the market hype about a new product by comparing the two
sequential stages in the typical new product rollout process to provide a more com-
prehensive view around the practice of new product introduction. Lastly, one minor
contribution is that we document and apply event study in a multi-country setting
in the NPD context. Up to date, a majority of NPD studies involves U.S. companies
only. We expect multi-country perspective will be increasingly important as NPD
collaboration becomes global. We hope our study can provide a guide for the future
studies investigating firm value implications of NPD practice involving companies
from all around the world.
As an extension of this study, we see three immediate research opportunities in the
future. In this chapter, we intentionally focus on the smartphone product category
excluding basic or feature phones because the manufacturer-service provider-platform
developer triad is the central configuration we want to investigate. Future studies may
consider comparing our study with market reactions to the introduction of basic or
feature phones. Another possibility is to look deeper into the development of OS
and examine how releases of new updates to the software platform affect firm value.
Lastly, many web sites collect user reviews about various aspects of a product. Such
reviews may contain information about the qualitative and nuanced characteristics
of the product not captured in technical specifications. We can take into account
consumer evaluations and reviews and use rating scores or text analytics to capture
the qualitative aspects. Thus, associating how the consumer market perceives a new
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RECONSTRUCTING BUSINESS ECOSYSTEM USING
CLUSTERING AND SIMULATION
6.1 Introduction
The previous three chapters examined the interaction between product innovativeness
and interfirm relationship with a close look into the mobile handset industry. In this
chapter, we zoom out to the macroscopic context similar to the one portrayed and
analyzed in Chapter 2. While Chapter 2 primarily focused on developing efficient
visualization methods and quantification schemes to help corporate decision makers
understand the transformation of the business ecosystem in which they are embedded,
this chapter proposes a computational framework that focuses on making inferences
and developing ecosystem models in a data-driven way. If the methods in Chapter 2
are about a system that enhances the understanding on the as-is of the surrounding
ecosystem transformation, the methods in this chapter are about a system that envi-
sions the underlying mechanisms and the to-be state of the enterprises (Rouse, 2005;
Basole et al., 2013b).
Today, business and innovation activities are increasingly embedded in the global
network of organizations and people. Complexity that stems from this network struc-
ture hinders corporate decision makers’ sight and understanding of the surrounding
network environments. One source of complexity is the limited visibility into the net-
work. Surveying the partners or suppliers that have direct relationships with the focal
firm is relatively easy, compared to being aware of the partners of the direct partners.
For instance, the disastrous flooding in Thailand in 2011 disturbed the global hard
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drive industry for years. Not to mention those hard drive manufacturers having facto-
ries in Thailand, all companies using storage devices across industries were inevitably
affected by the disaster. Vigilance on the status and activities of indirect partners as
well as direct partners is required in the face of a variety of risks. Recent advances in
visualization help disentangle the complexity and improve visibility into the network
structure (Basole and Bellamy, 2014; Park and Basole, 2015).
Another source of complexity arises due to the increased variety of modes of inter-
dependence among nodes in the network. The fact that there are typically so many
independent business entities that interact in multiple, and often conflicting, ways
is an enormous source of complexity (Rouse, 2000, 2008). This may result in many
types of poorly understood and poorly managed interactions. For example, Samsung
Electronics supplies memory semiconductor to Apple. At the same time, their flag-
ship mobile handsets compete head-to-head in the consumer electronics market. Even
worse, these relationships evolve over time rather rapidly. Facing the complex modes
of interdependence and the rapidly changing business environment, the ecosystem per-
spective has become a prevailing view for business intelligence (Moore, 1997; Iansiti
and Richards, 2006). Recent studies have addressed the challenges from network com-
plexity by adopting and applying visualization principles extensively (Basole, 2009).
Chapter 2 also contributes to the decision-making literature in an attempt to cope
with complexity using visualization. Understanding and even anticipating structural
changes of the surrounding ecosystem is particularly important for firm innovation
(Bellamy et al., 2014).
While the visualization approach helps decision makers by providing a visual men-
tal model of complex ecosystems, simulation is another approach to mitigate unin-
tended negative consequences of decision-making in a complex environment. Park
et al. (2012) demonstrate that simulations can help decision makers deal with the
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complexity by enabling timely exploration of likely outcomes of decisions before de-
ploying them. Moreover, if simulation methods are informed by data mining meth-
ods leveraging abundant data sources, such a computational framework can support
evidence-based decision-making practices.
In this chapter, we propose a computational framework incorporating inference
and prediction capabilities using both data mining and simulation approaches. To
abstract and infer data-driven models of relationship formation behavior of firms,
we interpret firm strategy as a sequence of decisions (Basole et al., 2015a) and we
implement a sequence-mining engine adapted from Hilton et al. (2015). Based on
the identified strategy clusters, we build an agent-based simulation model that inves-
tigates how organizational learning impacts the structural evolution of the business
ecosystem. In addition to the interfirm alliances data used in Chapter 2, we collect
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) data to enhance the coverage of interfirm activities
in the ICT ecosystem.
We identify five distinct strategy profiles using the cluster analysis. We com-
pare clustered profiles against the traditional standard industry classification (SIC)
scheme. We find that there are significant crossovers between the data-driven classi-
fication and the industry segments based on the SIC codes, which suggests that com-
panies in the same industry segment exhibit diverse behavioral patterns in forming
relationships with other firms. Inspecting the top companies in each cluster provides
face validity confirming our prior knowledge on existing large companies. The study
in this chapter makes timely contributions to the decision-making and corporate strat-
egy planning research and practice in the era of data abundance by demonstrating
and providing a methodology that leverages the power of observational data.
The rest of the chapter unfolds as follows. Section 6.2 reviews the methodologi-
cal literature on cluster analysis and organizational simulation. Section 6.3 describes
our data sources and presents our analysis methods. Section 6.4 reports our findings
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from clustering and simulation results. Section 6.5 discusses implications of our find-
ings and Section 6.6 concludes the chapter and suggests directions for future work
extending this chapter.
6.2 Literature Review
6.2.1 Clustering and Sequence Mining
Cluster analysis has been an integral method used in many fields including including
sociology (Zachary, 1977), bioinformatics (Li and Godzik, 2006; Huang et al., 2010; Fu
et al., 2012), physics (Girvan and Newman, 2002), and applied mathematics (Porter
et al., 2009) to name only a few. The importance of cluster analysis is ever-increasing
because of two main reasons. One is the proliferation of network data thanks to
advancement in social network services. The network science is gaining significant
attention in academic circles from natural sciences to social sciences (Barabási, 2003;
Watts, 2004) alike. The other reason is that the amount and variety of data are
getting bigger and wider, so it becomes harder and more critical to make generalizable
insights out of “big data” than ever. Cluster analysis provides a succinct summary
of groupings of large data that is beyond usual human cognition.
Cluster analysis is an unsupervised task of assigning a set of objects into homoge-
neous groups. Depending on the number of groups in demand, the nature of clustering
tasks can be divided into the following two kinds of problems. In the first case, the
number of clusters is known when clustering is carried out. Graph partitioning is one
line of research that fits this type of clustering. One of the most well known exam-
ples of such tasks that arise in computer science is assigning to multiple processors a
number of interdependent tasks represented as a graph (Aguilar and Gelenbe, 1997).
Since the number of processors is likely fixed and known, a clustering algorithm that
cannot consider the predefined number of clusters is of little practical use in this con-
text. Community structure detection, on the other hand, pursues a slightly different
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goal in the task of clustering. In this setting, the number of communities is unknown
beforehand. Not only grouping nodes precisely but also determining the number of
meaningful clusters latent in the graph structure is of great importance in this class
of problems. Social network analysis falls into this category (Newman, 2006).
Indeed, many clustering algorithms have been proposed in the data mining so-
ciety. Among them is hierarchical clustering, k-means clustering, distribution-based
clustering (Ester et al., 1996), and so forth. They are commonly based on the sim-
ilarities or closeness among nodes. Han et al. (2011) and Gan et al. (2007) provide
a thorough survey on details of the algorithms. Conceptually, in view of the number
of clusters in demand, two approaches are possible in cluster analysis: agglomerative
and divisive methods. Agglomerative methods start from grouping nodes with the
highest similarity and repeat the process with recalculated similarities among groups
and nodes. The agglomerative approach is more intuitive than the divisive approach,
so it was developed earlier and has been widely used. Agglomerative hierarchical
clustering is a representative example of this approach when the true number of clus-
ters is unknown. This approach needs to be followed by an additional critical step
that involves a decision criterion for the optimal number of clusters (Jung et al.,
2003). k-means clustering groups nodes in a similar way with a predefined number
of centroids. In contrast, divisive methods—possessing inherent rules for the opti-
mal number of clusters—repeat cutting the network successively until no subdivision
of the network yields gain. One of the methods in this avenue is modularity-based
clustering proposed by Newman (2006). Modularity measures how precise a division
of the network is against a graph with edges placed at random and has played an
essential role in detecting community structures in networks. One drawback of this
method is that the random modularity measure employs a fixed global model, which
assumes that each node can be linked to any other nodes of the network whether
they are large or small regardless of the geometric structure of the network. Thus,
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it cannot adjust the level of resolution or the scale on which the modularity measure
relies. Although taking less inputs from users is a desirable property of an algorithm
in general (Hilton et al., 2015), there can be situations where users want to adjust
a certain set of intuitive parameters. Park and Lee (2014) is a clustering algorithm
based on information-theoretic dependence measure that possesses flexibility by tak-
ing in the scope parameter that adjusts the level of scale for parsing the geometric
structure of the network.
The methods reviewed so far assume static network data that does not incorporate
the time dimension. In practice, there is a growing need for clustering a sequence of
data points. An exemplary case is genome sequencing in bioinformatics. Since the hu-
man genome project (Collins, 1998; Collins et al., 2003), a series of sequence clustering
algorithms was developed that specialized in identifying common sequences and com-
paring them against a library of sequences (Li and Godzik, 2006; Huang et al., 2010;
Fu et al., 2012). Clustering sequences of events has been an important problem in the
business domain as well. For instance, customer purchase history is a good example of
sequence data. Agrawal and Srikant (1995) developed a sequence clustering algorithm
that can be used to identify frequently occurring transaction patterns and Pei et al.
(2001); Mortazavi-Asl et al. (2004) improved the efficiency of the algorithm. These
sequence clustering methods focus on finding frequent subsequences largely ignoring
the underlying transition model. Hilton et al. (2015) developed a model-based clus-
tering method that estimates transition matrix and inter-arrival time matrix. They
applied the method to a large patient visits dataset and successfully classify five pro-
files of patients based on their event sequences. Their method allows characterization
of each profile using estimated transition and inter-arrival time matrices.
While sequence clustering is actively used in many fields, the literature on business
ecosystem and interfirm alliance mostly relies on predefined firm classification schemes
such as the SIC code. Although the SIC scheme provides a hierarchical classification
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of firms based on industry that they are operating in, it fails to capture specific firm
behavior. For example, it is possible that firms in software industry exhibit similar
behavior in alliance formation with firms in digital hardware manufacturing, but these
two industries are distant to each other in the SIC scheme. Considering interfirm
alliance sequence can be conceptualized as gene of the company1, we can complement
the standard way to cluster firm strategy by applying established sequence clustering
methods to the business ecosystem context. This chapter primarily adopts Hilton
et al. (2015) and apply their method to the business ecosystem formation context.
6.2.2 Organizational Simulation
Modeling organizations as a collection of agents has a long history in the complex
adaptive systems research (Prietula et al., 1998; Rouse and Boff, 2005). This approach
has been widely accepted in various fields including organization science (March, 1991;
Anderson, 1999; Burton, 2003; Burton and Obel, 2011) and operations management
(Nilsson and Darley, 2006; Pathak et al., 2007; Nair et al., 2009). In a complex
adaptive system, even when agents are prescribed with simple behavioral rules that
only consider local areas around, we can observe certain emergent macro patterns in
the system level. By virtue of enhanced computing power these days, this agent-based
modeling combined with computer simulation has generated many exciting examples
of system-level patterns from minimal rules governing individual behavior.
Computer simulation has long been used to emulate the behavior of physics-based
systems (Gould and Tobochnik, 1995). Ranging from molecular biology (Levitt, 1976;
Dror et al., 2012) to astronomical systems (Bertschinger, 1998), simulation provides a
cost-efficient way to predict the future state of a system given a certain set of inputs.
In addition to cost efficiency, simulation is often the only feasible way for systems
that do not lend themselves well to analytical solutions or field experiments. Human
1http://entsci.gatech.edu/genome/
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systems with little or limited adaptive agent behavior also greatly benefit from sim-
ulation methods. Manufacturing systems and queueing systems are good examples
and simulation is widely used and accepted in modeling such systems. However, or-
ganizational simulation became a promising feasible method for modeling social and
behavioral phenomena not long ago. March (1991) is a groundbreaking study that
uses agent-based simulation to elicit the trade-off between exploration and exploita-
tion. Following him, simulation methods become widely adopted in organization
science (Anderson, 1999; Burton, 2003; Burton and Obel, 2011). For recent stud-
ies that use organizational simulation, Kane and Alavi (2007); Rahmandad (2008);
Posen and Levinthal (2012); Jain and Kogut (2014) provide excellent examples of
such studies.
Organizational simulation as a research method is facing a big driver for change
these days because of abundant organizational network data accumulated and avail-
able from social network services. Since March (1991), organizational simulation
has mostly relied on prescriptive parametric assumptions and normative behavior of
agents in setting up the experiments. A large gap emerges between normative mod-
eling assumptions and empirical observations. To address this challenge, researchers
particularly from computer science start bridging the gap by proposing simulation
approaches that incorporate observational data. One class of problem that often re-
quire considering empirical observation for feeding simulation is link prediction in
networks. In practice, link prediction algorithm can be used to recommend a new
relationship in social network services (Liben-Nowell and Kleinberg, 2007). Leskovec
et al. (2008) take one step further to propose a method to replicate a social net-
work using a link-generating process informed by observed network data. Recent
studies, Tomasello et al. (2013, 2014, 2015), apply this approach to organization and
innovation management studies. Using a simulation model informed by the observed
interfirm alliance network and patent data, they investigate how firm’s position in
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a network is related to innovation output. In light of research domain and method,
their studies are closest to our study in this chapter.
Our organizational simulation model is informed by the results from the cluster-
ing algorithm developed by Hilton et al. (2015). Their method estimates transition
probabilities and inter-arrival times, so our simulation model is in essence to simu-
lation continuous-time Markov chains (CTMC). Gillespie (1976) develops one of the
first algorithms to simulate CTMC called the Stochastic Simulation Algorithm (SSA).
The basic idea is the combination of discrete-time Markov chains (DTMC) and ex-
ponential holding times. This simulation method has been adopted for a wide range
of fields including gene sequencing (McAdams and Arkin, 1997) as much as CTMC
is a useful tool to model various systems. Banks et al. (2007) provide a detailed and
technical review on various methods for simulating CTMC including the SSA and
other variants such as CTMC incorporating jump processes.
6.3 Data and Methods
6.3.1 Data Source
Our data comes from Thomson Reuter’s SDC Platinum (SDC). SDC provides curated
data of interfirm alliances and M&A events by scanning various primary sources such
as SEC filings. It is the standard data source used for interfirm alliance research
(Schilling, 2009). It uses CUSIP as the primary company identifier.
The SDC alliance data contains primary SIC code, location (city, state, country),
business description of participating companies as well as announced date. Most of
the alliances are between two companies, while some alliances involve more than two
participants. The joint venture is a special type of alliances. Each alliance is marked
whether or not it is a joint venture activity. Along with the joint venture flag, many
other binary flags indicate subtype of the alliance. The subtypes include strategic al-
liance, R&D alliance, marketing alliance, technology transfer alliance, manufacturing
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and supply alliance, and licensing alliance.
The M&A database consists of two parts. One part contains domestic activities
in the U.S., while the other part records international M&A activities. Each M&A
record lists acquiring firm and target firm. Other data fields include primary SIC
code, location, business description for both firms. Regarding the acquisition ac-
tivity, SDC provides the announced date and the percentage shares acquired after
the transaction. Following Jakobsen and Meyer (2008), we break down the M&A
activities into three groups based on the shares involved in the transaction. Full
acquisition is defined when 95% or more shares were acquired after the transaction.
Transactions involving less than 10% of shares are classified as portfolio investment
activities. Other transactions that fall in between the two thresholds are defined as
partial acquisition.
We filter companies by primary SIC code to retrieve companies in the ICT ecosys-
tem. We use the 58 SIC codes listed in Table 1 in Chapter 2. We follow the same
industry segment classification used in Chapter 2 classifying 58 SIC codes into 5 seg-
ments: (1) hardware components, (2) hardware equipment, (3) software, (4) telecom-
munications, and (5) media. In order to observe longitudinal behavior of companies in
forming relationship, we retrieve 25-year long data spanning from 1989 to 2014. This
filtering criteria produced 179,021 total events that consist of 69,026 alliances and
109,995 M&A activities. We identify 116,993 unique firms from this merged dataset.
6.3.2 Sample and Variables
The population data contains 116,993 unique companies involved in 179,021 events,
which means that on average a firm has less than two (1.53) relationship-forming ac-
tivities. The majority of companies in our dataset appears only once in either alliance
or M&A event. Since we are interested in the sequence of activities of companies in
the ecosystem, we further narrow down our sample to include those having appeared
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in at least five different events. This leaves us with 6,392 companies in the final
sample.
Table 30 shows the summary statistics of our sample. On average, a company
forms 13.07 relationships with others. 75% of those relationships are either alliance
or full acquisition. Partial acquisition and joint venture account for 15% and 7%,
respectively. We rarely observe pure portfolio investment activities (3%). Among
alliance or joint venture events, most of them are strategic alliances. Other subtypes of
alliance and joint venture are evenly distributed between 30-40%. About 35% and 38%
of interfirm relationships are cross-border and cross-segment. We define cross-border
activities as at least one participating firm has a different nationality to another.
Cross-segment activities are similarly defined depending on segment membership of








, ∀i ∈ {ST,RD,MK,TT,MF,LS} (22)
Equation (21) is the formula for the main relationship type ratios and Equation (22)
is for the subtype ratios specifically for alliances and joint ventures. See Table 30 for
the two-alphabet acronym for each type and subtype.
6.3.3 Clustering
Our analysis process starts with clustering firms based on their relationship formation
behavior. We directly adopt the model-based clustering method proposed by Hilton
et al. (2015). The method uses a Markov renewal process (MRP) to model the
sequence of events. Each event belongs to a certain type and a sequence is considered
one realization of the underlying process. Using the MRP framework, their algorithm
aims to estimate transition probability and inter-arrival time matrices as well as
bundle observations into homogeneous groups.
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Table 30: Summary Statistics
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total Frequency 6,392 13.07 27.81 5 1,044
Ratio of Alliance (AL) 6,392 0.30 0.29 0 1
Ratio of Joint Venture (JV) 6,392 0.07 0.14 0 1
Ratio of Full Acquisition (FA) 6,392 0.45 0.32 0 1
Ratio of Partial Acquisition (PA) 6,392 0.15 0.21 0 1
Ratio of Investment (IV) 6,392 0.03 0.07 0 0.83
Ratio of Strategy (ST) Alliance or JV 6,392 0.83 0.29 0 1
Ratio of R&D (RD) Alliance or JV 6,392 0.32 0.41 0 1
Ratio of Marketing (MK) Alliance or JV 6,392 0.42 0.41 0 1
Ratio of Tech Transfer (TT) Alliance or JV 6,392 0.40 0.41 0 1
Ratio of Manufacturing (MF) Alliance or JV 6,392 0.33 0.42 0 1
Ratio of Licensing (LS) Alliance or JV 6,392 0.33 0.42 0 1
Ratio of Cross-Border Relationship (CB) 6,392 0.35 0.30 0 1
Ratio of Cross-Segment Relationship (CS) 6,392 0.38 0.29 0 1
Moreover, Hilton et al. (2015) considers the censored nature of observational se-
quence data. Since we observe birth and death of companies using our dataset.
Nonexistence of a relationship after a certain point of time does not necessarily mean
that the firm died. Thus, our sequence data is censored before and after the ob-
servation period from January 1, 1989 to December 31, 2014. To take care of this
problem, their algorithm adds two additional states: left censor (LC) and right censor
(RC). Before running the algorithm, we pad each sequence with LC and RC at the
beginning and at the end, respectively. By definition, every sequence starts with LC
and ends with RC. Since no transitions come back to LC and go out from RC, the
matrices estimated by the algorithm have the structure portrayed in Figure 31.
They use maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) for each element of matrices.
For the transition probability from state si to state sj, the MLE is the number of
transitions from si to sj divided by the total number of transitions out of si. For the
inter-arrival time from si to sj, the MLE is the sum of observed transition times from
si to sj divided by the total number of transitions from si to sj.












Figure 31: Matrix Structure for Parameter Estimation
iteration, further division is performed only if such a division increases BIC. BIC
shown in Equation (23) represents the trade-off between better fitting the data and
complexity of the model to avoid over-fitting problems. The equation for BIC is as
follows.
BIC(M) = l(M)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Model fit
− b · |M | · log(R)/2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Penalty for model complexity
(23)
where M is the model under evaluation and R is the number of firms. We introduce
one new constant parameter b to adjust for the different size of the state space for
the following reason. We construct the state space by taking the Cartesian product
of three dimensions: primary type of relationship, subtype of certain relationship,
cross-border/within-border relationship, and cross-segment/within-segment relation-
ship. We have five primary types of relationship (alliance, joint venture, full acqui-
sition, partial acquisition, and portfolio investment) and alliance and joint venture
relationship types have eight subtypes (strategy, R&D, marketing, technology trans-
fer, manufacturing, licensing, multiple subtypes combined, and unspecified). As a
result, the size of our state space is 76 (= ((2× 8) + 3)× 2× 2). It is about ten times
greater than the number of states in Hilton et al. (2015) that has six states. Since the
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number of parameters to be estimated is proportional to the square of the number
of states, the model size is about 100 times greater than Hilton et al. (2015). This
results in over-penalization for model size because of the penalty term is proportional
to the model size as shown in Equation (23). Except for this minor adjustment,
our clustering method precisely follows Hilton et al. (2015). In short, the clustering
algorithm can be summarized as follows.
Step 1. Start with the null hypothesis that all firms belong to a single cluster. Compute
MLEs for transition probability and inter-arrival time matrices. Compute the
BIC0 based on the MLEs which serves as a reference point for model selection.
Step 2. Compute potential partitions that divide the population in two based on the
Kullback-Leibler (KL) distance. The KL distance quantifies the distance be-
tween two distributions. For each partition, compute the BICA assuming that
the partition is applied. These are BIC scores for alternative hypotheses that
dividing the population is a better model.
Step 3. Choose the partition that maximizes BIC. Run the expectation maximization
(EM) algorithm to obtain BIC∗A.
Step 4. If BIC∗A > BIC0, apply the partition to divide the population. Repeat this
procedure for each clustered population until no further divisions can be made.
Once the clustering algorithm produces labels for each firm, we run multinomial
logistic regressions to identify key factors that characterize each cluster. The response
variable is cluster membership. We use the largest cluster as the baseline group or




=αk + βkXi + εi (24)
where Yi is the cluster membership of firm i, k is the focal cluster number, K is
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the baseline cluster number, and X stands for the matrix containing the explanatory
variables.
6.3.4 Simulation
After we estimate transition probability and inter-arrival time matrices for each clus-
ter, we simulate the ICT ecosystem formation process as CTMC. We modify the
SSA laid out in Banks et al. (2007) to accommodate the organizational learning per-
spective we are interested in. In simulation, each firm is populated with one of the
clustered profiles. As the simulation progresses, each firm learns from prominent
benchmark firms based on network centrality measures at different speed. In short,
our simulation procedure can be summarized as follows.
Step 1. Populate given number of firms (n) and assign a cluster profile, rate of relation-
ship formation, industry segment, and geographic region from empirical joint
distribution. Set simulation time t = 0.
Step 2. Initialize all firms starting at the LC state. Draw τi from the exponential
distribution with rate λi for all i. Determine the destination state from the
transition probability matrix. The event partner is chosen based on segment
and geographic region.
Step 3. Keep updating the new time t = t+ 1 until there exist some firms whose τi < t.
For those firms, make the transition and draw ξi from exponential distribution
with rate λi. Update τi = τi + ξi.
Step 4. For every time tick, each firm learns from the benchmark chosen from the
predefined rule (e.g., firms with high degree) at the predefined speed. Learning
only occurs when the benchmark firm has a higher rate than the focal firm.
Step 5. Repeat Steps 3-4 until t ≥ tstop or all firms reach the absorbing state, the RC
state.
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Each simulation run is populated with 1,000 agents. We run the simulation 100
times for each combination of input parameters on organizational learning and take
the average to summarize the outcome. Each replication run simulates the ICT
ecosystem for 9,125 days (= 365 days × 25 years).
We set up simulation experiments along with three varying parameter dimensions.
The first dimension is the composition of agents based on the clustered profiles. Since
we identified five behavioral profiles, the composition is a vector of five elements that
sum to one. We start with the original profile composition and vary the composition
to see if what happens when the ICT ecosystem consists of only a single profile.
We can then associate the identified characteristic of clustered profiles with macro
patterns of the ecosystem. The second parameter dimension is the way firms choose
their benchmark to learn from. We start with the most straightforward benchmark
criteria: the prolificity of firms. In other words, firms mimic behavior from those
that have the most interfirm activities in the ecosystem. For each simulation time
step, the simulation sort all firms based on the number of their established interfirm
relationships in descending order. The parameter governs the cutoff threshold for the
list. For example, if the threshold is set to be 0.1, it means each firm benchmarks
from a company in the top 10% most prolific companies list. If it is set to be 0,
then no firms make adjustments in their rate and transition probabilities. The third
parameter dimension is the organizational learning speed. We assume that each firm
learns from the chosen benchmark in a linear way every time tick. The baseline
speed of learning is the reciprocal of the total time span (=1/9125) multiplied by
the difference between the focal firm and the benchmark firm. The learning speed
parameter is a multiplier to the baseline speed. Firms learn two elements from the
benchmark: interfirm relationship formation rate and transition probability matrix.
Thus, firms become homogenized over time through the mimicry mechanism specified
in this simulation. Table 31 summarizes our parameter space.
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Table 31: Simulation Experiment Setup
Parameters Values
Profile Composition {Original Composition, Profile 1 Only, Profile




{0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1}
Learning Speed {0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1}
6.4 Results
6.4.1 Clustering
We identify five clusters based on transition behavior. The clustering algorithm we
use is a iterative divisive method, so clusters emerge as a tree structure. Figure 32
illustrates the hierarchical structure identified by the clustering process. As explained
earlier, the algorithm starts with the null hypothesis that puts all firms into a single
cluster. Each cluster node is divided in two iteratively until it cannot be broken down
further.
Five final clusters are denoted in larger font at the bottom of Figure 32. Each
cluster is labeled from 1 through 5. One thing to note is that the identified clusters
contain firms rather disproportionately than evenly. Cluster 1 includes more than 75%
of all firms in our sample, while Cluster 4 has only 1%. Note that this tree represents
the number of firms assigned to each cluster before running the EM algorithm. The
final cluster assignment has slightly more even distribution across five profiles.
Before abstracting defining features and characteristics of the identified clusters,
we survey the top companies in each cluster. Table 32 shows the top 10 companies
for each of five clusters. The number in parenthesis next to the company name
means the number of alliances or M&A relationship that the company formed in
our sampling time frame between 1989 and 2014. Cluster 1 contains some of the
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Figure 32: Hierarchical Structure of Clustering Process
companies in the cluster is about 11.69 relations during the tenure, which is not
particularly high. On the contrary, companies in Cluster 5 formed about four times
more relations than those in Cluster 1 on average. We can infer that Cluster 5 consists
of a focused set of highly active companies exclusively, while Cluster 1 is rather
generic. Looking through the lists, we can also spot association between identified
clusters and industry segments. 7 out of top 10 companies in Cluster 2 have “media”,
“advertising”, “communications”, or “broadcasting” in their names, which suggests
Cluster 2 covers many media companies. Cluster 3 contains renowned software or
information service companies such as Google, Yahoo, America Online, and Adobe.
We do not recognize notable companies in the top 10 list of Cluster 4 except for
Sharp. Lastly, Cluster 5 includes prominent hardware manufacturers such as Cisco,
Samsung, Nokia, and Compaq.
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Table 32: Top 10 Companies for Each Cluster
Rank Cluster 1 (N = 4, 555) Cluster 2 (N = 431) Cluster 3 (N = 1, 053)
1 IBM Corp (1,044) 21st Century Media Newspaper (32) Texas Instruments Inc (240)
2 Microsoft Corp (838) LookSmart Ltd (24) America Online Inc (178)
3 Hewlett Packard Co (601) Perficient Inc (23) Yahoo! Inc (169)
4 Motorola Solutions Inc (459) Transcontinental Media GP (20) Google Inc (162)
5 Intel Corp (362) Lamar Advertising Co (19) Thomson Reuters Corp (143)
6 AT&T Corp (355) Ebix Inc (18) SAP AG (139)
7 Siemens AG (344) Cox Radio Inc (17) Adobe Systems Inc (136)
8 Hitachi Ltd (315) Arch Communications Group Inc (17) Unisys Corp (132)
9 Toshiba Corp (299) Davel Communications Inc (16) Computer Sciences Corp (123)
10 Digital Equipment Corp (289) Nexstar Broadcasting Group Inc (16) Symantec Corp (108)
Avg. Freq. 11.69 (27.85) 6.84 (2.96) 15.52 (19.60)
Rank Cluster 4 (N = 108) Cluster 5 (N = 245)
1 Sharp Corp (83) Cisco Systems Inc (361)
2 SFX Broadcasting Inc (28) NEC Corp (354)
3 American Radio Systems Corp (18) Sun Microsystems Inc (318)
4 TsentrTelekom (18) Oracle Corp (234)
5 Monradio Srl (16) Novell Inc (233)
6 Pulitzer Newspapers Inc (14) Samsung Electronics Co Ltd (223)
7 InfoCure Corp (13) Telefonaktiebolaget LM (201)
8 Triathlon Broadcasting Co (13) CA Inc (189)
9 Capstar Broadcasting Partners (13) Nokia Oyj (174)
10 EZ Communications Inc (12) Compaq Computer Corp (168)
Avg. Freq. 7.96 (8.05) 41.36 (55.96)
In Chapter 2, we used industry segments to categorize firms operating in different
domains. The clusters we identify in this chapter are based on observed link for-
mation behavior, thus our clustering results can complement the traditional industry
classification scheme. The previous analysis about the similarity between clusters and
segments is based on qualitative assessments of the top companies in each cluster.
The next step is to consider all companies to see how our clustering results are cor-
related with industry segments. Table 33 shows the cross-tabulation results between
cluster assignments and industry segments. Percentages are computed by column
so that each column sum equals to 100%. In order to find which segment is over-
or under-represented in each cluster, we need to make row-wise comparisons of the
percentage values.
Inspecting Table 33 mainly confirms the insights gained from the analysis using
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top companies for each cluster. Media companies have a strong presence in Cluster 2.
26.91% of firms in Cluster 2 are in the media segment, while media companies take
up only 20.04% overall. Similarly, Cluster 3 overly represents software companies and
Cluster 5 has excessive hardware equipment manufacturing enterprises. In addition,
the cross-tabulation reveals the character of Cluster 4. We know from the clustering
tree diagram (Figure 32) that Cluster 4 branches out from Cluster 3. Its contents,
however, represent a significant amount of media companies excessively above the
average. Cluster 1 is quite generic in that it has a similar composition of segments
compared with the average distribution. In sum, there are some indications that
companies in the same segment form interfirm relationship in a similar way, but there
are considerable numbers of crossovers across different segments.
Table 33: Cross Tabulation between Clusters and Segments
Cluster Number
Segment 1 2 3 4 5 Total
1 475 20 29 1 15 540
Hardware Components 10.43% 4.64% 2.75% 0.93% 6.12% 8.45%
2 678 11 45 3 41 778
Hardware Equipment 14.88% 2.55% 4.27% 2.78% 16.73% 12.17%
3 1,995 224 663 44 71 2,997
Software 43.80% 51.97% 62.96% 40.74% 28.98% 46.89%
4 505 60 140 21 70 796
Telecommunications 11.09% 13.92% 13.30% 19.44% 28.57% 12.45%
5 902 116 176 39 48 1,281
Media and Others 19.80% 26.91% 16.71% 36.11% 19.59% 20.04%
Total 4,555 431 1,053 108 245 6,392
We then move on to characterize clusters in a more general term. Since our
clustering algorithm is based on the transition patterns, it is imperative to examine
the transition diagram in order to characterize each cluster profile. One practical
problem to visualize the transition diagrams is that we have 78 states in total including
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LC and RC states, which is significantly greater than the number of states visualized
in Hilton et al. (2015). Although we have 25 years of data, estimating transitions
between 78 states may pose several technical challenges. We can possibly reduce the
state space by ignoring the subtypes of alliance and joint venture. However, the trade-
off is that we also lose additional information for inferring firm behavior if we drop
the subtypes. In this chapter, we decide to utilize maximal information by proceeding
with 78 states.
The inflation of the state space is largely due to the Cartesian product of different
types of states: main link type, subtype, and cross-border/cross-segment. Decom-
posing a transition matrix to reduce the number of states is possible only when the
Markov chain is lumpable (Kemeny and Snell, 1960). Since it is nearly impossible for
an empirically estimated transition matrix to satisfy the lumpability condition, we
take a different approach to generate the transition diagrams. Instead of decompos-
ing the full transition matrix, we estimate smaller-size transition matrices given the
clustering results. In the data level, we reduce state space and estimate the corre-
sponding transition matrix in a similar way for the full transition matrix. As a result,
we obtain three transition diagrams for each cluster profile.
Appendix Section A.1 shows all diagrams. Each diagram has two gray nodes: LC
and RC. All transitions start from LC and end at RC. Line thickness is rendered based
on stratification of transition probabilities. Following Hilton et al. (2015), thick lines
denote probabilities greater than or equal to 0.33, normal solid lines denote prob-
abilities greater than or equal to 0.2, and dashed lines denote probabilities greater
than or equal to 0.1. We do not visualize probabilities less than 0.1 except for tran-
sitions coming out from LC or transitions going into RC. Cluster 1 joins the ICT
ecosystem via either alliance or full acquisition with similar probability (40% and
31%). Full acquisition is the primary entry point for Clusters 2-4. Cluster 5 relies
heavily on joint ventures to establish presence in the ICT ecosystem. We do not find
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significant differences in transitions across different subtypes. This is largely because
M&A relationship does not have subtype information. In terms of cross-border and
cross-segment relationship, Cluster 5 is the only cluster that pursues cross-boundary
relationship, while all other clusters tend to anchor around within-border and within-
segment relationship.
Table 34: Predictors for Cluster Membership
Cluster = 2 Cluster = 3 Cluster = 4 Cluster = 5
(Log) Total Frequency -1.186** 0.783** -0.342 1.283**
(0.190) (0.057) (0.343) (0.095)
Ratio of Alliance -5.386** -1.147** 6.295** -1.990**
(1.010) (0.250) (1.976) (0.441)
Ratio of Joint Venture -12.116 -4.039** 34.262** 0.324
(8.703) (0.825) (9.533) (0.648)
Ratio of Full Acquisition 2.448** 0.367* 6.572** -2.247**
(0.365) (0.185) (1.077) (0.419)
Ratio of Investment -8.511** -2.640** -26.870** 0.365
(2.030) (0.738) (9.713) (0.792)
Ratio of Strategy Alliance or JV 1.729 0.214 23.311* 0.382
(1.827) (0.253) (10.180) (0.417)
Ratio of R&D Alliance or JV 0.229 0.353† 2.564* 1.484**
(0.428) (0.210) (1.065) (0.339)
Ratio of Marketing Alliance or JV -0.229 -0.257† 2.105† -0.589*
(0.296) (0.146) (1.168) (0.264)
Ratio of Tech Transfer Alliance or JV -0.232 -0.308† -1.953† -1.607**
(0.354) (0.169) (1.108) (0.426)
Ratio of Manufacturing Alliance or JV -0.041 -0.194 -0.210 -1.253**
(0.454) (0.177) (0.909) (0.369)
Ratio of Licensing Alliance or JV 0.660 0.473** 3.375* 1.265**
(0.406) (0.172) (1.412) (0.359)
Ratio of Cross Border Relationship -7.187** -0.946** -10.484** 0.701**
(0.636) (0.137) (2.835) (0.251)
Ratio of Cross Segment Relationship -1.579** -1.364** -1.777** 0.983**
(0.252) (0.165) (0.599) (0.307)
Constant -0.803 -2.193** -34.408** -5.620**
(1.909) (0.298) (10.237) (0.464)
Note: Cluster = 1 is the base outcome. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
†, *, ** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
In addition to inspecting the transition diagrams, we use multinomial logistic
regressions to significant factors that determines cluster assignments. Table 34 shows
196
the regression results. As Cluster 1 is the most generic profile, we use it as the
baseline. The ratio of partial acquisition and the ratio of non-specified subtype are
omitted due to multicollinearity.
First of all, active and prolific companies have a higher chance to belong to Cluster
3 or 5, while firms with only a small number of interfirm relations likely belong to
Cluster 2. In terms of main link types, Cluster 3 is characterized by aversion to joint
ventures, while Cluster 4 is extremely geared toward joint ventures. Both Clusters
2 and 3 rely on full acquisitions with little emphasis on alliances or portfolio invest-
ments. The regression analysis also reveals the characterization on subtypes. Cluster
4 is the only cluster that focuses on strategic alliances. Clusters 4 and 5 actively
engage in R&D and licensing activities. The difference between the two is marketing
collaborations. Cluster 4 joins relatively more marketing alliances, while Cluster 5
does not participate much in marketing, tech transfer, or manufacturing collaboration
activities. Lastly, only Cluster 5 forms cross-border and cross-segment relationship
actively, which confirms the finding from examining the transition diagrams.
Table 35: Cluster Labels based on Company Description
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5
manufactur (0.0236) manufactur (0.0072) manufactur (0.0157) manufactur (0.0038) telecommun (0.0053)
servic (0.0105) llc (0.0040) equip (0.0060) station (0.0029) domest (0.0039)
provid (0.0094) louisiana (0.0032) servic (0.0057) found (0.0028) cellular (0.0033)
internet (0.0076) compani (0.0026) found (0.0056) also (0.0020) fix (0.0032)
equip (0.0071) inc (0.0024) internet (0.0055) base (0.0019) cabl (0.0031)
semiconductor (0.0053) locat (0.0024) locat (0.0052) solut (0.0018) internet (0.0028)
product (0.0053) vega (0.0023) provid (0.0039) compani (0.0018) telephon (0.0027)
wholesal (0.0043) tennesse (0.0023) compani (0.0038) softwar (0.0017) manag (0.0026)
devic (0.0040) kentucki (0.0023) compon (0.0034) radio (0.0016) latin (0.0024)
found (0.0039) nevada (0.0023) semiconductor (0.0030) wholesal (0.0016) telephoni (0.0021)
6.4.2 Organizational Simulation
Followed by the clustering results, we report simulation results. We start with the
variation in the composition of agents in the ICT ecosystem. Figure 33 shows the
comparison of the key network metrics over the different compositions. The baseline
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Table 36: Cluster Labels based on Deal Synopsis
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5
form (0.0416) form (0.0583) manufactur (0.0122) form (0.0198) interest (0.0150)
inc (0.0336) provid (0.0544) enter (0.0079) provid (0.0175) us (0.0150)
agreement (0.0333) agreement (0.0493) agre (0.0076) allianc (0.0167) stake (0.0148)
unit (0.0314) inc (0.0485) ltd (0.0076) strateg (0.0163) mil (0.0141)
allianc (0.0310) allianc (0.0480) ventur (0.0075) servic (0.0162) own (0.0139)
strateg (0.0304) servic (0.0479) sign (0.0072) unit (0.0155) termin (0.0134)
market (0.0299) strateg (0.0472) disclos (0.0070) inc (0.0151) name (0.0134)
provid (0.0290) unit (0.0463) detail (0.0070) agreement (0.0133) telephon (0.0132)
term (0.0282) term (0.0456) joint (0.0068) term (0.0126) major (0.0126)
develop (0.0279) market (0.0429) agreement (0.0063) corp (0.0112) cabl (0.0124)
group is the original composition identified by the clustering algorithm (Cluster 1:
76%, Cluster 2: 6%, Cluster 3: 13%, Cluster 4: 1%, Cluster 5: 3%). Each subse-
quent bar labeled as Profile 1 through 5 shows the case where the entire ecosystem
is composed of companies that belong to the particular cluster. This way, we can
validate whether the simulation model works as intended by examining the results
of each case agree with our observations on the clustering results. The top-left chart
shows the average degrees of the simulated ecosystems. Since the average degree is
a measure of the propensity for forming relationships, this chart exhibits the same
pattern we can see in the average number of interfirm relationships for each cluster
reported in Table 32. The top-right chart shows the average clustering coefficient.
Despite the small numbers of relationships, ecosystems simulated solely from Profiles
2 and 4 exhibit high tendency to form cliques. However, the small world quotient
(average clustering coefficient divided by average shortest path length) shown in the
bottom-left chart presents a slightly different story. Profile 5 is the most small-world-
like network and immediately followed by Profile 4. Considering that companies in
Profile 4 do not form many relationships, their relationships self-organize into a small
world network. The last chart in the bottom-right corner shows the average ratio
of cross-border-cross-segment relationship. It displays a similar trend of the average
degree chart, while Profile 1 has a relatively high ratio of cross-boundary activities
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and Profile 2 has a relatively low ratio. The relationships formed in the simulated
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Figure 33: Simulation Results with Ecosystem Composition Varied
Next, we move on to the benchmark selection criteria parameter. Figure 34 show
total number of interfirm relationships, average degree, average clustering coefficient,
and average path length for the simulation ICT ecosystem on varying benchmark
ranges. The thick solid line is the average value from 100 replications and the dash
lines denote 95% confidence interval. The benchmark range means the cutoff ratio for
selecting a benchmark for each firm. For example, if the benchmark range is 0.1, each
firm learns from the benchmark chosen randomly from the top 10% prolific firms.
The learning speed is fixed at the constant ratio 1/9125 of the difference between the
focal firm and the benchmark firm so that it takes all 25 years for the focal firm to
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catch up the benchmark firm. Firms learn both the rate of relationship formation











































Figure 34: Simulation Results with Benchmark Range Varied
We find that the total frequency of interfirm relationships and the average degree
significantly increase as the benchmark range moves from 0 to 0.1. Note that, when
the benchmark range is 0, it means that no firms learn from each other. Instead, they
form relationships based on their characteristics drawn from initialization. Thus, the
simulated ICT ecosystem becomes dense when firms are actively benchmarking the
interfirm activities of the top companies. However, as the scope of benchmark becomes
wider, the density decreases as it is less likely the benchmark target company is highly
prolific. As a result, the average path length of the simulated ecosystem shows an
inverse pattern to the average degree chart. On the other hand, the average clustering
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coefficient does not seem affected by the varying benchmark range. Since a measure
of small world network is the average clustering coefficient divided by the average
shortest path length, it suggests that the ecosystem becomes more small-world-like
when constituent firms mimic the top benchmark firms. We do not find significant
differences in relationship types over this parameter space.
Lastly, we report the simulation results with the learning speed parameters varied.
Figure 35 shows the same ecosystem-level network metrics to the previous figure. The
learning speed of 0 means that firms do not learn from each other and the learning
speed of 1 means that every firm learns from the chosen benchmark at the full speed
of 1/9125. As each firm’s learning speed increases, the total number of relationships
and the average degree increase as we can expect from the formulation. However, the
increase is not as drastic as the case where we vary benchmark selection range param-
eters. The average clustering coefficient is insensitive to parameter variation as before
and the average path length chart shows an inverted pattern of the average degree
chart similar to the previous figure. In this case, we do not find statistically significant
patterns in the proportion of different types of alliances and M&A activities.
An interesting finding arises from another measure. Figure 36 shows the time to
saturation against the learning speed parameters. The time to saturation is a measure
of how long it takes until each simulation run has all agents arriving at the absorb-
ing state, RC. Once an agent reaches RC, it no longer forms interfirm relationships
because RC by definition stands for the right edge of the observational time frame.
Our simulation stops after 25 years of simulation time steps or all firms are in the RC
state. Therefore, the mean value of the simulation time window is around 9,125 and it
slightly decreases as firms learn faster from each other. However, increase in standard
deviation or uncertainty of saturation time is rather unexpected. It suggests that as
firms speed up their learning process, the ecosystem as a collective body arrives at










































Figure 35: Simulation Results with Learning Speed Varied
occur much more frequently than the baseline model without organizational learning.
6.5 Discussions
When reporting the clustering results, we find that some companies belong to a
cluster that primarily contains companies in other industry segments. For example,
Texas Instruments belongs to Cluster 3, but the cluster contains many software or
Internet companies such as Google and Yahoo. It is an exception in this list of top
Cluster 3 companies. This type of observations leads us to formulate a hypothesis
that the way Texas Instruments forms relationship follows the patterns that most
software companies do. It may indicate that Texas Instruments is trying to embed
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Figure 36: Time to Saturate with Learning Speed Varied
other companies of interest in the clustering results and formulate hypotheses about
those companies around their relationship formation behavioral patterns.
To date, the SIC codes serve as a method to categorize companies based on the
industry in which they are operating. This type of inference informed by data mining
methods shown in this chapter can complement the existing classification of firms
and shed light on how we can derive firm types in a data-driven way. This novel
way of grouping firms based on their behavior is particularly important when the
industry boundaries are blurred. Chapter 2 previously shows that the ICT ecosystem
already contains a significant amount of cross-segment alliances, which character-
izes convergence of the ecosystem. As traditional industry boundaries fade away, it is
increasingly important to complement the SIC codes relying on the hierarchical struc-
ture of industries with methods that accommodate emergent categorizations derived
from the data.
For the simulation study in this chapter, we can further make several refinements.
First, we can sophisticate the benchmark selection criteria. In this chapter, the
benchmark is chosen based on degree centrality. But, there are different measures
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that gauge the prominence or importance of a node in a network such as between-
ness centrality or eigenvector centrality. For instance, betweenness centrality measure
captures structural holes bridging different parts of a network and eigenvector cen-
trality highlights highly influential nodes in a network. We can build in different
objectives for each firm and each firm chooses a benchmark depending on the given
objective—whether it wants to become a gatekeeper or a highly influential player.
Learning speed is another dimension we can further refine. The current model
applies a uniform learning rate to all companies in the simulation. Since compa-
nies have different capabilities and resources to adapt to the changing environment
or transform into the to-be state, we can build in heterogeneous learning speed for
companies in the simulation. Moreover, we can make the learning curve take a more
sophisticated form such as S-shaped curves. In the current model, we use the learn-
ing curve that approaches the benchmark following an exponential curve because we
multiply a constant to the difference between the focal firm and the benchmark firm.
Finally, we can further investigate the interaction between the benchmark selection
range parameters and the learning speed parameters. Combining variations in learn-
ing target and learning rate, we can draw response surfaces in the three-dimensional
space similar to Park et al. (2012).
6.5.1 Practical Implications
The clustering and simulation framework proposed in this chapter mainly serve the
purpose of researchers interested in understanding firm behavior types and ecosystem
dynamics. These inquiries pertain to the ecosystem-level analytics. However, the
managers of individual companies embedded in the ecosystem may be more inter-
ested in performing what-if and scenario-based analysis that generates direct insights
on what strategic stances their companies should take. There are a few conceptual
and technical challenges to extend the current simulation framework in order to serve
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the purpose of the managers of individual companies. The events that individual
company managers are interested in are relatively minuscule compared to the en-
tire ecosystem dynamics. Thus, simulation results generated from various scenarios
may not yield significant variations in output analysis. Moreover, simulation stud-
ies require replications. Aggregating and visualizing a large number of replications
from the perspective of a single firm is another technical challenge. Representing and
visualizing simulation models and results are active research areas to date.
This chapter focuses on the formation process of interfirm relationships including
alliance and M&A. In the real-world innovation landscape, most innovation activi-
ties and results are incremental to previous state-of-the-art technologies. However,
disruptive innovation occasionally happens and it radically changes the competitive
and technological landscape. Georgantzas and Katsamakas (2007) and Georgantzas
(2011) use the system dynamics modeling approach to build a simulation-based and
scenario-driven decision support framework. Their approach could potentially inform
the development of the clustering and simulation framework proposed in this chap-
ter. One difference is that our simulation approach inherently spans multiple levels
of organizational interactions incorporating an array of simulation methods ranging
from agent-based modeling and intra-firm process modeling to inter-organizational
strategic and economic modeling.
From developing these clustering and simulation framework, we learned that data-
driven approach to characterize firm strategies would have enormous potential to
transform corporate and policy decision making processes. During the past decades,
we have built a large body of normative thought framework for describing why and
how firms behave in a certain way based on the game theory. Such an approach
often lacks consideration of specific context that a company or an organization is
embedded in. Our data-driven approach can fill the gap between the current strategic
management literature and the reality of corporate decision making.
205
6.6 Conclusion
This chapter proposes a generative workflow using clustering and organizational sim-
ulation methods for understanding the relationship between organizational learning
and ecosystem formation. The clustering algorithm identifies five distinct behav-
ioral clusters and estimates transition matrices using the maximum likelihood esti-
mator and the expectation maximization algorithm. The clustered profiles significant
crossovers with predefined industry segments based on the SIC codes. The estimated
transition matrices based on the observational data of interfirm alliances and M&A
inform the simulation model that emulates the ICT ecosystem. The simulation model
provides a framework to test the effect of organizational constructs—organizational
learning in this chapter—on the system-level structure.
This chapter makes timely contributions at this time of data abundance and pri-
macy. A methodological contribution lies in bridging data mining methods with sim-
ulation methods. So far, data mining and machine learning algorithms have grown
significantly as empirical methodologies standalone. On the other hand, simulation
has the advantage of giving a clear mental model for complex phenomena. We argue
and demonstrate that connecting these two distinct methodologies can generate great
synergy for decision-making and strategy planning practices. Another contribution is
that we demonstrate a data-driven identification of industry structure without rely-
ing on predefined classification schemes. The SIC scheme is still serving its purpose
by providing an exhaustive view over the economy, but it is too rigid to portray the
fast-paced ICT ecosystem faithfully. Now that industry boundaries are blurred and
distinction between competitors and collaborators is soften, a data-driven classifica-
tion based on revealed behavioral patterns can greatly complement the traditional
mental model of industry structure for the purpose of strategic planning.
The most promising aspect of the study presented in this chapter is the method-
ological richness. This chapter employs the model-based approach for both clustering
206
and simulation, while previous chapters mostly rely on empirical methods. Thus, this
methodology is highly extensible for other research subjects. For example, we can
apply the same clustering algorithm to categorize new product development practices
of different firms and build a simulation framework.
There are several directions to which we consider expanding this chapter. One im-
mediate and foreseeable future work is to streamline the workflow between clustering
and simulation. We run clustering and simulation separately in this chapter, although
they are linked via manual curation. Streamlining these two steps allows automatic
setup for simulation based on data mining results and will make this computational
framework more accessible and adaptable to other settings. Furthermore, we can even
implement a visual and interactive system once the workflow is integrated. Such a
visual analytics system that promotes data-to-simulation process will become indis-
pensable for scenario planning as data-driven decision-making is widespread. Lastly,






This dissertation starts with describing the network structure and the transformation
trajectory of the ICT ecosystem using network visualization in Chapter 2. Sprinkled
across five broad industry segments and 58 SIC codes is a myriad of companies that
constitute the ICT ecosystem. Our network visualization approach vividly narrates
the status quo of the ecosystem and its path of transformation over the past two
decades. We show that the ICT ecosystem underwent a turbulent period around
the year of 2000. This chapter operationalizes the concepts of coopetition, conver-
gence, and complexity in visual terms by dichotomizing alliance relationship into
cross-industry or within-industry.
Zooming in from a macroscopic portrait of the ICT ecosystem, we start relating
interfirm relationship to technological innovation in new product offerings in Chapter
3. We particularly focus on the smartphone industry because of the special feature
that smartphone as a product offers for our research. The functional value of a smart-
phone is fully realized only with the availability of capable operating systems. These
days, operating systems serve as digital platforms bridging third-party application
developers and users. Previous research on technology management studying how
product innovation evolves over time largely relies on the search space model hinging
on the concepts of the breadth and depth of search activities. Digital platforms are
not present in the traditional models and this dissertation attempts to close the rift
between the classical search space innovation model and the reality where products
are increasingly enabled by various types of digital platforms.
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Smartphone not only involves digital platforms but also requires network carriers
in order to function properly. In the end, a smartphone is a phone before a hand-
held computing device. Chapter 4 turns to the relationship between product device
manufacturers and network service providers. In the mobile phone industry, service
providers serve as a distribution channel for physical devices. Since it is unlikely
for consumers to multihome network carriers, a service provider has the gate keeping
power to its customer base. In this setting, sourcing a technologically superior product
can be an effective way to leverage products to increase customer base from the
service provider’s perspective. We focus on the industry-wide sensational event of the
introduction of the iPhone as a research setting. Using the difference-in-differences
estimator, we show that service providers can implicitly solicit products with better
technical specifications by introducing a strong product on its network and increasing
competition among the manufacturers. In other words, manufacturers run as hard as
possible to stay the same on the service provider’s network. Furthermore, like other
systems with self-sustaining feedback loop, this increased level of competition does
not dissolve even after the original impetus is removed.
After looking at manufacturer-platform and manufacturer-service provider rela-
tionships and how these relationships coevolve with product innovation, we attempt
to observe three firms side by side altogether in Chapter 5. The focus of this chap-
ter is to quantify differential impact of new product introduction to each of three
types of companies involved in the value creation process. Using multi-country event
study, we identify strong positive financial implication of new product introduction
for the manufacturer. The positive impact is amplified when the product is tech-
nologically superior to preexisting models. The stock price of companies assuming
other roles such as service providers and platform developers seems generally insen-
sitive to new product introduction and technical specifications. Contrasting between
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announcement and release events, we also show that the market is overexcited at an-
nouncement and disappointed after the actual release of the product. Our findings in
this chapter suggest that better product does not necessarily benefits involved parties
equally.
We then step back again to the macroscopic viewpoint in Chapter 6, where we
model and infer firm behavior in forming relationships with others. In Chapter 2, firms
are categorized into bins predefined by the standard industry classification scheme.
We first cluster relationship-forming behavior by estimating transition matrix and
interarrival time matrix with maximum likelihood estimator and expectation maxi-
mization. Using the identified clusters, we run organizational simulations informed
by the organizational learning theory of adapting behavior.
These five chapters show the ICT ecosystem and in-depth analysis particularly
around the smartphone industry with alternating macroscopic and microscopic lenses.
We hope this line of research extends the thought framework on how to conceptualize
the activities in the ICT ecosystem and furthers the understanding of the interaction
between interfirm relationships and product innovation.
7.2 Generalizability to Other Business Ecosystems
Although the research context of this dissertation is the ICT ecosystem, our approach
and methods employed in this study are readily applicable to other business ecosys-
tem settings. To illustrate the generalizability of our approach, we take as examples
two immediately related business ecosystems—the entrepreneurial ecosystem and the
third-party application developer ecosystem. Both ecosystems are closely related to
the ICT ecosystem and they have distinctive features different from the ICT ecosys-
tem.
Let us first examine the differences of these example ecosystems from the ICT
ecosystem, and then consider how our approach is relevant and generally applicable to
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these example ecosystems. While the ICT ecosystem contains large and established
firms, the entrepreneurial ecosystem has de novo companies, angels, and venture
capital investors. The relationship that a startup company seeks differs from the
relationship that an established firm looks for. A startup company may need a series
of funding, while an established firm searches for partners to jointly embark on a new
project or a new market. The third-party application developer ecosystem differs from
the ICT ecosystem in that it primarily focuses on the software development activities.
The application developers are critically influenced by the strategic decisions of the
platform companies and the success of the platforms is also greatly affected by the
level of participation from the developer community. The platform companies and
the application developer ecosystem are in a symbiotic relationship.
Despite these contrasts, researchers can use the approach and methods employed
in this dissertation to study dynamics of these two adjacent ecosystems. Since ecosys-
tems can be represented as a network, we can use the network visualization and
quantification approach demonstrated in Chapter 2. For the entrepreneurial ecosys-
tem network, nodes would represent not only de novo firms (portfolio companies)
but also venture capitalists (investors) and individual entrepreneurs (people). Edges
would mean relationships including investment, employment, and competition. Such
a network can be modeled and visualized as a tripartite graph (Basole et al., 2015c).
The application developer ecosystem network would contain companies and individual
developers building third-party applications running on one of the digital platforms.
In that case, edges would mean the platform choice of application developers.
The relationship formation behavioral patterns in both ecosystems can also be
similarly modeled using the clustering and simulation framework shown in Chapter
6. For the entrepreneurial ecosystem, we can infer different types of de novo firms’
strategy in terms of relationship formation, new product and service development, and
achieving funding rounds. Based on the data-driven inferences of firm behaviors, we
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can develop another simulation framework that, for example, helps decision making on
investment and acquisition. For the application developer ecosystem, the clustering
method shed light on how developers launch and patch new and existing applications.
The simulation approach may help understand the emergent interaction patterns
between the platform companies and the application developer community.
This subsection argues for generalizability of our approach using example ecosys-
tems that are closely connected to the ICT ecosystem. However, our methods and
approaches can inform researchers interested the business ecosystems in other rela-
tively distant fields such as supply networks in the automobile industry or hierarchical
networks of financial institutions.
7.3 Future Opportunities
As we progress on the research presented in this dissertation, we realize that mix-
and-match of methodology and research domain may yield several immediate future
research opportunities extending our work. We provide a few examples of future
research opportunities by applying a method used in one domain to another domain.
1. Simulation for the search space with digital platforms
Chapter 3 theorizes how firms achieve an innovative solution in the techno-
logical search space and empirically investigates how the existence of digital
platform interacts with the search process for innovation. Based on this empir-
ical analysis, we can further solidify our proposed conceptualization of search
space with digital platforms by formulating a constrained NK model. Initially
inspired from biological evolution process, the NK model takes into account
interaction among different technological dimensions. We can revise the model
to be adapted to the digital platform era by imposing digital platforms as con-
straining factors that enables and disables a certain combination of technologies.
Using a similar simulation approach used in Chapter 6, we can strengthen our
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newly proposed search space theory.
2. Unsupervised clustering to identify product family based on technical
specifications
Product family is currently defined by manufacturer-specified predecessor-successor
relationship. Chapter 3 extends the definition of product family by incorporat-
ing the main CPU chipset and the internal project codename, but it is still
a top-down approach. A complex product evolves in an organic way just like
companies form relationship with each other seen in Chapter 6, so we should
be able to identify time-series evolution of product family clusters using unsu-
pervised clustering method used in Chapter 6. Similar to what Chapter 6 could
replace the externally-imposed standard industry classification based on top-
down approach, this data-driven identification of product family could inform
the general evolution pattern of product technical specifications.
3. Advanced visual analytics for cluster analysis and scenario explorer
Chapter 6 identifies the inherent community structure in interfirm alliance and
M&A network. Although the chapter looks for clustered behavior for overall net-
work, we can break down such behavioral clusters by time. Once time-varying
clusters are identified, we can visualize the time-series changes in clusters us-
ing network visualization methods shown in Chapter 2. Using such a visual
analytics system, we can allow decision makers to visually inspect how indi-
vidual companies move along with the evolving industry ecosystem. Decision
makers are also allowed to visually explore alternative scenarios when policy
intervention is applied from the individual company perspective.
4. Expanded investigation on broader ICT ecosystem
The working definition of the ICT ecosystem used in this dissertation usually
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involves corporations that are sufficiently large to form alliances or make ac-
quisitions. Particularly, we focus on three types of companies: manufacturer,
network service provider, and platform developer. The ecosystem definition has
shifted to embrace not only large corporations playing different roles and de-
pendent on each other but also small and peripheral players such as third-party
application developers. The nature of interfirm relationship also moves from
formal alliance and M&A to informal and casual relationship such as service
linkage through APIs. Using the methodology of this dissertation, we can ex-
pand the subject of the investigation into a broader ICT ecosystem which will
provide a more complete view on the ICT ecosystem. Moreover, we can apply
our approach to other types of business ecosystems. Entrepreneurial ecosys-
tems composed of start-up companies, venture capital investors, and talents are
excellent exemplary contexts to apply our methodology for analysis.
We believe that data-driven business analytics from the ecosystem perspective
continue to thrive for conceiving and developing better decision support systems. We




A.1 Clustered Profile Transition Diagrams
This section contains a collection of clustered behavior profiles represented as tran-
sition diagrams from Chapter 6. Each figure contains three subfigures which show
transition diagrams in three decomposed state spaces: main relationship type (al-
liance, joint ventures, full acquisition, partial acquisition, and portfolio investment),
sub relationship type (strategy, R&D, marketing, technology transfer, manufactur-
ing, and licensing), and border-segment type (within border within segment, within
border cross segment, cross border within segment, cross border cross segment). Av-
erage time for each transition is in parenthesis next to the corresponding transition
probability. Node abbreviations are as follows.
• LC: Left Censor, RC: Right Censor
• Alli: Alliance, JV: Joint Venture, Full: Full Acquisition, Prtl: Partial Acquisi-
tion, Inv: Portfolio Investment
• Strat: Strategy, R&D: R&D, Mkt: Marketing, Tech: Technology Transfer, Mfg:
Manufacturing, Lic: Licensing
• WBWS: Within Border Within Segment, WBCS: Within Border Cross Seg-
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Figure 41: Clustered Strategy Profile 5
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Suárez, F.F., Utterback, J.M., 1995. Dominant designs and the survival of firms.
Strategic Management Journal 16(6), 415–430.
243
Subramanian, U., Raju, J., Zhang, Z., 2013. Exclusive handset arrangements in the
wireless industry: A competitive analysis. Marketing Science 32(2), 246–270.
Sundgren, N., 1999. Introducing interface management in new product family devel-
opment. Journal of Product Innovation Management 16(1), 40–51.
Swink, M., 2000. Technological innovativeness as a moderator of new product design
integration and top management support. Journal of Product Innovation Manage-
ment 17(3), 208–220.
Teece, D.J., Rumelt, R., Dosi, G., Winter, S., 1994. Understanding corporate coher-
ence: Theory and evidence. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 23(1),
1–30.
Teich, J., 2012. Hardware/software codesign: The past, the present, and predicting
the future. Proceedings of the IEEE 100(Special Centennial Issue), 1411–1430.
Thompson, J., 1967. Organizations in action. Transaction Publishers.
Tichy, N., Devanna, M., 1986. The transformational leader. Training & Development
Journal .
Tiwana, A., Konsynski, B., Bush, A.A., 2010. Research commentary platform evolu-
tion: Coevolution of platform architecture, governance, and environmental dynam-
ics. Information Systems Research 21(4), 675–687.
Tomasello, M.V., Napoletano, M., Garas, A., Schweitzer, F., 2013. The rise and fall
of r&d networks. Working Paper , 34.
Tomasello, M.V., Perra, N., Tessone, C.J., Karsai, M., Schweitzer, F., 2014. The
role of endogenous and exogenous mechanisms in the formation of r&d networks.
Scientific reports 4, 5679.
Tomasello, M.V., Tessone, C.J., Schweitzer, F., 2015. A model of dynamic rewiring
and knowledge exchange in r&d networks. Working Paper , 18.
Trajtenberg, M., 1990. A penny for your quotes: Patent citations and the value of
innovations. RAND Journal of Economics 21(1), 172–187.
Tsai, W., 2002. Social structure of “coopetition” within a multiunit organization: Co-
ordination, competition, and intraorganizational knowledge sharing. Organization
Science 13(2), 179–190.
Tufte, E., Graves-Morris, P., 1983. The visual display of quantitative information.
Tushman, M.L., Anderson, P., 1986. Technological discontinuities and organizational
environments. Administrative Science Quarterly , 439–465.
Utterback, J., Meyer, M., 1993. The product family and the dynamics of core capa-
bility. Sloan Management Review 34(3), 29–47.
244
Utterback, J.M., Abernathy, W.J., 1975. A dynamic model of process and product
innovation. Omega 3(6), 639–656.
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